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# A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION

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# A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION

BY

WILLIAM SAMUEL LILLY

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“ Wer in der Weltgeschichte lebt,  
Dem Augenblick sollt' er sich richten ?  
Wer in die Zeiten schaut und strebt,  
Nur der ist werth, zu sprechen und zu dichten.”

GOETHE.

*SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED.*

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DEAR LADY BLENNERHASSETT,

In your *Frau von Staël* we have *the* contribution of German historical scholarship to the Centenary of 1789. The following pages, in which I have endeavoured to test the ideas underlying the French Revolution by the "moral laws of nature and of nations," may, perhaps, serve, in some sort, to supplement your admirable volumes. However that may be, your kind permission to write your name here, enables me not only to pay a tribute to personal friendship, but to acknowledge the debt of gratitude laid upon me, as upon all scientific students of history throughout the world, by your masterly and monumental work.

Most sincerely yours,

W. S. LILLY.

ATHENÆUM CLUB, LONDON.

June 20th, 1889.



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TO THE SECOND EDITION.

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My Publishers inform me that the thousand copies of this work, printed a few months ago, have been sold, and that a second edition is called for.

In preparing it for the press, I have carefully revised every sentence, and have made such alterations and additions as seemed desirable, in order to bring out more clearly my meaning, and to meet suggestions for which I am indebted to various reviewers. That appeared to me the best way of manifesting my appreciation of the favour shown to a volume, which, as I am fully conscious, little accords with the dominant tone of what is called "public opinion."

W. S. L.

*March 1st, 1890.*



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*A portion of the materials for this work has been obtained from essays of mine in the Quarterly, Dublin, and Fortnightly Reviews, by permission of the respective Editors, whose kindness I desire here to acknowledge.*

W. S. L.

# A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION.

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## CHAPTER I.

### THE REVOLUTIONARY DOGMA.

A CENTURY has passed away since the Duke of Liancourt brought to Louis XVI. the tidings of the capture of the Bastille by the Parisian mob. "It is a revolt!" exclaimed the ill-fated monarch. "Sire," replied the Duke, "it is a Revolution." A Revolution indeed: or, rather, *the* Revolution of these latter days: the greatest which the world has experienced for well-nigh two thousand years, and which therefore we are accustomed to speak of, not inappropriately, without descriptive date or adjective. The movement which thus received its baptism of blood and fire has since been manifesting itself to the world. The subsequent history of France is essentially the history of its endeavour "to mix itself with life." This is the movement which, first distinctly formulated in 1789, and

speedily realised as a principle of action in 1791, had free course until, on the 5th of October, 1795, Napoleon opposed to it those iron floodgates whereby it was, more or less effectually, held in check for five-and-thirty years. This is the movement which, running subterraneously, but, in Royer Collard's picturesque phrase, "with full stream," swept away in 1830 the throne of Charles X. This is the movement which in 1848 subverted the monarchy of July, and which, thwarted for eighteen years by the Second Empire, and for five years more by the Marshalate, has since borne France victoriously before it. (It is this movement—French, indeed, in its origin, but œcumenical in its influence—which has shaken to the foundation the political order throughout continental Europe, and which aspires everywhere to re-make human society in its own image and likeness.) (The French Revolution of 1789 opens a new chapter in the world's history. How are we to judge of it by the experience of the century with which that chapter begins?

It is a question of great pith and moment. To read aright the signs of the times is the problem which confronts each successive generation; the ever-renewed Sphinx's riddle, not to guess which is to die. To know the phenomena of history profiteth little. "*Rassemblons les faits pour avoir des idées,*" says Buffon. The dictum applies as much to the social as to the physical order. Facts! But ideas, rights—abstractions if

you will—are facts too; and most potent facts; nay, strictly, the only real facts; the substance of those shadows which flit across the world's stage. If we would obtain that political instruction which Thucydides accounted the true end of historical research, we must discern ideas in their roots and relations and results. So only can we “from the apparent what infer the why.” It must, indeed, be admitted that we do not know, that we can but dimly conjecture, the secret reasons, the obscure instincts, the confused motives, whereby particular acts of any man were determined. What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man that is in him? And even a man's own knowledge of his own mental evolution is usually vague and imperfect. The Unconscious here counts for a great deal. Still, by attentive study of a man's deeds and words, we may infer, not unsoundly, concerning his affections, his affinities, his aspirations. Of a nation of men this is also true; nay, far truer, because the manifestations of national character are much more conspicuous and more instinctive—that is less reasoned—than are the manifestations of individual character. It is pre-eminently true of the French Revolution. For this was avowedly, (in the words of Burke, “a revolution of doctrine and theoretic dogma, bearing a great resemblance to those changes which have been wrought on purely religious grounds, in which a spirit of proselytism bears an essential part.”) Human

society reposes upon ideas. Aristotle pointed out, two thousand years ago, that it is not in man's choice whether he will philosophise or not; philosophise he must. He thinks; he believes; and therefore he acts. Without some faith—even if it be only in “the inalienable nature of purchased beef”—he could not act at all. What then is the idea, the faith, the dogma, underlying the Revolution?

Before answering that question, let us look a little at the public order which the Revolution found and destroyed. Corrupt and outworn as it was, it rested upon certain definite principles. It had lived upon them for fourteen hundred years, and owed to them such vitality as it still possessed. And at the very root of them lay this conviction: that man, naturally of imperfect inclinations to good and of strong propensities to evil, is encompassed by duties, divinely prescribed, and resting upon the most august and momentous sanctions. Take that venerable document which so well sums up the fundamental religious and ethical conceptions, unquestioningly received throughout Christendom, while Christendom was, the *Catechism or Instruction* prescribed by the Established Church of this country “to be learned of every person before he be brought to be confirmed by the Bishop.” Duty is the keynote of it. It is nothing

but an exposition of what the neophyte is "*bound* to believe and to do." It takes the child in the place in which it finds him; a Christian, and so under religious obligations; a human being, and so under obligations to his fellows of the race of man; a member of a family, and so under obligations to its head; a member of a body politic, and so under obligations to those set in public authority; a member of a social order, and so bound by the obligations attaching to his place in the same. Here is the fundamental doctrine of the old world order which the Revolution found in its decadence and decrepitude: the doctrine of duty pervading the whole of man's existence, dominating every human being, from the king to the peasant. Of course ethical ideas existed in Europe long before Christianity subdued it. But Christianity wrought a momentous change in them. Pagan antiquity conceived of the citizen as appertaining wholly to the State. But "the State itself had been founded upon a religion and constituted as a church; the religion which had brought forth the State and the State which maintained (*entretenait*) the religion, mutually upheld one another, and constituted but one homogeneous whole; and these two powers, thus united, blended, formed one almost superhuman power, to which body and soul were alike subject." \* Hence the law of

\* *La Cité Antique*, par Fustel de Coulanges, l. iii. c. 17. I shall have to glance again at this subject in the next chapter.

society was the law of the individual, whence sprang his duties in every relation of life, and whence sprang his rights also. For the only rights of which antiquity knew, were the rights of the citizen : of any abstract rights of humanity it knew nothing. Christianity changed all that by proclaiming another and a higher source of duty in the Divine Nature and the filial relation of man to it. This we may confidently affirm to be the primary, the essential dogma whereon it rests ; and M. Renan is well warranted when he declares "*l'idée de Jésus . . fut l'idée la plus révolutionnaire qui soit jamais éclos dans un cerveau humain.*" \* It was this idea which wrought slowly and imperfectly—for imperfection is the universal law of life—the greatest social revolution the world has ever seen ; which freed the consciences of men from the yoke of Cæsarism, which raised woman from her degradation, as the sport of man's caprice, to moral and spiritual equality with him ; which struck the fetters from the slave ; which made of the rich the stewards of the poor. For it was by speaking to the sovereign, to the man, to the master, to the rich, of the duties attaching to them as spiritual and responsible beings, that all this was accomplished. The public order which gradually arose throughout Europe, on the ruins of the Roman Empire, was a vast hierarchy of duties. Doubtless, in countless instances, they were grudgingly performed, or bru-

\* *Vie de Jésus*, p. 125.

tally violated. But they were everywhere undoubtedly regarded as the divinely imposed laws of life; no more to be chosen by men or women, Savonarola reminds the fugitive Romola, than birthplace, or father, or mother can be chosen, although we may choose to forsake them. And these duties were conceived of as the source and the measure of human rights. It is indeed strictly true to say that the only right of man then recognised as inalienable and imprescriptible, was the right to do what he ought; and in the secure possession of this right human liberty was held to reside. This old world view is well expressed by Milton. "The whole freedom of man, consists either in spiritual or civil liberty. As for spiritual, who can be at rest, who can enjoy anything in this world with contentment, who hath not liberty to serve God and to save his own soul? . . . . The other part of our freedom consists in the civil rights and advancements of every person according to his merit"; \* such civil rights, such advancements, being his due, as enabling him more fully and completely to use the talents entrusted to him by the "Great Taskmaster."

It is this notion of divinely-appointed, all-per-vading duty, as the paramount law of life, which especially distinguishes the Middle Ages, and which is the source of all that is highest in them, and in particular of their liberties. Absolute monarchy, the all-absorbing, unrestrained despotism of Roman

\* *Ready Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth.*

Imperialism, had no place among their political conceptions. The monarch was everywhere bound by pacts, solemnly recognised and sworn to, as a condition of his unction and coronation, and was hemmed in, on all sides, by free institutions; by the Universal Church, "the Christian Republic," as it was called; by universities, corporations, brotherhoods, monastic orders; by franchises and privileges of all kinds, which, in a greater or less degree, existed throughout Europe. The Renaissance, which considered in its merely political aspect, was a mere plagiarism of antiquity, rehabilitated the idea of Pagan Cæsarism; and that idea, under one form or another, soon pervaded the greater part of Europe. In France, especially, the doctrine of the omnipotence of the State, fostered by a servile clergy, attained proportions, little if at all inferior to those prevailing in the antique world; and the will of the *Grand Monarque*—"transcendent king of gluttonous flunkies," if ever ruler deserved that description—became in practice the standard of religious obligation. In the emphatic language of Sainte-Beuve: "Sous Louis XIV. le culte du monarque était devenu une démente universellement acceptée qui étonne encore par son excès." The sovereign was again "a present Deity," and the obligation of passive obedience to him was well nigh the only obligation really believed in. It is no wonder that the august idea of duty, thus prostituted, and made a mere instrument of political

slavery, fell into discredit; or that the great theistic conception brought into the world by Christianity lost its hold over the intellect of France. Nor should it surprise us that in what I must account the most profoundly irreligious age the world has ever seen, the men who, in 1789, composed the National Assembly, should have sought another foundation whereon to rear the public order, to the construction of which they addressed themselves without the slightest misgiving as to their competency for the enterprise.

That foundation they obtained, as they thought, in the idea of certain political rights, sacred, imprescriptible, inalienable, attaching to man by virtue of his human nature. Ascertain these, said the Revolutionary legislators, and you may forthwith make the constitution and bring back the Golden Age. The world is out of joint: it is full of wrong and violence; and "the sole causes of public misfortunes and of the corruption of governments are ignorance, forgetfulness, or contempt of the rights of man." \* Let us therefore solemnly expound these rights, "in order that the claims of the citizens, being founded, in future, on simple and incontestable principles, may always tend to the maintenance of the Constitution and the general

\* Preamble to *The Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen.*

happiness.”\* Accordingly they proceeded to set forth their Declaration of the abstract rights of humanity. This is the corner-stone, elect, precious, upon which they sought to rear the new political edifice, having first, as was necessary, made a clean sweep of existing institutions. I shall first consider their method, and then their application of it.

Their method has been happily described by Quinet as “social geometry, a kind of political mathematics,” up to that time confined to the realms of speculation. They afford the first instance recorded in history of a number of men sitting down and saying, “Go to: let us reconstruct society on *à priori* principles” — a gigantic task indeed, for which their qualifications were of the slenderest. Perhaps we should be well warranted in saying that the only two men of conspicuous ability found among them were Mirabeau and Talleyrand. The great majority were disciples of Rousseau, with no knowledge of men, or of affairs, or of anything beyond the dreams and speculations of their master; and may be said, as Aristotle said of the Sophists, to have professed political philosophy without in the least knowing what it is or wherewithal it is concerned. A few gaudy phrases, a few specious formulas, a few abstract ideas, an illimitable self-confidence, and an ebullient enthusiasm were their equipment for the work of recreating society. The statesman, trained in the practice of public affairs

\* Preamble to *The Declaration of the Rights of the Man and*

and the traditions of government, had been wont to set himself to inquire, to calculate, to follow in advance the working of any measure which he thought of introducing, bearing in mind the habits, the passions, the interests of the different classes, who, whether in greater or less degree, would be affected by it. Quite other was the method of the legislators of 1789, and of the Jacobins, to whom the world owes the logical continuance of their work. To them their political axioms were all in all, applicable universally to the *individua vaga* of their theories. To make the constitution, meant for them the translation into institutions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Contrat Social*.

The central conception of that treatise is what Mr. John Morley calls "the doctrine of the sovereignty of peoples," and what, in my judgment, may be more accurately designated, the doctrine of the sovereignty of the individual. "Of this doctrine," Mr. Morley tells us, "Rousseau assuredly was not the inventor. The great Aquinas had protested against the juristic doctrine that the law is the pleasure of the prince. The will of the prince, he says, to be a law must be directed by reason: law is appointed for the common good, and not for a special or private good; it follows from this that only the reason of the multitude, or of a prince representing the multitude, can make a law." \* Upon which I am led to remark that if—

\* Rousseau, by John Morley, vol. ii. p. 144

as would seem — Mr. Morley imputes to Aquinas the doctrine that “the reason of the multitude” is the ultimate source of human authority, he greatly errs. Nothing could be farther removed from the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. The original and pattern of all earthly law, ever to be kept in view by the human legislator, is, as Aquinas holds, that *lex æterna* which is the necessary rule of ethics, and of which “the reason of the multitude” is no more the accredited organ than is the will of the prince. To which it may not be superfluous to add that “the multitude” meant for Aquinas, not what it meant for Rousseau, and means for Mr. Morley, a fortuitous *congeries* of sovereign human units, but, an organic whole, implying all that may be gathered from Darwinism, and elsewhere, as natural and necessary in the organism. So much, in passing, to vindicate a great name from the misconception to which a popular and accomplished writer has given wide currency. And now, without further enquiry, at present, into the sources of Rousseau's political speculations, let us consider a little, the view of civil society, for which the world is indebted to him.

That view is indicated in the picturesque words with which the *Contrat Social* opens: “Man is born free and is everywhere in chains.” Unrestricted liberty and boundless sovereignty Rousseau postulates as the normal state of the abstract universal Man who is the unit of his system. Hence

he holds that the inhabitants of any country are entitled to absolute political equality; that every man may claim, of natural right, an equal share in the government of the territory where he happens to be born. This is not a mere bygone speculation of Rousseau. Much has dropped away from his theory of the public order. For example, the turbid, inconsequent Theism in which it was originally veiled, has long disappeared, and has been replaced by acrid Atheism. But the dogma of the absolute equivalence of men—"any man equal to any other, Quashee Nigger to Socrates or Shakespeare, Judas Iscariot to Jesus Christ"—is of the essence of his teaching. And so is the dogma of the sufficiency of the individual in the order of thought and in the order of action. These are the very foundations upon which the disciples of Jean-Jacques, from his day to ours, have been endeavouring to reconstruct society. The great political problem, according to Rousseau, is, "to find a form of association which defends and protects with all the public force, the person and property of each partner, and by which, each, while uniting himself to all, still obeys only himself." And this problem is supposed to be solved by the assignment to each adult male of an equal morsel of sovereignty, or—for that is what it comes to—of an equal infinitesimal share in the election of one of the depositaries of sovereignty. The essence of the Revolutionary dogma is, that only on equality, absolute

and universal, can the public order be properly founded. Arrange that every adult male shall count for one, and nobody for more than one, and by this distribution of political power, whatever the moral, social, or intellectual state of its recipients, you realise the perfect, the only legitimate form of the State.

Such, then, is the new conception of civil society adopted by the Revolution—a multitude of sovereign human units, who, that is to say, the majority of whom, exercise their sovereignty through their mandatories. And, in the will of this numerical majority, we are bidden to find the unique source of all rights. Hear the exposition of this doctrine by a worthy professor of it, the late M. Gambetta, in a famous speech, received with tumult of acclaim throughout Europe. “Political philosophy demands that the people be considered as the exclusive, the perennial source, of all powers, of all rights. . . . All authority (*la toute-puissance*) has its seat in the national sovereignty. The will of the people must manifest itself directly, openly; it must have the last word; all must bow before it, else national sovereignty has no existence, and the people are sold (*le peuple est joué*).” Nothing is sacred against the will of the numerical majority, called “the people.” The only real crime is to contravene its desires. The laws made by the legislature, the policy pursued by diplomatists, the judgments delivered by the tribunals, all must be dictated by this

supreme power, from which, alone, they derive their validity.) To sum up. That complete freedom or lawlessness (for the two things were supposed to be identical) is the natural condition of man, that all men are born and continue equal in rights, that civil society is an artificial state resting upon a contract between these sovereign units, whereby the native independence of each is surrendered, and a power over each is vested in the body politic, as absolute as that which nature gives every man over his limbs, "that human nature is good, and that the evil in the world is the result of bad education and bad institutions,"\* that man, uncorrupted by civilisation, is essentially reasonable, and that the will of the sovereign units, dwelling in any territory under the social contract, that is of the majority of them, expressed by their delegates, is the rightful and only source of justice and of law—such is the substance of the dogma which the Revolution has been endeavouring, for a century, to unite to the reality of life. What are we to think of it?

That is the inquiry which I propose to pursue in the following pages. And I shall conduct it in a method specially dear to Englishmen, a method which, without disparaging others more in favour

\* *Diderot*, by John Morley, vol. i. p. 5. Mr. Morley rightly regards this proposition as "the central moral doctrine of the Revolution."

with historical philosophers in France and Germany, I take leave to think of peculiar excellence. I mean the method indicated by the maxim *Exitus acta probat*, the way of judging a tree by its fruits, a principle by its results. There are four great factors of civilisation as it exists in the world: Liberty, Religion, Science, Art. I shall proceed to consider the Revolution in its relation with each of these. I shall then examine its connection with the political fact of this age commonly called Democracy; and, in conclusion, I shall indicate its influence upon public life in England.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE REVOLUTION AND LIBERTY.

A GREAT English poet has recorded, in majestic verse, the high hopes which filled his own, and so many other generous hearts, a century ago,

“ When France, in wrath, her giant limbs upreared,  
And with that oath which smote earth, air, and sea,  
Stamped her strong foot, and swore she would be free.”

How far have those hopes been realised? How far has the Revolution vindicated liberty? That is the subject to be considered in this Chapter.

And first, how are we to conceive of liberty? The Revolutionary dogma holds it to reside in political equality. Rousseau's receipt for making the constitution is to devise “ a form of association which defends and protects, with the whole power of the State, the person and goods of each partner, and by virtue of which each, while uniting himself with others, nevertheless obeys only himself, and remains as free as before.” Assign to each adult

male an equal morsel of political power, or—for that is what it comes to in practice—an equal infinitesimal share in the election of one of the depositaries of political power, and the result is liberty, which is therefore the outcome of a simple mechanism. “He digests, therefore he lives,” said the admirers of Vaucanson’s duck. “He votes, therefore he is free,” say the Revolutionary publicists, as they behold “the man and the citizen” performing at the ballot box. Quite in accordance with this view Sir George Trevelyan is stated to have declared, upon one occasion, that a householder who has not a vote has no more freedom than a negro slave. The utterance is said to have been received with loud cheers. Sir George Trevelyan is, at all events, a scholar, and, one would think, can hardly have listened to those cheers without putting to himself Phocion’s question in somewhat similar circumstances, “Dear me, have I been saying anything unusually foolish?” Let me endeavour to exhibit a somewhat worthier conception of liberty, as revealed by philosophy and illustrated by history.

Liberty, in the largest sense of the word, is, strictly, the unimpeded use of any faculty. But the notion of the exercise of absolute and unbounded liberty by any finite being is irrational, because it

necessarily implies the destruction of such being. Law is the essential condition of the right use of liberty. And law is grounded in that faculty of reason whence springs free agency. Moral liberty, with which we are here concerned, may, in a sense, be said to be unlimited, for it is beyond the attack of any human power: and so the proverb, "Thought is free." But as soon as it manifests itself externally, it is brought in contact with the environment, and becomes conditioned. The dictum of Cicero in one of his most famous orations, that we obey laws in order to be free—"Legum idcirco omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus"—may properly receive the widest application. In the moral, the intellectual, the physical, the political order, liberty is found not in chaos but in cosmos, not in anarchy but in obedience, not in lawlessness but in law. Nor is law an abstraction. Invisible, impalpable, imponderable, it is the most real thing in the world. "Its power," Coleridge has admirably said, "is the same with that of my own permanent self, and all the choice which is permitted to me consists in having it for my guardian angel or my avenging fiend. This is the spirit of law, the lute of Amphion, the harp of Orpheus. This is the true necessity which compels men into the social state, by a still-beginning, never-ceasing force of moral cohesion." It is in the social state to which man is thus compelled, by an inward necessity of his nature, that liberty is realised.

Let us see how this primary and most pregnant truth was apprehended by the greatest political thinker of ancient Hellas—I mean Aristotle. It is worth while to do so, both because his incomparable treatise, based as it is upon a profound knowledge of human nature, is “not of an age, but for all time,” and because of the direct and most potent influence which he has exercised in the modern world, through the masters of the medieval school. Open Aristotle’s *Politics*, and what do you find laid down, upon the very first page, as the end of political association? Only protection of person and property? Mere existence? By no means; not only existence, but noble existence, or the higher life (τὸ ζῆν καλῶς). The doctrine of the sophists, that “political society is a mere security for the mutual respect of rights.” is mentioned by him only to be dismissed as unworthy of the wise. “To citizens, both collectively and individually, the higher life is the aim proposed.” Man, he tells us, is a political animal, and the State a natural institution; and one who is not a citizen of any State, “the clanless, lawless, hearthless man,” of Homer, if the cause of his isolation be not accidental, is either a superhuman being or a savage, a brute or a god. But when man is called a political animal, he continues, the word bears a higher sense than that which attaches to it, if applied to bees and other gregarious creatures. For the special attribute of man, marking him off from the rest of

animate nature, is that he is a moral being, enjoying perception of good and evil, justice and injustice, and the like. But it is only in a polity that justice can be realised; justice which, as we read in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, may, in a sense, be accounted perfect virtue, according to the proverb, "In justice lies the whole of virtue's sum." Hence, civil society is the instrument of man's complete development; such development is its true end. And its best form will be that which makes it the most efficacious instrument for that end. The State he defines as an association of free persons. The supreme political problem, he deems, is upon what principles to organise this association of free persons, justly. The object to be kept in view is the good of the political organism, of the community as a whole, which is really the good of every individual member of it. And he accounts it clear that the many should control greater interests than the few, due limits being set to their authority in order to prevent injustice; for the oppression of the wealthy few, by the many poor, is quite as unjust as the oppression of the many poor, by the wealthy few; the oppression, in either case, being merely the iniquitous employment of superior strength. He thinks, then, that the many should elect the rulers and hold them responsible. He gives two reasons for it. The first is, that if you exclude a large number of persons from participation in political affairs, the State of which they are composed is

sure to have a large number of enemies within its pale. And the second, that the many, whatever their individual deficiencies, may collectively be superior to the few; as those who have to live in a house may be not bad judges of its merits, though unversed in the art of building; as the guests at a dinner, though themselves no cooks, may form a sound conclusion upon the *cuisine*. But “while the State consists of a number of individuals, those individuals are different in kind. It is impossible to form a State, all the members of which are alike. The parts which are to constitute a single organic whole *must* be different in kind.” This inequality must be recognised, under pain of falsehood, that is of injustice, for, he reminds us, the words “unjust” and “false” are virtually the same. And here, in a few pregnant sentences, he answers two sets of opponents. “The one part,” he says, “holds that justice is equality, and so it is, not indeed for all the world, but only for equals. The other maintains that inequality is just, as it is, in truth, for unequals, not for all the world.” Again, he will not consent to regard as citizens all who are indispensable to the existence of the State. Thus—not to speak of slaves and aliens—he holds that artisans are “naturally servile,” and thinks that in a well-regulated polity citizenship should not be conferred upon any mechanic. The general outcome would seem to be that the State—Aristotle had, of course, a town

autonomy in view — is the development of the earlier associations, the family and the village, and is the stage in which independence (*αὐτάρκεια*) is first attained; that it depends, like the household, upon a common interest in a common morality; that it is the instrument of the ethical development of man as enabling him to realise that justice, in the perception and practice of which lies his true nobility; and that the best polity will bestow some share of power upon all citizens, but in view of the capital fact of human inequality, will regulate the degree of power according to the capacity to co-operate towards the true end of the social organism. That end, as we have seen, is the higher life, which means for the individual the attainment of such moral and intellectual perfection as his faculties and environment permit.

The polity which Aristotle describes was, indeed, an ideal polity. But it was an ideal designed after consideration of the commonwealths actually existing around him. Nor is it too much to assert that, in its most essential features, it was realised in some of them. And yet we are roundly told by eminent writers—by M. Fustel de Coulanges, for example—that “individual liberty was unknown to the ancients” (“les anciens n’ont pas connu la liberté individuelle”): that “there was nothing in the whole man, as he existed in the Greek republics, which was independent.” With the greatest respect for this learned and accomplished author, I must

enter a protest against such sweeping assertions. I am far from denying that even the greatest schools of Hellenic philosophy underrated the will as an element in man. The capital problem of our ethical nature, the moral consciousness of the Ego, received inadequate attention from them. Hence the imperfection attaching to all their notions of human liberty. But is it conceivable that individual freedom was altogether unknown to Aristotle when he wrote the *Politics*? or to his master, Socrates, when, as we read in the *Memorabilia*, he characterised it as man's most precious and noble possession? Was there nothing independent in Pericles and Cleisthenes, in Aristophanes and Sophocles, in Plato and Thucydides? "But the State was omnipotent; person and property and religion were absolutely under its control." Yes. Let us not, however, forget that the State was held to be founded upon justice. And by justice was meant not the will of one man or of many men, but a spiritual, a divine dictate, independent of all experience, transcending all human convention, which was the rule of right action. "Le véritable législateur chez les anciens," M. Fustel de Coulanges truly says, "ce ne fut pas l'homme, ce fut la croyance religieuse que l'homme avait en soi." \* Hence the dictum of Plato, that to obey the laws was to obey the gods. Hence the

\* *La Cité Antique*, Liv. III. c. 10.

extreme conservatism of the Hellenic republics, the vast difficulty of effecting any change in their usages and institutions. Law was merely religion regulating society, and assuring to the individual the only liberty which was supposed to belong to him, his liberty as a citizen. Of the man apart from the citizen it knew nothing. The individual was of account only in the town autonomy of which he was an integral part: always its armed defender; by turn its magistrate and diplomatist; his single life at once lost and found in its larger corporate life. For the liberties that have grown up in the two thousand years which separate us from the time of Aristotle, religious liberty, contractual liberty, educational liberty, testamentary liberty, we shall seek in vain in that ancient Hellenic world. We might as well expect to find there the telephone or the steam engine. These things belong to a different stage of human development. But in the civic liberty which we do find there, as a living, energising fact, is the germ of all other liberties. The rights of man have sprung from the rights of the citizen. It is a saying of Goethe that the liberty of mankind was begun in Greece. His forgetfulness of the world's debt to the Hebrew prophets, for their vindication of the sacredness of the moral Ego, is characteristic. Still, unquestionable it is, that those old Hellenic republics were the harbingers, we may say the first missionaries, of freedom in

the Western world. Nor was Shelley altogether unwarranted when he wrote:—

“ ‘ Let there be light,’ said Liberty,  
And, like sunrise from the sea,  
Athens arose.”

The real political progress of Europe from those days until now consists in the gradual vindication of the personal, social, and public prerogatives which make up individual freedom. We may call it the evolution of the individual in the social organism, or federation of organisms, of which he is the cell: where each exists for all and all for each, and the life of each is multiplied by the common life of all. What the august jurisprudence of Rome achieved for the liberty of person and property is an oft-told tale, which I need not repeat. But I may, in passing, point out how closely the two liberties are connected. At the dawn of human history, neither personal freedom nor single ownership can be said to have existed. The social unit was not the individual but the family, whose head possessed despotic power over the members. Common, not single, possession prevailed. For long ages, the unemancipated son differed nothing from a slave. Personal liberty and private property rose together; they developed together; and—let us lay that truth to heart—they now stand or fall together. The special contribution of the Roman jurists to human freedom is their working out, with cool, calm, logic, of the

law of private right. Unquestionably, the great fosterer of liberty in the modern world has been the Christian religion. For it, more than anything else, has developed a feeling of the infinite worth of human personality. And it is from personality that the rights of man, as man, spring. I do not undervalue the other factors which have been co-operant to this end. Chief among them is the Stoic philosophy, which taking as its starting-point the consciousness of the individual, dealt, in a way untrodden by any previous system of thought, with his moral nature, his attribute of self-determination, developing the idea of ethical obligation, and seeking to estimate truly the meaning and worth of human life. Again, the tradition of virile independence which the Teutonic tribes brought from the forests of Germany no doubt did much to teach Europe the dignity of man. Still, certain it is, as a matter of historical fact, that in Christianity, and in Christianity alone, was found a force able to destroy the domination of the State over the immaterial part of our nature. It enfranchised religion from secular chains, and laid the only true foundation for that liberty of conscience before human law, which is the most precious of all liberties, and the tutor of the rest. “*Le premier arbre de la liberté,*” said Victor Hugo—finely, if with all too French rhetoric—“*le premier arbre de la liberté a été planté, il y a dix-huit cents ans, par Dieu même sur le Golgotha. Le premier arbre de la*

liberté, c'est cette croix sur laquelle Jésus Christ s'est offert en sacrifice pour la liberté, l'égalité, et la fraternité du genre humain." And for the first three centuries the truth preached by the noble army of martyrs from the rack, the stake, the jaws of lions, was the self-same which the King of Martyrs had preached from his cross; that the children of men, brothers in Divine sonship, equal in their spiritual nature, were, of indefeasible right, independent of all earthly power in the domain of conscience; each of them, even to the humblest, the most degraded, responsible in that sacred sphere, to Him whom it is better to obey than man.

This is the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free. All the great religions are, indeed, at one, in proclaiming the doctrine of a limit to human sovereignty, a region in which it does not enter. The special glory of Christianity is to have made this doctrine triumph over the strongest political power the world had ever known, and to have engrained it into the minds of the most progressive races. And here I may be met with the obvious objection, that during the period of the unchecked domination of Christianity in the Middle Ages theological uniformity was rigidly enforced by penal laws: I may be pointed to the Inquisition as the irreconcilable foe of "freedom of conscience." I answer that the modern conception of religious liberty was as impossible then, as was the medieval

conception of personal liberty in that phase of Rome civilisation, when the *paterfamilias* exercised over his children the power of life and death. Religious unity was the keystone of medieval polity, just as the *patria potestas* was the keystone of the archaic family. Men had not learnt in the Middle Ages, from the new philosophy, which denies the absolute value of all religions, the lesson formulated by Montaigne: "Après tout, c'est mettre ses conjectures à bien haut prix, que d'en faire cuire un homme tout vif." When Christianity was the prime objective fact of life, the bond of the social and political order, religious dissidence wore a very different aspect from that which it presents in such an age as ours. "Toleration," the present Bishop of London has remarked, in a once famous essay, "is the very opposite of dogmatism: it implies, in reality, a confession that there are insoluble problems, upon which even revelation throws little light." \* But to our medieval forefathers who were

\* Essay on The Education of the World in *Essays and Reviews*, p. 43. It is well to remark, in passing, that Dr. Temple's definition of toleration, although accurately representing the contemporary conception of it, is by no means historically correct. The earlier advocates of toleration did not in the least intend by it the opposite of dogmatism. They meant the sufferance, under conditions, by the dominant dogmatism, of the co-existence of other forms of religious belief. To which may be added that religious liberty, as it now exists, is by no means the fruit of the positive religious teaching of Protestantism. It sprang up, in Protestant countries, only when such teaching began to decay, and spread in proportion as the decay progressed.

before all things dogmatic, it would have appeared most terrible blasphemy to doubt the all-sufficiency of the revelation which they believed themselves to possess in the Catholic Church. Nay, they accounted "heresy" the supreme evil of which a man could be guilty, as combining in itself all the worst elements of wickedness. It was treason against the Sovereign Lord; it was a capital injury to the commonwealth, whose prosperity depended upon His favour, *Dis te minorem quod geris imperas*, being the most axiomatic principle of statecraft: it was the most grievous of wrongs to one's neighbour, for it was as a canker eating away the body politic: it was worse than murder, in the degree that the soul which it slew is more excellent than the body. Jeremy Taylor has forcibly expressed this old world view. "God reigns over all Christendom," he observes, "just as he did over the Jews. . . . When it happens that a kingdom is converted to Christianity, the commonwealth is made a church, and Gentile priests are Christian bishops, and the subjects of the kingdom are servants of Christ, the religion of the nation is turned Christian, and the law of the nation made a part of the religion; there is no change of government but that Christ is made king, and the temporal power is His substitute. . . . But if we reject God from reigning over us, and say, like the people in the Gospel, *Nolumus hunc regnare* . . . then God has armed the temporal power with a sword

to cut us off." \* I am not holding a brief for theological persecution. I confess that when I read a book like de Maistre's *Lettres sur l'Inquisition*, the odour of slaughter and sophism which exhales from its pages nearly stifles me. I gaze with shuddering wonder upon St. Peter Martyr, or St. Peter d'Arbues, superintending the racking of a suspected heretic or the burning of a relapsed one. I think, with Cardinal Newman, that to witness an auto-da-fé would be the death of me.

"Prisca juvent alios : ego me nunc denique natum  
Gratulator : hæc ætas moribus apta meis.

Still, the philosophical historian must be just, even to St. Peter Martyr or to St. Peter d'Arbues. Distinguishing in the Inquisition the principle from the application, according to Cardinal Hergerother's judicious advice,† he will recognise in it a relative right. There can be no question, to quote Trendelenburg's admirable words, that "the idea of the State, taken in the fullest sense, demands the ethical guidance of religion, or, to express it in Christian language, demands the Church as the condition of its proper being;" although, as this illustrious thinker well adds, "the complete union of religion and State

\* *Life of Christ*, Pref. p. 35 (Pickering's edition). It is curious that these words should have proceeded from the pen of a writer who, in Mr. Hallam's judgment, "sapped the foundations of dogmatism," and, "prepared the mind, thus freed from bigotry, for the public toleration of differences in religion."

† *Katholische Kirche und christlicher Staat*. Essay XVI., Part II., § 16.

remains, if ever possible, an ideal of the future." \* And assuredly, as a matter of principle, a nation is entitled to safeguard, by its legislation, the religion which it professes. "A state," writes Dr. Arnold, "may as justly declare the New Testament to be its law as it may choose the institutes and code of Justinian. In this manner the law of Christ's Church may be made its law: and all the institutions which this law enjoins, whether in ritual or discipline, may be adopted as national institutions. . . . If a man believes himself bound to refuse obedience to the law of Christianity, or will not pledge himself to regard it as paramount in authority to any human legislature, he cannot properly be a member of a society which conceives itself bound to regulate all its proceedings by this law." † From the point of view of *principle*, this appears to me unanswerable. That it is never, in the long run, *expedient* to repress, by penal legislation, religious beliefs and practices—save such as are manifestly subversive of civilised society—seems to me just as certain. And I know of no stronger argument in support of this view than that which is furnished by the history of the Inquisition itself.

Medieval intolerance then—to return to our immediate subject—was a natural consequence of the universal prevalence of the Christian faith, and of

\* *Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik*, § 172.

† *Introductory Lectures on Modern History*, pp. 53-60.

the supreme value set upon it. Coercion is certainly the most obvious way of guarding uniformity, and the men of the Middle Ages applied it as unhesitatingly in the religious sphere as we apply it in the political. Nor did it occur to them that in so doing they at all invaded individual liberty:—"Posse peccare non est libertas nec pars libertatis," says St. Anselm. Of course the particular form which coercion assumes, varies according to circumstances. The lawgivers of the Middle Ages prescribed for religious dissidence the highest penalty they knew of. "The severity of the punishment of heretics," remarks Mœhler, "depends clearly upon the severity of the penal laws admitted by the society of the period." The criminal legislation of "the ages of faith" was savage and cruel. But it must be remembered that men then thought as little of undergoing as of inflicting physical torture. To which we may add that real earnest belief, whatever its object, is impatient of contradiction. The Communists of our own day, assassinating "*les serviteurs d'un nommé Dieu*," the earlier champions of "liberty, equality, fraternity," massacring the priests and hurrying the laity by thousands to the scaffold or the river, may serve as illustrations of this fact. It may, perhaps, on the whole, be truly said that the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, recognising and directing the impulses of human nature which found expression in the system then prevailing of religious coercion, controlled, re-

strained, and mitigated what she could not destroy. However that may be, certain it is, as her severest critics allow, that the separation between temporal and spiritual authority, upon which she insisted, was "the parent of liberty of conscience": certain that her assertion of this principle has been a potent factor in the advance of human freedom.

Ideas have a life of their own. No generation can do more than surmise dimly, if at all, their future developments. The advance of the general mind is so slow as to be imperceptible, unless viewed at a distance: *e pur si muove*. And the public order follows tardily and unwillingly the general evolution of thought. The cause of religious liberty in the Middle Ages was bound up with the struggle of the Church against secular sovereignty. It meant little more to the most clear-sighted of its champions than the independence of the spirituality from "kings,

\* "One beneficial consequence which M. Guizot ascribes to the power of the Church is worthy of especial notice—the separation (unknown to antiquity) between temporal and spiritual authority. He, in common with the best thinkers of our time, attributes to this fact the happiest influence on European civilisation. It was the parent, he says, of liberty of conscience. The separation of temporal and spiritual is founded on the idea that material force has no right, no hold, over the mind, over conviction, over truth. Enormous as have been the sins of the Catholic Church in the way of religious intolerance, her assertion of this principle has done more for human freedom than all the fires she ever kindled have done to destroy it."—Mill, *Dissertations and Discussions*, vol. ii. p. 243.

tyrants, dukes, princes, and all the jailers of human souls." Yet in these words of Gregory VII., we have the root of the matter, and, potentially, all that has grown out of that root. For they involve the conception of freedom as ethical and spiritual, as resting upon the infinite worth of the individual and his direct relation to God, which prevailed in the Middle Ages, and which was the source of the great growth of individuality so strikingly characteristic of them. It has been said, "Classical history is a part of modern history; only medieval history is ancient." There never was a more foolish saying. Medieval history, considered as a whole, is the history of the gradual emancipation of all the forces which make up individual life, and of the assignment to them of their due place in the public order.

Adequately to deal even with the outlines of this great subject would require a volume. Here I shall merely touch upon one point: the work done by Christianity for those whom we call "the masses;" the multitudes condemned by the inexorable laws of life to manual toil. We speak of the elevation of the labourer from slavery, through serfdom, to personal freedom, as having been mainly wrought out by the Church. And truly. But this was only one part of the freedom wherewith she endowed him. If you regard the toil of the agriculturist, of the artisan, from a merely material point of view, what an ignoble drudgery it is!—"a naturally servile occupation," as Aristotle

deemed it. But Christianity, inspiring that toil with a higher motive than the needs of the physical organism, proclaiming the spiritual worth of all honest work, as a divinely appointed ordinance, nay, placing it upon a level with the highest exercises of devotion — *laborare est orare* — ennobled in a supreme degree the lives of the humblest toilers. Those companies of religious men, following the rule of St. Benedict, who cleared the forests, drained the morasses, reclaimed the desolate places of Germany, France, Spain, England, were doing a work of which they little dreamed. “We owe the agricultural restoration of a great part of Europe to the monks,” writes Mr. Hallam. Yes; and we owe to them what is of far more importance — that sentiment of the dignity of labour without which the mere legal emancipation of the labourer would have been of little worth. All that is great in those Middle Ages — and how much does that mean! — springs from the same transcendental root. The gradual vindication of a man’s right to be himself, to live out his own life, was wrought by men who felt the ineffable greatness of man, and the infinite value of life.

Such were our medieval forefathers, to whom we Englishmen directly owe “the ancient and immemorial rights and liberties of the subject,” as we proudly call them, and the venerable institutions which are their guarantees and sacred shrines. The constitutional history of England is the history

of the slow, oft-thwarted but continuous development, by a process of organic growth, upon the one hand, of that individual freedom which means complexity, differentiation, inequality; and upon the other hand, of that closer unity resulting from the harmonious working of diverse forces, freely constituted under the sway of great religious and ethical principles regulating both public and private life. Nothing is more certain than that the English constitution, and the other constitutions which arose throughout Europe in the fourteenth century, were not due to any preconceived theory. We may apply here certain words of Aristotle: "As men went on, the nature of things was their guide, and conducted them from one point to another." A true instinct taught them that the intervention of the subject in public affairs is a necessary guarantee of individual liberty. And the best way of securing such intervention appeared to them, the assignment to each constituent element of the body politic, or estate of the realm, of such share in the government as it seemed fitted to exercise. The political enfranchisement of the various classes of the community, and their association in the work of legislation, was the ideal to which, probably with very small consciousness of it, Europe tended from the beginning of the thirteenth century to the end of the fifteenth. Then, in well-nigh every Continental country, this bulwark of personal freedom is sapped by Renaissance Absolutism, and gradually disap-

pears. With us, the Parliamentary system of Henry II. and Simon de Montfort, perverted, but not destroyed, by Tudor despotism, maintained itself against the usurpations of the Stuarts, until the great event of 1688 finally vindicated "the undoubted rights and liberties of the subject," and secured that preponderant influence of the House of Commons, as the representative and mouthpiece of the nation, which is the great safeguard of English freedom.

I need not dwell upon the progress of that freedom since 1688, nor show how, as it has "broadened down," the constitutional institutions, which are its pledges and instruments, have gathered ever fresh strength and security. Who can deny that we Englishmen now enjoy the plentitude of all the liberties which the full exercise of personality implies? Liberty of person, liberty of property, of which testamentary freedom is no small part, liberty of worship, liberty of public meeting, liberty of the press, educational liberty; we have them all. And what better guarantees of these liberties are possible than such as we possess: a Government, not the mandatory of any one class, but broad-based upon the will of the whole people, an independent judiciary, trial by jury, the writ of *habeas corpus*—without which all our other liberties would be but as sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal—the absence of all exceptional jurisdictions, of all class or official privileges before the law. "The whole

freedom of man," wrote Milton in noble words, cited in the last chapter, and well worth citing again, "consists either in spiritual or civil liberty. As for spiritual, who can be at rest, who can enjoy anything in this world with contentment, who hath not liberty to serve God and to save his own soul? The other part of our freedom consists in the civil rights and advancements of every person according to his merit." Spiritual liberty has been realised in ampler measure than even Milton, in his age and environment, could understand. His principle has been developed, and his limitation discarded, that "popery, and open superstition, no law can possibly allow that intends not to unlaw itself." And the principle of "the advancements of every person according to his merit," that, too, has received a wider extension than Milton could have dreamed of. Not only is merit—or what gets itself accepted as such—the consideration that regulates the trust of public authority, but competition is the very law of our highly complex civilisation; a competition not merely of material force, but of intelligence, of morality—yes, and we may say of self-sacrifice. And the office of competition is to elicit fitness; in other words, to afford a free career to personality, by allowing to each the unfettered employment of his individual powers for his own advantage, and for the advantage of the organism of which he is a member. To permit each to be fully himself, to find his own proper level—this is liberty. Hence,

it is not too much to say, that liberty is rooted and grounded in inequality. Uniformity is fatal to it. And when once equality before the law and an open career for talent are assured, all the factors of inequality—such as quasi-independent bodies in the State, corporations, guilds, great fortunes, great families—are so many factors of liberty. The free play of indefinitely varying personalities is of the very essence of national vitality; without it a people may have a name to live, but is dead. The only legitimate limit to the freedom of each is that which is necessary for the equal freedom of all. It is a limit which, as a matter of fact, is fixed not so much by positive law as by the innate good sense and right feeling, born of that respect for our own personality as most inward and most sacred to us, which leads us to respect the personality of others. Hence that recognition of liberty as something above parties, something of a higher order than the shibboleths of public life—always petty, usually contemptible — which supplies the true bond of national cohesion, and “ keeps our Britain whole within herself.” The scientific student then, as he traces through history the progress of society, may fully adopt the words of Spinoza: “ The end of the State, is not to transform men from reasonable beings into animals or automata ; its end is so to act, that the citizens may develop in security body and soul, and make free use of their reason ; the end of the State is, in truth, liberty.” This is no

*à priori* abstract idea, such as that wherewith the maker of paper constitutions starts, when he sets himself to build up his house of cards. It is a principle, which is the most concrete thing in the world ; the quintessence of the facts from which it is deduced ; the very law of their succession and connection as manifested in their working.

We may say then, as the result of our argument, that Liberty, viewed as a fact in the world's history, and the most considerable of facts, is, if we contemplate it in itself, in its nature, the absence of constraint in the action of our faculties ; that, considered in its end, it is the exercise of personality ; that its indispensable condition is a certain stage of intellectual and spiritual development — call it, if you like, civilisation, so long as you mean by the word something more than material progress—in which a man shall be capable of tending consciously towards the realisation of personality ; and that the law of its tendency is moral. “ When we measure the progress of a society by its growth in freedom,” the late Professor Green has well observed, “ we measure it by the increasing development and exercise, on the whole, of those powers of contributing to social good, with which we believe the members of the society to be endowed ; in short, by the[ir] greater power . . . as a body, to make the most and best of themselves. Freedom, in all the forms of doing what one will with one's own, is valuable only as a means to an end. That end is

what I call freedom in the positive sense: in other words, *the liberation of the powers of all men, equally, for contributions to a common good.*" \*

This is real freedom. This is the only liberty worthy of that august name. This rational liberty all social institutions and political machinery should subserve; and they are of value only in proportion as they do subserve it. How far has the Revolution vindicated such liberty? Its achievements may be divided into two classes: the destructive and the constructive. Certainly its power for destruction is without parallel in the world's history. It has gone as near as possible to the effacement of the France which existed before 1789. I say "as near as possible." For the past is really indestructible. You do not destroy it by destroying its symbols. "Far off, yet ever nigh," it lives in the present, in a thousand ways, and most notably in national character: in those instincts, aptitudes, passions, which heredity transmits in such ample measure. Each infant born into France to-day, unquestionably bears imprinted on its brain many of the intellectual dispositions, of the spiritual qualities, of the physical habits, of its parents, of its remote ancestors, of the whole race. It was no effervescence of rhetoric, but a simple statement of fact, when the French philosopher wrote, "*nous sommes non*

\* *Works*, vol. iii. pp. 371-2. The italics are mine.

seulement les fils de la postérité, de ceux qui ont déjà vécu, mais au fond et réellement ces générations antérieures elles-mêmes." The Revolutionary legislators could not "unget" themselves—if I may borrow a phrase from Sir Anthony Absolute; they could not rid themselves of those things past of which they were made and moulded. But of the public institutions of their country which they found existing, hardly any escaped their rage for indiscriminate destruction. What is the gain to freedom? It may be easily summed up. The arbitrary power of the monarch has passed away. The outworn machinery of government, "an expensive anarchy," D'Argenson called it, has disappeared. The oppressive and irrational privileges of the aristocratic caste—privileges which, long divorced from duties, were justly and passionately hated by the great mass of Frenchmen—are gone for ever; the *roturier* is free from "his birth's invidious bar": "*la carrière est ouverte aux talens.*" The guilds and companies which, if they, in some sort, protected the individual artisan, also hampered him by antiquated restrictions, have ceased to exist. The peasant, too, like the skilled labourer, is lord of himself; he may do as he likes, so far as his fellow-men are concerned, and pursue his own good, or what he accounts such, in his own way. Add to this, that religious intolerance and religious persecution—the same can hardly be said of irreligious—have vanished, together with

the iniquities and cruelties of the old penal laws and the old criminal procedure, and you have a tolerably complete account of "the conquests of 1789." And what the Revolution did in these respects for France, primarily and most largely, it has done, in greater or less measure, for much of Continental Europe. The march of Napoleon, though devastating as Attila's, from Madrid to Moscow, had in it something electric: it brought down in a common ruin the feudal or despotic politics, founded on a fictitious "right divine of kings to govern wrong," and associated everywhere with a legalised inequality which did not correspond with the nature of things. It shook, so to speak, the idea of freedom into the air.

But must we not say that in the air that idea remains, for the most part? Where has the Revolution constructed anything stable? Where has it achieved, practically achieved, liberty in the higher and positive sense? Take France, where it has had its most perfect work. M. Prévost-Paradol once apologetically said that if the Revolution had failed to found a government in France, it had, at all events, founded a society. "A society!" One thinks of Mr. Carlyle's words: "We call it a Society: and go about professing openly the totallest separation, isolation." In the name of a spurious equality—"hate striving to pass itself off as love," Amiel well called it—France has been converted into a chaos of hostile individuals. To constitute

a nation there is need of common traditions, common feelings, common modes and ends of action. In the place of these we find complete dissolution of the bonds of thought, the unappeasable rancour of factions, or rather sects, the irreconcilable antagonism of classes: "Immortale odium et nunquam sanabile vulnus." "But the masses of the French population," it is sometimes said, "the toiling masses! Who can deny how much the Revolution has done for their enfranchisement, their elevation?" Let us consider it. Of the ten or eleven millions of adult Frenchmen, some five millions are peasant-proprietors. Can we predicate liberty of these? Can we even predicate of them personality, except in the most elementary sense? Let us on this subject hear M. Vacherot, one of the chief apostles and confessors of the Revolutionary dogma. He warns us, "Il faut prendre garde aux idylles sur le bien-être, l'indépendance, la moralité, du paysan. La vérité est, qu'il vit misérablement, qu'il est abruti et mécontent. Et cet état de choses ira en empirant."\* This state of things has gone on getting worse since M. Vacherot wrote these words a quarter of a century ago. If any one desires to know the truth regarding it, let him gird himself up to read M. Zola's *La Terre*, the vilest and the most "realistic" of that master's productions. He will not be amused; the book is deadly dull. But he will

\* *La Démocratie*, p. 209, 2nd edition.

find a gallery of photographs, a collection of "documents" (to use the author's phrase), the substantial accuracy of which appears to be quite beyond serious question. The French peasant will stand revealed in all the repulsiveness of actual life; consumed with "the furious passion for possessing land" avaricious, penurious, dishonest, tyrannical, foul: sunk in a depravation which one hardly likes to call bestial: it is unfair to the beasts. He is sometimes spoken of—at all events, in this country—as the most conservative element in French society. This is one of those half-truths by which opinion is governed, and which, as a rule, are more misleading than whole errors. Conservative, indeed, the French peasant proprietor is of one thing, and that is his own petty property. He knows that the tenure by which this is held dates from the First Revolution; that, so far as his class is concerned, the effect of that great upheaval was to convert their copyholds, burdened with oppressive dues and the feudal services of an outworn world, into freeholds. This is the sum and substance of his knowledge of the history of his country; and his dominant idea is dread of any political movement which may jeopardise his holding. The Revolution, especially as represented by the first Napoleon, who curiously enough lives in his memory as a lover of the people—

Napoléon aimait la guerre  
Et son peuple, comme Jésus."—

a song still popular in some districts declares—is the sole tradition which he cherishes; while the *ancien régime* stands for the symbol of all that is inimical to him. His intellectual horizon is the narrowest conceivable. Of the common good he never so much as dreams. His life is spent in incessant manual labour. The infinite sub-division of land, resulting from the Revolutionary Code, is an evil against which he finds no remedy, save in the limitation of the number of his children. As a rule, he restricts himself to two. But even with two children he finds it hard to keep out of the hands of the village usurer. His five or six acres constitute a provision for only one son. To avoid a partition of his pittance of land, he must raise money to buy off the other. Hence it frequently happens that he is in the hands of the village Shylock, the most demoralised and demoralising of tyrants. Doubtless, as a rule, the French peasant proprietor must be credited with the virtues of industry and frugality. Without them it would be impossible for him to live. But, on the other hand, he is given over to the spirit of utter selfishness, of complete indifference to all except the pettiest personal interests, of blind hatred and unreasoning fear of everything above his social and intellectual level, of abject meanness displayed by no other peasantry in Europe in the same degree. And in politics he is the facile prey of the charlatan who can best prey upon these passions. He is not

apprehensive that Radicalism, in its extremest form, will touch his petty piece of land. The fine schemes for relieving of their wealth the millowner, the manufacturer, and the other capitalists most open to the indictment, that they toil not neither do they spin, but live by the toiling and spinning of others, do not touch him. Nay, he dimly discerns that these measures would but carry forward for the benefit of other classes the same process of confiscation, whereby the nobles, the clergy, and the higher *bourgeoisie* were dispossessed for his benefit in the last century. Nothing is more utterly untrue than the allegation so commonly made in this country that the peasant proprietors of France are an impregnable barrier against Jacobinism. In political emergencies they are absolutely helpless. They have no principle of cohesion. They are a mere rabble, incapable, not only of meeting, but even of understanding, any great crisis in the affairs of their country. Shall we account as free these human automata, these voting animals, driven to the ballot-box as sheep to the slaughter, at one time by the Government official, at another by the professional demagogue?

Turn we now to the urban population of France. We have seen what Christianity did for the toiling masses by teaching the dignity of labour, while it emancipated the labourer. The Revolution unteaches that lesson. I have been greatly struck to observe how signally this is exemplified by the

Parisian artisan, in many respects the foremost type to be found anywhere of the skilled workman. His whole being is penetrated by the anarchic teaching of Rousseau. He spends his time in a perpetual state of intoxication produced by the bad brandy of the *Contrat Social*. You cannot more deeply offend him than by addressing him as *ouvrier*, or by speaking to him of *la classe ouvrière*. He will tell you, surlily, that he is as good as another. And you will preach to deaf ears if you expound to him the wholesome doctrine of Mr. Mill: "Belief that any one man is as good as another is almost as detrimental to moral and intellectual excellence as any effect which most forms of government can produce." But salute him as *citoyen*, and you open a door to his heart at once. You transport him into a fantastic and impossible dreamland, wherein dwells what he calls justice. For he is firmly persuaded that he is a disinherited sovereign, wrongfully condemned to a dull, prosaic existence of toil. All his life he had been dazzled with visions of Socialistic and Communistic Utopias. And it is natural that he should burn to realise them. All his life political agitators have inflamed his worst passions: his greed, his envy, his hatred, until he has become, so to speak, possessed by them. But liberty is a moral good: its root in the elemental reason, in virtue of which a man is a law unto himself. It is incompatible with the sovereignty of the passions. The passions it is, I

say, not the rational faculties, of the masses congregated in French cities, that have been universally liberated. And assuredly, it is not to "the common good" that they are directed. The proof is before our eyes. Go on almost any Sunday evening to the Tivoli Wauxhall, or any other large place of meeting in Paris—it is the same in the other great towns of France—and there you will find the workmen, in their thousands, listening greedily to inflammatory attacks upon the primordial principles of social order; breathing out threatenings and slaughter against capitalists, public functionaries, priests; revelling in the wildest declamation, the most insensate rodomontade. The late M. Gambetta, whose angry utterances, at all events, had the ring of truth, described his constituents at Belleville, upon one occasion, as drunken slaves, (*esclaves ivres*). Slaves indeed! And drunken with the deadly wine of the anarchical doctrines which were his own stock-in-trade; "la politique de l'impossible, la théorie de la folie furieuse, le culte de l'audace aveugle." It is significant that the French artisan will very seldom give his vote to an employer of labour, however liberal and philanthropic; that he will never give it to a fellow operative, however trustworthy and intelligent. His favourite candidate is the professional demagogue, copious in phrases and gesticulations, who can most fluently repeat his pet shibboleths, and most seductively enlarge upon them, who promises

him "equality in fact," and "the completion of the work begun by the giants of 1792."

Of such demagogues the Chamber of Deputies is chiefly composed. The Revolution, so far from having liberated the powers of all Frenchmen, equally, for contributions to a common good, has produced among the best of them that political indifference which is the worst curse that can fall upon a nation. It has issued in the uncontrolled domination of those who, at the best, must be described as the most mediocre of mediocrities. Consider the five hundred and eighty-four sovereigns of France, as they sit grouped in their parties; listen to the vapid sophisms, the gross personal insults, the vulgar gibes, which resound as their sterile debates proceed and "quack out-bellows quack." Lives there the man who will affirm that their vocal and other powers are liberated for contributions to a common good? Nay, that the thought of a common good so much as enters their minds? that they are possessed by any other thought than the triumph of their faction—that is, of themselves? "The only roots of the Revolution," said Camille Desmoulins, its *enfant terrible*, "are in individual self-love." M. de Tocqueville told Mr. Senior, in 1858, that seventy years of Revolution had destroyed public spirit in France: that only the most selfish vanity and covetousness remained. The only effective power left is that supplied by popular passions—*passions*

*de la cervelle* and *passions de l'estomac*—and supremacy belongs to the agitator who knows how most effectually to manipulate them. M. Renan, surveying his country now with calm, philosophic eye, describes it as “l’affreux marécage où glapissent et croupissent, pêle mêle, toutes les inepties, toutes les grossièretés, toutes les impuretés.” The Revolution has endowed every adult French male with an infinitesimal fraction of political authority, represented by the right to deposit a voting paper in the electoral urn. But how far has it conferred upon him a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, something which he does or enjoys in common with others? If the progress of society, the advance of freedom in a nation, is to be measured by the increasing development and exercise, on the whole, of individual powers of contributing to social good, what progress has society, what advance has freedom made in France during a century of Revolution?

So much in general. And if we descend to particulars, and survey the constituent elements of human liberty, so slowly and laboriously evolved during two thousand years, there is not one of them to which the Revolution, dominant in France, is not avowedly hostile,\* which it has not largely abridged,

\* “Ce sont les ennemis de la révolution qui plaident le plus chaudement en faveur de la liberté politique,” said Napoleon in 1802. Thibaudeau, *Le Consulat*, vol. iii. p. 39.

and which it does not threaten to annihilate. Personal liberty? The whole system of French criminal law, which is the branch of law most nearly affecting the masses, is based upon an odiously tyrannical presumption of guilt. The *employés* of the Government enjoy, in respect of their official acts, immunity from the ordinary tribunals. In every walk of life, the State, unchecked by those provincial and municipal liberties which are the great clogs upon arbitrary power, weighs down the individual. The idea, so dear to *doctrinaire* legislators among ourselves, is realised. The nation, to use a phrase of one of its greatest living writers, is “un peuple d'administrés,” destitute of that social hierarchy which, as Mirabeau's keen eyes discerned, is the best barrier against tyranny. The dead level of enforced equality is broken only by an aristocracy of officials, fortuitously intruded into and removable from the several departments. The “man and the citizen” is nominally sovereign. The only liberty he really enjoys is the liberty of a ticket-of-leave man under perpetual *surveillance*. Freedom is, in fact, the prerogative not of the individual, but of the State; that is to say, of the professional politicians—usually political adventurers of the lowest type—who control and prey upon the State. The picture painted by Landor, in a few pungent words, is realised: “Society trodden down, and forked together, in one and the same rotten mass, with rank weeds covering the top, and sucking out the juices.”

Pass to another element of individual freedom, the right to dispose of one's own property, which is, in fact, realised liberty. The Revolution has shown plainly enough how hostile it is to this right. Its publicists regard property as a mere privilege, which the State may, at pleasure, hold to ransom. Hence the monstrously heavy succession duties, which periodically ruin wealth and prevent its accumulation. Hence the tyrannical restriction of testamentary power, whereby France has been covered with "a multitude of small perpetual entails," while at the same time, a deadly wound has been inflicted upon the spirit of the family, that sacred institution which, next to religion and in common with religion, is the source of all virtue, of all prosperity, of all true patriotism. But, indeed, of the prerogatives of the father, the Revolution makes small account. What more monstrous invasion of them is conceivable than the arrogation by the State of a monopoly of primary education, in contemptuous disregard of a man's inviolable right and sacred duty to bring up his children as his conscience dictates? \* What heavier blow could be given to individuality—that essential element of

\* Five-and-twenty years ago, one of the most thoughtful and sincere Liberals France has ever known, the late M. Laboulaye, wrote: "S'emparer des générations nouvelles pour façonner leur esprit au gré de la mode, ou des passions du jour, c'est dépouiller l'homme du premier et du plus saint de ses droits."—*Le Parti Libéral*, p. 67.

liberty—than to cast all the youth of a country into one common mould? It must be owned that the Revolution here follows out consistently its main principle. Destroy all other inequalities, and intellectual inequality remains. Eradicate it wholly you cannot. The best means to minimise it is a uniform system of compulsory State education, like the French. And what a system! A system rooted and grounded in Atheism, and avowedly designed to produce a nation of Atheists. But the subject of the Revolution and Religion requires a chapter to itself.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE REVOLUTION AND RELIGION.

HOSTILITY to Christianity is one of the chief characteristics written upon the history of the Revolution. In the popular movement which immediately preceded it, and from which it directly issued, the clergy of France, as a body, heartily joined. The vast majority of the fifty thousand *curés* had small cause to love the *ancien régime*, with its tyrannous abuses and legalised injustice. Even among the Prelates, taken though they were, almost exclusively, from the noble caste, there were not a few strenuous advocates of reform. It was not until the *Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen* was adopted by the National Assembly, that the anti-Christian inspiration of the Revolution was clearly manifested. The underlying principles of that famous document are Rousseau's doctrines, that goodness, lawlessness and equality are the natural attributes of man: that the ultimate source of sovereignty lies in the personal rights of the separate parties to the social contract: that the

popular will is the supreme fount of justice. These are the direct negation of the Christian doctrines that man is born with a fault, a taint, a vice of nature; that he is born under the law of virtue; that he is born under subjection to the family and to those larger societies which have sprung from the family; that civil authority is of divine appointment, although it has reached those who are clothed with it through the people; that justice is anterior to all experience, wholly independent of the volition of any man or number of men, eternal, immutable, absolutely binding upon the human race, as upon the totality of existence.\* There is an entire contrariety between the *Declaration of Rights*, which

\* The following extract from the Brief *Caritas*, addressed by Pius VI. on the 10th of March, 1791, to Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld and the Bishops of the National Assembly, may well be cited here. "Jam cum hominis sit ita sua ratione uti ne supremum auctorem non tantum agnoscere, verum et colere, admirari ad eumque se suaque omnia referre debeat, cumque ipsum subjici jam ab initio majoribus suis necesse fuerit ut ab ipsis regatur atque instituatur, vitamque suam ad rationis, humanitatis religionisque normam instituere valeat; certe ab uniuscujusque ortu irritam constat atque inanem esse jactatam illam inter homines æqualitatem ac libertatem. *Necessitate subditi estote* (Ad Roman. xiii. 5). Itaque ut homines in civilem societatem coalescere possent, gubernationis forma constitui debuit, per quam jura illa libertatis adstricta sunt sub leges supremamque regnantium potestatem, ex quo consequitur quod S. Augustinus docet in hæc verba: 'Generale quippe pactum est societatis obedire regibus suis.' Quapropter hæc potestas non tam a sociali contractu quam ab ipso Deo recti justique auctore repetenda est: quod quidem confirmavit Apostolus in superius laudata Epistola: *Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit; non est enim potestas nisi a Deo*," xiii. 1.

refers the evils of the world to defective political machinery, and seeks their remedy in the manufacture of a Constitution, and the teaching of Christianity, that "out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adultery, fornication, thefts, false witness, blasphemies," which are assuredly the chief causes of those evils; that the only spring of all real improvement in humanity is in the recreation of the heart by the subduing of the passions, the purification of the affections, the renewal of the will. In a word, the Revolutionary conception of man and society is materialistic; the Christian is spiritual. The *Declaration* was supplemented within a year by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. This was an application to the ecclesiastical domain, of the Revolutionary dogma of the sovereignty of the people and the omnipotence of the State, as taught in the *Contrat Social*.\* It was a direct negation of that freedom of conscience before human law upon which, as I showed at length, in the last chapter, the Christian religion is founded. Absolutism, whether the tyrant be one or many-headed, claims dominion over the whole man, denying the value and rights of his spiritual nature, wherein liberty is rooted. To this claim, Christianity, especially in the Catholic form of an universal Church, opposes an invincible hindrance. The Civil Constitution was an invitation to the

\* "Je pensais . . . qu'il appartenait en chaque pays au seul souverain de fixer et le culte et ce dogme intelligible." *Du Contrat Social*, liv. iv. c. viii. *De la Religion Civile*.

French clergy to sacrifice their religion to the Revolution. It was accepted by only three of the whole Episcopate: Talleyrand, Loménie de Brienne, and Jarente, men notoriously lubricious in life, and Voltairian in opinion. On the 27th of November, 1790, the National Assembly, "dragged on by the logic of their ideas," as M. Albert Sorel well points out, made a decree requiring all priests to take the oath\* to the Constitution on pain of dismissal from their office, and of prosecution as disturbers of the public peace, if they continued to fulfil it. "Thus," remarks the learned historian of the Gallican Church, "the so-called reign of liberty was inaugurated by a deliberate decree of persecution.†" "Those who manufactured the *Constitution Civile*," he further observes, with entire truth, "were determined that

\* "Le serment prescrit par les articles 21 et 38 de la constitution civile, 'd'être fidèles à la loi et au Roi, et de maintenir de tout son pouvoir la constitution décrétée par l'Assemblée nationale et acceptée par le Roi,' impliquait l'adhésion aux nouvelles lois ecclésiastiques. Les prêtres qui le refuseraient seraient déchus de leurs droits; ils seraient remplacés, et s'ils s'immisçaient 'dans leurs anciens fonctions' ils seraient considérés 'comme perturbateurs du repos public,' et avec eux 'toutes personnes qui se coaliseraient pour combiner un refus d'obéir aux décrets de l'Assemblée nationale ou pour exciter des oppositions à leur exécution.' Cette assemblée de philosophes se trouvait ainsi *entraînée par la logique de ses idées* à violer, presque aussitôt après l'avoir décrété, un des principes les plus passionnément réclamés par la philosophie du siècle, la tolérance religieuse." *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, par Albert Sorel, 2<sup>e</sup> Partie, p. 126. The italics are mine.

† *The Gallican Church and the Revolution*, by the Rev. W. Henley Jervis, M.A., Prebendary of Heytesbury, p. 97.

the religious revolution should take root no less decisively than the secular.”\* The true character of that religious revolution was speedily manifested, and fully justified the presageful words of Pius VI. in condemning the Civil Constitution.† The most cherished aim of the Revolution, until Napoleon crushed it, for a while, was to abolish the Catholic faith in France.

And that has been its most cherished aim ever since. The spirit which animated the primitive Jacobins still breathes in their successors. “The enemy is Clericalism,” M. Gambetta once declared, and by “Clericalism,” in the Revolutionary jargon, is meant, primarily, Catholicism : its creed, its worship, even its morality : ‡ “la morale est regardée comme une cléricale,” a keen-witted Frenchman once observed to me. As we all know, the Revolution, since it has again made head in France, has done its best to discomfit this foe. Hardly a day passes, in that country, without some fresh injury, some new insult, against Catholicism. Even the bare profession of it constitutes, in practice, an absolute disqualification for public office.

\* *The Gallican Church and the Revolution*, by the Rev. W. Henley Jervis, M.A., Prebendary of Heytesbury, p. 119.

† “Ex ipsa conventus constitutione facile intelligunt nil aliud ab illa spectari atque agi quam ut aboleretur catholica religio.” *Brief Caritas*.

‡ It may be worth while to give here the following significant extract from a speech delivered at a Masonic banquet at Antwerp by M.

But we should greatly err if we supposed that the Revolution is inimical only to the Catholic form of religion. I said just now that "Clericalism" means, for the Revolutionary publicists, *primarily* Catholicism. But in its full signification, it embraces Christianity in every shape, even the most shadowy, in every form, even the most attenuated: nay, every kind of Theism: everything which the world has hitherto known and revered as religion. M. Louis Blanc, than whom no one has a better right to speak with authority upon this matter, expressly tells us, "Nous entendons par le cléricalisme, non seulement le catholicisme, mais toute religion et toute religiosité, quelle qu'elle soit." So M. Vacherot declares that no religion is compatible with the Revolutionary ideal.\* And this is the burden, day by day, of the Revolutionary Press throughout Europe, delivered in every variety of key, from the filthy ribaldry of 'Thersites to the dire vaticinations of Cassandra, heralding the approaching extinction, in fire and

Van Humbeck, Minister of Public Instruction in Belgium when the Revolutionary party last held office in that country: "Un cadavre est sur le monde, il barre la route du progrès. Ce cadavre du passé, pour l'appeler par son nom, carrément, sans périphrases, *c'est le catholicisme*. . . . C'est ce cadavre, mes Frères, que nous avons aujourd'hui regardé en face, et si nous ne l'avons pas jeté dans la fosse, nous l'avons soulevé du moins de manière à l'en rapprocher de quelques pas. C'est un grand résultat. Nous le devons à nos Frères d'Anvers. Nous les en remercions chaleureusement, maçonnièrement."

\* *La Démocratie*, p. 60.

bloodshed, of the Divine City. From a mass of extracts lying before me, which too amply warrant this assertion, I select the following as being one of the few that are neither obscene nor blasphemous. It is from the *Mot d'Ordre*, and may serve to show that religious Protestants are held in no less abhorrence than Catholics, by the devotees of the Revolution, nay, apparently in more. The immediate occasion of the outburst was the observance of Good Friday.

“ Cette anomalie a une explication assez naturelle, c'est que ce deuil laïque et obligatoire n'est point particulier aux catholiques, et qu'il répond aussi aux exigences de la bigoterie protestante, *qui est plus insupportable, plus haïssable que la bigoterie cléricale*. Il n'est pas de Jésuite, pas de Prémontré, pas de Mariste, qui ne soit *cent fois moins intolérant et moins hypocrite* que le premier venu des ministres de la religion dite réformée, ou de l'église évangélique.”

The war in which the Revolution is engaged is essentially a war against the Theistic idea. And it is simply because the Catholic Church is the only exponent of that idea worth considering in France, in Belgium, in Italy (for, speaking generally, whatever she loses in those countries is gained by Atheism), that she finds herself “in the fore-front of the hottest battle.” I do not know who has better and more clearly stated this truth than M. Andrieux, a person who was once, and who may again be, of great political influence in France. The following is the text of a resolution adopted

by acclamation, upon his proposition, at the Anti-Council held at Naples, in 1869 :—

"Considérant que l'idée de Dieu est la source et le soutien de tout despotisme et de toute iniquité, considérant que la religion Catholique est la plus complète et la plus terrible personification de cette idée, que l'ensemble de ses dogmes est la négation même de la société, les Libres-Penseurs assument l'obligation de travailler à l'abolition radicale du Catholicisme et son anéantissement par tous les moyens, y compris la force révolutionnaire."

Such is the attitude of the Revolution towards "all religions and all religiosity." And the reason is because it claims itself to be a religion and a religiosity. Man is a religious animal. A religion of some sort he must have, even if it be a mere anti-religion: a religion without God, without future life: \* a religion which, to borrow a phrase from Aristotle, obliterates the higher self, the self of the reason and moral nature, and recognises only the lower self of the appetites and passions. Such a religion, or anti-religion, the Revolution provides and burns to substitute for all others.

This is a truth which it is well worth while to elucidate. I propose to do so, with the help of a distinguished man of letters, who may fairly be

\* So M. de Tocqueville: "Une sorte de religion nouvelle; religion imparfaite, il est vrai, sans Dieu, sans culte, et sans autre vie, mais qui néanmoins, comme l'islamisme, a inondé toute la terre de ses soldats, de ses apôtres, et de ses martyrs." *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, Liv I. c. 3.

considered as the chief English authority regarding it. Mr. John Morley is the professed apologist of the Revolution. He has devoted many years of an active life to the endeavour to recommend it to his countrymen. And his character, no less than his ability, invests him with a special claim upon our attention. Although he has attained to a conspicuous place among party leaders, no one who has intelligently studied his writings can, for one moment, confound him with the sort of men of whom party leaders are usually made. A very able journalist—the late Mr. Hannay—when some one accused Sir Robert Peel of having no principles, replied: “Oh yes, he has principles,—as a horse-dealer has horses.” The saying was monstrously unjust to that conscientious statesman. But who can deny that it is only too applicable to a large and ever-increasing number of prominent politicians? There is the gravest reason to fear that, at no distant date, the designation of public man will be as little honourable as that of public woman. “Est-ce qu’il n’est pas tout naturel que vos convictions tournent avec votre intérêt? Elles ne changent pas pour ça: elles se déplacent: voilà tout.” So observes the clever American lady in *Rabagas*. But Mr. Morley’s convictions are of another order. They are held with an intensity of belief and an earnestness of purpose which breathe in every page of his writings. They are the very springs of his intellectual life. For these reasons Mr. Morley

may claim to speak with authority, and not as the scribes of the newspapers, regarding the inner meaning and spirit of the Revolution, regarding its relation to religion. In the remainder of this chapter I shall do little more than collect and tabulate \* his utterances on this matter. The necessity for doing so arises from the fact that Mr. Morley, with the one exception of his work on *Compromise*, has not systematically or consecutively expounded the faith that is in him. In an interesting article † he observes how dexterous Robespierre used to be in presenting a case. "First, he said everything important at the exact moment, when he had brought the minds of his hearers into the state most fitted to receive it. Second, he insinuated gradually and indirectly into their minds ideas which would have aroused opposition if they had been expressed more directly." This is also Mr. Morley's favourite method. And he has pursued it with great skill and with abundance of success.

" His plausible words  
He scattered not in ears, but grafted them,  
To grow there, and to bear."

He is well aware, as he has told us in his book on *Compromise*,‡ that "it is not easy to wind an

\* My references to Mr. Morley in this chapter, and throughout the present volume, are made to the edition of his writings published by Messrs. Macmillan in 1886.

† *Miscellanies*, vol. i. p. 47.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 6.

Englishman up to the level of dogma." But that is his avowed end. And he has displayed quite remarkable astuteness in his choice of means.

To begin with the beginning. "At the heart of the Revolution," declares Mr. Morley, "is a new way of understanding life." \* He accepts the formula, "*Révolution, Révélation*." In a passage worth citing at some length he draws this out:

"Christianity is the name for a great variety of changes which took place, during the first centuries of our era, in men's ways of thinking and feeling about their spiritual relations to unseen powers, about their moral relations to one another, about the basis and type of social union. So the Revolution is now the accepted name for a set of changes which began faintly to take a definite practical shape . . . towards the end of the eighteenth century. . . . While one movement supplied the energy and the principles which extricated civilisation from the ruins of the Roman Empire, the other supplies . . . amid the distraction of the various representatives of an obsolete ordering, the only forces to be trusted, at once for multiplying the achievements of human intelligence stimulated by human sympathy, and for diffusing their beneficent results with an ampler hand and more far-scattering arm. Faith in a divine power, devout obedience to its supposed will, hope of ecstatic, unspeakable reward—these were the springs of the old movement. Undivided love of our fellows, steadfast faith in human nature, steadfast search after justice, firm aspiration towards improvement, and generous contentment in the hope that others may reap whatever reward may be—these are the springs of the new. There is no given set of practical maxims agreed to by all members of the revolutionary schools for achieving the work of release from the pressure of an antiquated social condition, any more than there is one set of doctrines and one kind of discipline accepted by all Protestants. Voltaire was a revolutionist in one sense, Diderot in

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\* *Rousseau*, vol. i. p. 4.

another, and Rousseau in a third ; just as in the practical order, Lafayette, Danton, Robespierre, represented three different aspirations and as many methods.\* "

The Revolution, he goes on to tell us, " emphatically belongs " to the " class of great religious and moral movements." † It is, in fact, he would have us understand, " a new gospel" ‡ and a better one ; and he delights in decorating it with the terms consecrated by the usage of the old. Thus, in one place he speaks of Rousseau, as " our spiritual father that begat us." § Elsewhere he styles Hume, Rousseau, Diderot, " the fathers of the new Church," and Condorcet, Mirabeau, Robespierre, its " fiery apostles." || Robespierre is also pronounced to be " the great preacher of the Declaration of the Rights of Man ; " ¶ and the Encyclopædists are described as " a new order," \*\* bound by the new vows of " poverty, truth, and liberty," †† and destined, happily, to replace the Society of Jesus. ‡‡ " The best men of the eighteenth century," Mr. Morley avers, were possessed by " a furious and bitter antipathy against the Church, its creeds, and its book ; " §§ just as the best men of the first century had their spirits stirred within them when they saw fair cities wholly given to idolatry. He describes

\* *Rousseau*, vol. i. p. 1.

† *Ibid.* p. 4.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 136.

§ *Ibid.* p. 5

|| *Miscellanies*, vol. ii. p. 42.

¶ *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 48.

\*\* *Diderot*, vol. i. pp. 17, 130.

†† *Ibid.* p. 125.

‡‡ *Ibid.* p. 18.

§§ *Miscellanies*, vol. ii. p. 12.

Catholicism a hundred years ago, in language which recalls St. Paul's account of the heathen world, as "a true Chimera, a monster sodden in black corruption, with whom in the breast of a humane man there could be no terms."\* He is of opinion that "the Church was the most justly abhorred of all institutions."† On the other hand, as St. Peter discerned in his disciples "a chosen generation, a royal priesthood," "called out of darkness into marvellous light," so does Mr. Morley discern in Diderot and his allies "the great party of illumination,"‡ "a new priesthood," § upon whose "lawful authority" he insists, attributing to them "more generous moral ideas and higher spirituality." || Does the astonished reader stare and gasp at seeing "moral ideas" and "spirituality" ascribed to libidinous materialists like Diderot and his crew? Let him possess his soul in peace awhile. We shall see by-and-bye that in the new gospel the words "spirituality" and "morality" have a new sense. Pass we on to observe that Mr. Morley considers the aspiration of the gluttonous and obscene blasphemers, who assembled round the Baron d'Holbach's table, for the destruction of "not merely the superstitions which had grown round the Christian dogma, but every root and fragment of theistic conception," to be "a not ungenerous

\* *Voltaire*, p. 224.

† *Miscellanies*, vol. ii, p. 172.

‡ *Diderot*, vol. i. p. 9.

§ *Ibid.* p. 129.

|| *Ibid.* p. 131.

hope." \* And his chief complaint against the original leaders of the Revolution is, that their means to this end were not well chosen, but "led to a mischievous reaction in favour of Catholicism." † But I must quote Mr. Morley at some length on this subject, for so alone can justice be done to the vigour of his thought and the charm of his manner. On the 10th of November 1793—or, out of compliment to Mr. Morley, let us give the date of the revolutionary calendar, the 20th of Brumaire, year II.—took place in the cathedral of Notre Dame the famous Feast of the Goddess of Reason, ordained by the Commune of Paris at the instance of Chauvette. It is hardly necessary for me to recall the details of the function; how a well-known prostitute, Mdle. Candille, "of the Opera," personated the goddess, and was exhibited on a cloud made of pasteboard, with a pike in her hand, and the sacred red night-cap on her head—it was almost her only clothing—as the living image of the new divinity; how a lamp, symbolizing Truth, burned before her; how her breechesless adorers (*les sans-culottes*) sang in her honour a hymn written by Chenier, to a tune composed by one Gossec, a musician much in vogue then; how they proceeded subsequently to celebrate mysteries, "seemingly of a Cabiric or even

\* *Rousseau*, vol. ii. p. 256.

† *Diderot*, vol. ii. p. 165. At p. 187 of the same volume he expresses the opinion that "the smoke of the flaming châteaux went up as a savoury and righteous sacrifice to heaven."

Paphian character," writes the historian, which following his prudent example, I will "leave under the veil." I need not say that Chaumette and his friends of the Commune—worthy predecessors of the present municipal rulers of Paris—did not confine themselves to thus persuasively recommending "the more generous moral ideas and higher spirituality" of the new gospel. They also vigorously resorted to the civil sword. And now let us hear Mr. Morley upon them:

"In the winter of 1793 the Municipal party, guided by Hébert and Chaumette, made their memorable attempt to extirpate Christianity in France. The doctrine of D'Holbach's supper-table had for a short space the arm of flesh and the sword of the temporal power on its side. It was the first appearance of dogmatic atheism in Europe as a political force. This makes it one of the most remarkable moments in the Revolution, just as it makes the Revolution itself the most remarkable moment in modern history. The first political demonstration of atheism was attended by some of the excesses, the folly, the extravagances that stained the growth of Christianity. On the whole, it is a very mild story compared with the atrocities of the Jewish records or the crimes of Catholicism. The worst charge against the party of Chaumette is, that they were intolerant, and the charge is deplorably true; but this charge cannot lie in the mouth of persecuting churches. Historical recriminations, however, are not very edifying. . . . Let us raise ourselves into clearer air. The fault of the atheists is, that they knew no better than to borrow the maxims of the churchmen; and even those who agree with the dogmatic denials of the atheists—if such there be—ought yet to admit that the mere change from superstition to reason is a small gain, if the conclusions of reason are still to be enforced by the instruments of superstition. Our opinions are less important than the spirit and temper with which they possess us, and even good opinions are worth very little unless we hold them in a broad, intelligent, and spacious way. Now some of the opinions of

Chaumette were full of enlightenment and hope. He had a generous and vivid faith in humanity. . . . One can understand how an honest man would abhor the darkness and tyranny of the Church. But then, to borrow the same absolutism in the interests of new light, was inevitably to bring the new light into the same abhorrence as had befallen the old system of darkness. . . . Instead of defying the Church by the theatrical march of the Goddess of Reason under the great sombre arches of the cathedral of Our Lady, Chaumette should have found comfort in a firm calculation of the conditions.

" ' You,' he might have said to the priests—' you have so debilitated the minds of men and women by your promises and your dreams, that many a generation must come and go before Europe can throw off the yoke of your superstition. But we promise you that they shall be generations of strenuous battle. We give you all the advantages that you can get from the sincerity and pious worth of the good and simple among you. We give you all that the bad among you may get by resort to the poisoned weapons of your profession and your traditions—its bribes to mental indolence, its hypocritical affectations in the pulpit, its tyranny in the closet, its false speciousness in the world, its menace at the deathbed. With all these you may do your worst, and still humanity will escape you ; still the conscience of the race will rise away from you, still the growth of brighter ideals and a nobler purpose will go on, leaving ever further and further behind them your dwarfed finality and leaden moveless stereotype. We shall pass you by on your flank, your fieriest darts will only spend themselves on air. We will not attack you as Voltaire did ; we will not exterminate you ; we shall explain you. History will place your dogma in its class, above or below a hundred competing dogmas, exactly as the naturalist classifies his species. From being a conviction, it will sink to a curiosity ; from being the guide to millions of human lives, it will dwindle down to a chapter in a book. As History explains your dogma, so Science will dry it up ; the conception of law will silently make the conception of the daily miracle of your altars seem impossible ; the mental climate will gradually deprive your symbols of their nourishment, and men will turn their backs on your system, not because they confuted it, but because, like

witchcraft or astrology, it has ceased to interest them. The great ship of your Church, once so stout and fair, and well laden with good destinies, is become a skeleton ship ; it is a phantom hulk, with warped planks and sere canvas, and you who work it are no more than the ghosts of dead men, and at the hour when you seem to have reached the bay, down your ship will sink, like lead or like stone, to the deepest bottom.' " \*

This passage well indicates the real issue between the Revolution and Christianity. It also reveals Mr. Morley at his best as a controversialist ; "replete with mocks, full of comparisons and wounding flouts" as Voltaire himself. I shall give a few more samples of his skill in this art of "sapping a solemn creed with solemn sneer."

First, take the following, in which a parallel is more than hinted between Voltaire and the Divine Founder of Christianity :—"Voltaire had no calm breadth of wisdom. It may be so. There are movements which need, not this calm breadth of wisdom, but a two-edged sword ; and when the deliverers of mankind are they who "come to send fire on the earth." † This is very suggestive. Mr. Morley, to whose intimate acquaintance with the letter of the Sacred Scriptures every page of his writings bears witness, must be well aware who it was that said, "I am come to send fire on the earth."

Again, complaining of the prominence given to the base and contemptible squabbles which fill so

\* *Miscellanies*, vol. i. pp. 77-81.

† *Voltaire*, p. 43.

large a space in Voltaire's life, he asks: Why, after all, should men, from Moses downwards, be so cheerfully ready to contemplate the hinder parts of their divinities? " \*

Once more. In his brief and garbled account of the Voltaire-Hirsch lawsuit—"nowhere in the annals of jurisprudence is there a more despicable thing," Mr. Carlyle rightly judges †—Mr. Morley is obliged to own that the Patriarch of the new gospel, "the very eye of eighteenth-century illumination" ‡ proved himself an accomplished forger and a hardy perjurer. But he finds in the Apostolic College of the old faith a precedent at least for the perjury, which thus, under his skilful manipulation, becomes one of the "signs of an apostle": "When very hard pressed, Voltaire would not swerve from a false oath any more than his great enemy the apostle Peter had done." §

In an article in his *Miscellanies*, Mr. Morley quotes M. Taine's opinion—which is the opinion of every sane thinker—that Jean-Jacques' *Contrat Social* "is very poor stuff." By way of reply, Mr. Morley insinuates that the Epistles and Gospels of

\* Voltaire, p. 101.

† See his *History of Frederick the Great*, book xvi. c. 7, for a full and impartial account of it.

‡ Voltaire, p. 5. At p. 7 he tells us that Voltaire "never counted truth a treasure to be discreetly hidden in a napkin," but "made it a perpetual war-cry and emblazoned it on a banner."

§ Voltaire, p. 206.

Christianity are very poor stuff too. Here is the passage :

“M. Taine shows, as so many others have shown before him, that the Social Contract, when held up in the light of true political science, is very poor stuff. Undoubtedly it is so. And Quintilian—an accomplished and ingenious Taine of the first century—would have thought the Gospels and Epistles and Augustine and Jerome and Chrysostom very poor stuff, compared with the

Mellifluous streams that watered all the schools  
Of Academics, old and new, with those  
Surnamed Peripatetics, and the Sect  
Epicurean, and the Stoic severe.

And in some ways, from a literary or logical point of view, the early Christian writers could ill bear this comparison.” \*

In the same vein, in his book on Rousseau, speaking of the very nauseous matter, conveyed in a very nauseous manner, in certain too famous passages of his spiritual father's *Confessions*, he observes : “This morbid form of self-feeling is only less disgusting than the allied form which clothes itself in the phrases of religious exaltation.” And he adds : “Blot out half-a-dozen pages from Rousseau's *Confessions*, and the egotism is no more perverted than in the *Confessions* of Augustine.” †

So much may suffice to show how entirely the Revolution breathes Voltaire's aspiration *écraser l'Infâme*, and how skilfully its English apostle em-

\* *Miscellanies*, vol. iii. p. 278.

† *Rousseau*, vol. ii. p. 303. So in the next page : “No monk or saint ever wrote anything more revolting in its blasphemous self-feeling.”

ploys the same weapons which that philosopher was wont to wield. As might be expected the ministers of the *Infâme* fare as badly at the hands of Mr. Morley as their Divinity. He pronounces the main notes of the sacerdotal temperament to be "sense of personal importance," "thin unction," and "private leanings to the cord and stake." \* He is of opinion that "an archbishop owes it to himself to blaspheme against reason and freedom in superlatives of malignant unction." † The severest thing he can bring himself to say of Voltaire is that "he often sank to the level of ecclesiastics." ‡ And he pleads in extenuation of a certain perjury committed by Diderot, that such an "apostle of the new doctrine was perhaps good enough for the preachers of the old." § "Theologians," he maintains, "rest on the vileness of men," while the apostles of the new faith, he instances Condorcet as an example, "rested on their goodness." || To "orthodox apologists" "the stern and serene composure of the historical conscience is always unknown:" ¶ always: there is no exception, from the days of Justin Martyr to the days of Cardinal Newman. The clergy are essentially lovers of despotism and haters of liberty. "When the people take their own government into their own hands, the clergy are sure to turn cold or antipathetic towards improve-

\* *Miscellanies*, vol. i. p. 44.

† *Rousseau*, vol. ii. p. 83.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 84.

§ *Diderot*, vol. i. p. 111.

|| *Miscellanies*, vol. ii. p. 241.

¶ *Ibid.*

ment.”\* Of the early martyrs who, with their eyes fixed on the Cross of Christ, counted it joy to be admitted to the fellowship of His sufferings, he pronounces dogmatically that “their solace was found in barbarous mysteries.”† Baptism he classes among ceremonies which are “no better than mere mummeries.”‡ “The false mockeries of the shrine of the Hebrew divinity” are “now made plain to scornful eyes.”§ It is of course against the Catholic Church, as the great fortress and bulwark of historic Christianity, that Mr. Morley chiefly directs the heavy artillery of his flouts and gibes. But to Protestantism, if really earnest, he is hardly less hostile. “The great evangelical revival,” he holds, “has ever since warped intellectual growth in England.”|| And if, on the whole, he views Protestantism with greater indulgence than Catholicity, it is because he regards it as inchoate scepticism, sure to issue eventually in bald deism or even in sheer atheism. He observes that it was through Voltaire that “the free and protesting genius of the Reformation, late and changed, but directly of descent, made its decisive entry into France.”¶ He judges, however, that “the Protestant dilution of the theological spirit seems to be, in the long run, a more effective preparation for decisive abandonment of it, than

\* *Miscellanies*, vol. ii. p. 127. † *Rousseau*, vol. ii. p. 279.

‡ *Compromise*, p. 187.

§ *Rousseau*, vol. ii. p. 201.

|| *Voltaire*, p. 96.

¶ *Ibid.* p. 91.

virulent dissolution in the biting acids of Voltairism." \* Even the moral character of the Divine Founder of Christianity does not escape his acrid criticism. Thus does he take to task the late Mr. Mill for the tribute paid by that philosopher to the stainless perfection of Christ :

"This unconditional exaltation of the Christ of the Gospels as "the pattern of perfection for humanity," as "the ideal representative and guide," and so forth, can only be possible to such a moralist as Mr. Mill was, or as any enlightened person of our day must be, by means of a process of selection and arbitrary rejection. We may, no doubt—and many of us do—construct an ideal figure out of the sayings, the life, and the character of the great figure of the Gospels. Mr. Mill's panegyric should remind us that we do this only on condition of shutting our eyes to about one-half of the portraits as drawn in the gospels. I mean that not merely are some essential elements of the highest morality omitted, but that there are positive injunctions and positive traits recorded which must detract in the highest degree from the justice of an unqualified eulogium. Mr. Mill allows in one place that the noble moralities of Christ are "mixed with some poetical exaggerations, and some maxims of which it is difficult to ascertain the precise object." This is far too moderate an account of the matter. There are sayings morally objectionable and superstitious in the highest degree, and we have no more right arbitrarily to shift the discredit of these on to the shoulders of the disciples or narrators than we have to deny to them all possibility of credit for what is admirable. This, however, is a side of the argument which it would perhaps do more harm than good to press. Even an excessive admiration for a benign and nobly pitiful character is so attractive and so wholesome, that one can have scanty satisfaction in searching for defective traits. That Mr. Mill should have committed himself to a position which calls for this deprecatory withdrawal from the critic, is one of the puzzles and perplexities of the book. It is astonishing that he

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\* *Voltaire*, p. 220.

should not have seen that his conception of the character of the Prophet of Nazareth was moulded in obedience to his own subjective requirement in the way of ethical beauty, and could only be made to correspond with the objective picture in the Gospel record by means of an arbitrary suppression of some of the most remarkable sayings and striking traits. It is a process in fashion. Human experience has widened ; many narrow superstitions have dropped off ; the notion of right and duty has been impregnated with new ingredients ; the ideal has changed. Then we proceed to the anachronism of fastening the new ideal on our favourite figures of antique days, without regard either to obvious historic conditions or to the plain and unmistakable letter of the antique record. ‘ One of the hardest burdens,’ as Mr. Mill says, ‘ laid upon the other good influences of human nature has been that of improving religion itself.’ Let us carefully abstain, then, from falsifying the history of the development of human nature by imputing, either to the religions of the past, or to their founders, perfections of which it is historically impossible that either one or the other should have been possessed. Let us not assume that Christ was so infinitely ‘ over the heads of his reporters,’ to use Mr. Arnold’s phrase, and then proceed to construct an arbitrary anthology of sayings which we choose to accept as Christ’s on the strength of this assumption. It were surely more consonant with intelligence of method to content ourselves with tracing in Christ, as in the two or three other great teachers of the world, who are not beneath him in psychagogic efficacy, such words and traits as touch our spiritual sense and fit in with the later and more mature perceptions of the modern time. And why should we not do this without fretting against discords in act or speech that were only to be expected from the conditions ; and still more, without straining our own intelligence, and coercing the record into yielding us a picture of transcendent and impossible faultlessness ? ” \*

These extracts will perhaps be sufficient to exhibit the real nature of the conflict between the Gospel of the first century and the Gospel of the eighteenth,

\* *Fortnightly Review*, vol. xxiii. p. 120.

between Christianity and the Revolution. Mr. Morley tersely sums the matter up: "Those who agree with the present writer, positively, absolutely, and without reserve, reject as false the whole system of objective propositions which make up the popular belief of the day, in one and all of its theological expressions." \* Let us now sit at his feet awhile to learn some particulars of the new religion which he so fervently preaches, and see what he has to tell us of its faith and morals.

Mr. Morley justly observes that "at the bottom of all the great discussions of modern society lie the two momentous questions: first, whether there is a God, and secondly, whether the soul is immortal." † To both these questions the new gospel gives a negative answer. I do not mean to say that positive Atheism is of faith in the Revolutionary religion. Mr. Morley himself, whose orthodoxy is, I suppose, beyond question, does not profess it in express terms, although he manifests much admiration for its professors, ‡ as being, at all events, much more sensible than Theists. His own opinion seems to be that the existence of God is "an insoluble question." §

\* *Compromise*, p. 160.

† *Ibid.* p. 128.

‡ "The Atheists . . . were, in effect, the teachers of public spirit and beneficence" (*Diderot*, vol. ii. p. 190). In vol. i. of this work, p. 130, he tells us that Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau were the true reformers of the Catholic creed.

§ *Rousseau*, vol. i. p. 316.

And he has not the least sympathy with "the sentimental juvenilities of children crying for light." \* He intimates, not obscurely, that if there is any God, He cannot be, as Christianity teaches, Love; nay, that He cannot be benevolent, nor even ethical. Admirable master of language as he is, he appears to be at a loss for words adequate to the expression of his contempt for those fatuous persons who "find joy in meditating on the moral perfections of the omnipotent Being, for whose diversion the dismal panorama of all the evil work done under the sun was bidden to unfold itself, and who sees that it is very good." † And in criticising Mr. Mill, he writes as follows:—

"It is conceivable that the world may have been created by a Being who is not good, not pitiful, not benevolent, not just; a Being no more entitled to our homage or worship than Francesco Cenci was entitled to the filial piety of his unhappy children. Why not? Morality concerns the conduct and relations of human beings, and of them only. We cannot know, nor indeed does it seem easy to believe, that the principles which cover the facts of social relationship must therefore be adequate to guide or explain the motions of a Demiurgus, holding the universal ordering in the hollow of his hand. To insist on rejecting any theory of creation which forbids us to predicate anything of the Creator in terms of morality, seems

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\* *Voltaire*, p. 69. I suppose the reference is to Lord Tennyson's noble lines:

"So runs my dream: but what am I?  
An infant crying in the night:  
An infant crying for the light,  
And with no language but a cry."

† *Miscellanies*, vol. iii. p. 84.

as unphilosophical as to insist on rejecting the evolutionary theory of the origin of the human species on the ground that it robs man of his nobility and dignity. If any one feels bound to praise and worship the Creator he is bound to invest the object of his worship with praiseworthy attributes. But a philosopher is not bound to do anything except to explain the facts." \*

Mr. Morley's practical conclusion is, that sensible men will be content to be what St. Paul calls *ἀθεοι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*, "without God in the world," and is thus expressed in a passage of his *Rousseau* :

"Rousseau urged that Voltaire robbed men of their only solace. What Voltaire really did urge was that the solace derived from the attribution of humanity and justice to the Supreme Being, and from the metaphysical account of evil, rests on too narrow a base either to cover the facts, or to be a true solace to any man who thinks and observes. He ought to have gone on, if it had only been possible in those times, to persuade his readers that there is no solace attainable, except that of an energetic fortitude." †

The Revolutionary religion, then, is devoid of any Theistic conception. And the place which God holds in the old Gospel is to be filled in the new by Man. The creed of the Revolution is, in point of fact, a kind of Positivism. "The coming modification of religion," Mr. Morley tells us, "will undoubtedly rest upon the solidarity of mankind, as Comte said." ‡ And in the spirit of that philosopher he would have men "turn back to the history of their own kind, to the long chronicle of its manifold experiences, for an adequate system of life and an

\* *Fortnightly Review*, vol. xxiii. p. 122.

† *Rousseau*, vol. i. p. 318.

‡ *Miscellanies*, vol. iii. p. 50.

inspiring social faith.” \* “Acquiescence in Naturalism,” Mr. Morley praises as “wise and not inglorious.” † “The theologian,” he judges, “discourages men: the naturalist arouses them: he supplies them with the most powerful of motives for the energetic use of the most powerful of their endowments.” ‡ “The preacher of Naturalism replaces a futile vanity in being the end and object of creation, by a fruitful reverence for the supremacy of human reason.” § In “Naturalism in art,” || we have one “note” of the Revolution. In “materialistic solutions in the science of man” we have another. ¶ Mr. Morley admits “that it may be convenient for purposes of classification to divide a man into body and soul, even when we believe the soul to be only a function of the body;” \*\* which is clearly his own opinion. The spirit, he holds, is “annihilated” by death. †† He tells us that “the only means through which the basis of a true positivism can be firmly laid” is “to establish at the bottom of men’s minds the habit of seeking explanations of all phenomena in experience, and building up from the beginning the great positive principle that we can only know phenomena, and can only

\* *Miscellanies*, vol. i. p. 220.

† *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 179.

‡ *Diderot*, vol. ii. p. 177.

§ *Ibid.*

|| *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 8.

¶ *Ibid.*

\*\* *Rousseau*, vol. i. p. 81.

†† *Miscellanies*, vol. ii. p. 210. Elsewhere he speaks of death as “eternal sleep” (*Miscellanies*, vol. i. p. 35).

know them experientially.” \* Perhaps his fullest exposition of the Revolutionary doctrine on this important matter is conveyed in the following passage, which, moreover, is well worth citing for its literary excellence :—

“Positivity is the cardinal condition of strength for times when theology lies in decay, and the abstractions which gradually replaced the older gods have in their turn ceased to satisfy the intelligence and mould the will. All competent persons agree that it is the first condition of the attainment of scientific truth. Nobody denies that men of action find in it the first law of successful achievement in the material order. Its varied but always superlative power in the region of æsthetics is only an object of recent recognition, though great work enough has been done in past ages by men whose recognition was informal and inexpress. It is plain that, in the different classes of æsthetic manifestation there will be differences in objective shape and colour, corresponding to the varied limits and conditions of the matter with which the special art has to deal; but the critic may expect to find in all a profound unity of subjective impression, and that, the impression of a self-sustaining order and a self-sufficing harmony among all those faculties and parts and energies of universal life, which come within the idealising range of art. In other words, the characteristically modern inspiration is the inspiration of law. The regulated play of forces shows itself as fit to stir those profound emotional impulses which wake the artistic soul, as ever did the gracious or terrible gods of antique or middle times. There are glories in Turner’s idealisation of the energies of matter, which are at least as nobly imaginative and elevated, in spite of the conspicuous absence of the human element in them, as the highest products of the artists who believed that their work was for the service and honour of a deity.

“It is as mistaken to suppose that this conviction of the supremacy of a cold and self-sustained order in the universe is fatal to emotional expansion, as it would be to suppose it fatal to intellectual

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\* *Miscellanies*, vol. iii. p. 73.

curiosity. Experience has shown in the scientific sphere, that the gradual withdrawal of natural operations from the grasp of the imaginary volitions of imaginary beings has not tamed, but greatly stimulated and fertilised scientific curiosity as to the conditions of these operations. Why should it be otherwise in the æsthetic sphere? Why should all that part of our mental composition which responds to the beautiful and imaginative expression of real truths, be at once inflamed and satisfied by the thought that our whole lives, and all the movements of the universe, are the objects of the inexplicable caprice of Makers who are also Destroyers, and yet grow cold, apathetic, and unproductive, in the shadow of the belief that we can only know ourselves as part of the stupendous and inexorable succession of phenomenal conditions, moving according to laws that may be formulated positively, but not interpreted morally, to new destinies that are eternally unfathomable? Why should this conception of a coherent order, free from the arbitrary and presumptuous stamp of certain final causes, be less favourable, either to the ethical or æsthetic side of human nature, than the older conception of the regulation of the course of the great series by a multitude of intrinsically meaningless and purposeless volitions? The alertness of our sensations for all sources of outer beauty remains unimpaired. The old and lovely attitude of devout service does not pass away to leave vacancy, but is transformed into a yet more devout obligation and service towards creatures that have only their own fellowship and mutual ministry to lean upon; and if we miss something of the ancient solace of special and personal protection, the loss is not unworthily made good by the growth of an imperial sense of participation in the common movement and equal destination of eternal forces.

“To have a mind penetrated with this spiritual persuasion, is to be in full possession of the highest strength that man can attain. It springs from a scientific and rounded interpretation of the facts of life, and is in a harmony, which freshly found truths only make more ample and elaborate, with all the conclusions of the intellect in every order. The active energies are not paralyzed by the possibilities of enfeebling doubt, nor the reason drawn down and stultified by apprehension lest its methods should discredit a document, or its inferences clash with a dogma, or its light flash unseasonably

on a mystery. There is none of the baleful distortion of hate, because evil and wrongdoing and darkness are acknowledged to be effects of causes, sums of conditions, terms in a series; they are to be brought to their end, or weakened and narrowed, by right action and endeavour, and this endeavour does not stagnate in antipathy, but concentrates itself in transfixing a cause. In no other condition of the spirit than this, in which firm acquiescence mingles with valorous effort, can a man be so sure of raising a calm gaze and an enduring brow to the cruelty of circumstance. The last appalling stroke of annihilation itself is measured with purest fortitude by one, whose religious contemplation dwells most habitually upon the sovereignty of obdurate laws in the vast revolving circle of physical forces, on the one hand, and, on the other, upon that moral order which the vision and pity of good men for their fellows, guiding the spontaneous energy of all men in strife with circumstance, have raised into a structure sublimer and more amazing than all the majesty of outer nature." \*

"Our new creed," Mr. Morley modestly admits is "but rudimentary." † Still, its main outlines are, perhaps, indicated with sufficient clearness in the passages which I have cited. At its present stage of development, indeed, it is affirmative chiefly in negation. "Whosoever will be saved," it proclaims, "must before all things reject the elder gods," to whom Mr. Morley will not so much as "offer a pinch of incense." ‡ Turn we to the ethics of the new religion.

Now, as a matter of fact, the morality of the old

\* *Miscellanies*, vol. i. p. 236. † *Compromise*, p. 167.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 195. So at p. 75: "To have been deprived of the faith of the old dispensation is the first condition of strenuous endeavour after the new."

religion is associated with the two great positions which the new rejects—belief in the existence of God, and belief in the immortality of the soul. Kant judged these beliefs the necessary postulates of ethics. Mr. Morley thinks differently. “If the Deity is not good in the same sense as men are said to be good”—and that unquestionably is Mr. Morley’s opinion of “the Hebrew divinity,” should such a Being really exist—“then it is a depraving mockery to make morality consist in doing his will.”\* While “the natural effect of abandoning belief in another life,” is “an energetic interest in arrangements for improving the lot of man in this life.”† Does the reader demur to this *ipse dixit* as opposed to the experience of mankind in all ages? Mr. Morley will prove its truth by one conclusive example. Consider Chaumette, he urges—Chaumette,‡ “the fiery apostle” of the dogma that death is an eternal sleep; the inventor of the worship of Reason. If you are not fully convinced of the truth of Mr. Morley’s thesis when you reflect upon the nature of Chaumette’s “arrangements for im-

\* *Fortnightly Review*, vol. xxiii. p. 122.

† *Miscellanies*, vol. i. p. 78.

‡ “Chaumette showed the natural effect of abandoning belief in another life by his energetic interest in arrangements for improving the lot of man in this life.” (*Miscellanies*, vol. i. p. 78.) To the first part of this proposition, at all events, we may assent, and it is always a pleasure to agree with Mr. Morley if one can. Chaumette undoubtedly is an excellent example of “the natural effect of abandoning belief in another life.”

proving the lot of man in this life," if you experience misgivings when you recall the direction which his energy took, you are clearly still in the "gall of bitterness and in the bond of iniquity," you have no dispositions for faith in the new gospel. Let once the bright beams which stream from "the party of illumination" enter your mind, and then assuredly you will perceive, in the light of this great example, that men will be "more likely to have a deeper love for those about them, and a keener dread of filling a home with aching hearts, if they courageously realised from the beginning of their days that . . . the black and horrible grave is indeed the end." \*

But let us proceed. The morality of the old religion was bound up with the belief in man's liberty of volition. Human personality it regarded as manifested under the condition of free will, influenced but not coerced by motives, endowed with power of choice between alternative courses. Upon this foundation rested the whole edifice of man's duty, public and private. The human *can* was the correlative of the divine *ought*. But if there is no God, the Creator, Sovereign, and Judge of men, and man is a mere machine with no more soul than a steam-engine, we are reduced to determinism, which, indeed, is a primary dogma of the new gospel. And so Mr. Morley pronounces that the

\* *Rousseau*, vol. i. p. 220.

doctrine of free will is “virtually unmeaning” \*—as to him it of course must be—and to the fatuous persons who believe it, he opposes “sensible people who accept the scientific account of human action.” “*Sapientes qui sentiunt mecum.*” Still, those of us who are thus under sentence of intellectual reprobation, may find some consolation in the thought that we are in the company of Plato and Aristotle, of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, of Leibnitz and Kant. Let us now see how Mr. Morley proposes to get ethics out of necessarianism:

“This brings us to Holbach’s treatment of Morals. The moment had come to France which was reached at an earlier period in English speculation, when the negative course of thought in metaphysics drove men to consider the basis of ethics. How were right and wrong to hold their own against the new mechanical conception of the Universe?”

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“Holbach begins by a most unflinching exposure of the inconsistency with all that we know of nature, of the mysterious theory of Free Will. This remains one of the most effective parts of the book and perhaps the work has never been done with a firmer hand. The conclusion is expressed with a decisiveness that seems almost crude. There is declared to be no difference between a man who throws himself out of the window and the man whom I throw out, except this, that the impulse acting on the second comes from without, and that the impulse determining the fall of the first comes from within his own mechanism. You have only to get down to the motive, and you will invariably find that the motive is beyond the actor’s own power or reach. The inexorable logic with which the author presses the Free-Willer from one retreat to another, and from shift to shift, leaves his adversary at last exactly as naked and defenceless before Holbach’s vigorous and thoroughly realised

Naturalism as the same adversary must always be before Jonathan Edwards' vigorous theism. 'The system of man's liberty,' Holbach says with some pungency, 'seems only to have been invented in order to put him in a position to offend his God, and so to justify God in all the evil that he inflicted on man, for having used the freedom which was so disastrously conferred upon him.'

"If man be not free, what right have we to punish those who cannot help committing bad actions, or to reward others who cannot help committing good actions? Holbach gives to this and the various other ways of describing fatalism as dangerous to society, the proper and perfectly adequate answer. He turns to the quality of the action, and connects with that the social attitude of praise and blame. Merit and demerit are associated with conduct according as it is thought to affect the common welfare advantageously or the reverse. My indignation and my approval are as necessary as the acts that excite these sentiments. My feelings are neither more nor less spontaneous than the deciding motives of the actor. Whatever be the necessitating cause of our actions, I have a right to do my best by praise and blame, by reward and punishment, to strengthen or to weaken, to prolong or to divert, the motives that are the antecedents of the action; exactly as I have a right to dam up a stream, or to divert its course, or otherwise deal with it to suit my own convenience. Penal laws, for instance, are ways of offering to men strong motives, to weigh in the scale against the temptation of an immediate personal gratification.

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"Holbach answers effectively enough the common objection that his fatalism would plunge men's souls into apathy. If all is necessary, why should I not let things go, and myself remain quiet? As if we *could* stay our hands from action, if our feelings were trained to proper sensibility and sympathy. As if it were possible for a man of tender disposition not to interest himself keenly in all that concerns the lot of his fellow-creatures. How does our knowledge that death is necessary prevent us from deploring the loss of a beloved one? How does my consciousness that it is the inevitable property of fire to burn, prevent me from using all my efforts to prevent a conflagration?

"Finally, when people urge that the doctrine of necessity degrades

man by reducing him to a machine, and likening him to some growth of abject vegetation, they are merely using a kind of language that was invented in ignorance of what constitutes the true dignity of man. What is nature itself but a vast machine, in which our human species is no more than one weak spring? The good man is a machine whose springs are adapted so to fulfil their functions as to produce beneficent results for his fellows. How could such an instrument not be an object of respect and affection and gratitude?

"In closing this part of Holbach's book, while not dissenting from his conclusions, we will only remark how little conscious he seems of the degree to which he empties the notions of praise and blame of the very essence of their old contents. It is not a modification, but the substitution of a new meaning under the old names. Praise in its new sense of admiration for useful and pleasure-giving conduct or motive, is as powerful a force and as adequate an incentive to good conduct and good motives, as praise in the old sense of admiration for a deliberate and voluntary exercise of a free-acting will. But the two senses are different. The old ethical association is transformed into something which usage and the requirements of social self-preservation must make equally potent, but which is not the same. If Holbach and others who hold necessarian opinions were to perceive this more frankly, and to work it out fully, they would prevent a confusion that is very unfavourable to them in the minds of most of those whom they wish to persuade. It is easy to see that the work next to be done in the region of morals is the readjustment of the ethical phraseology of the volitional stage, to fit the ideas proper to the stage in which man has become as definitely the object of science as any of the other phenomena of the universe." \*

It has been my object, in this chapter, to allow Mr. Morley himself to expound the new gospel of which he is the most considerable prophet among us. I have not been concerned to refute his opinions. To speak plainly—which I trust I may do without

\* *Diderot*, vol. ii. pp. 178-183.

incurring the imputation of discourtesy—his opinions seldom seem to me worth the trouble of refuting. But before I go on, I may observe upon the passage which I have just cited, that it does not give one a very exalted impression of Mr. Morley's capacity for philosophical inquiry. If men be not free, what right have we to punish those who cannot help committing bad actions, or to reward others who cannot help committing good actions? That is the question. Holbach's answer is in effect: We may praise or blame a machine according as it gives us pleasure or pain; and if the machine is intelligent, our praise or blame will supply motives for its acts. This answer Mr. Morley commends as "proper, and perfectly adequate." It is true, he adds, that Holbach thus "empties the notions of praise and blame of the very essence of their old contents." Of course this is true. And that—although Mr. Morley quite fails to perceive it—is a sufficient answer to Holbach. An ethical element is of the essence of what we mean by praise or blame. And for that element there is no room in the philosophy of the Revolution as authoritatively expounded by Holbach and by Mr. Morley. Hence they are under the necessity of denying it, or of explaining it away, as Mr. Morley seeks to do when he grotesquely tells us that "a machine whose springs are adapted so to fulfil their functions as to produce beneficent results"—a "patent self-guiding perambulator," for example—must "be an object of

respect, and affection, and gratitude." No. The moral element in praise or blame is not artificial. It is in the nature of men, and no fork of determinism will expel it thence. "I have a right to do my best, by praise and blame, by reward and punishment, to strengthen or to weaken, to prolong or to divert, the motives that are the antecedents of the action; exactly as I have a right to dam up a stream, or to divert its course, or otherwise deal with it, to suit my own convenience." Surely this is what Sir Toby Belch would call "exceeding good senseless." Right! Why every one has a right to do what he cannot help doing. The word "right" implies moral quality. But if our actions, good or bad, are simply the necessitated outcome of machinery, moral quality does not exist in them. "As if we *could* stay our hands from action, if our feelings were trained to proper sensibility and sympathy!" But if they are not so trained, the reason is that they cannot be trained, and it is no one's fault, but arises from the nature of the machine: "*velle non discitur*" is an axiom of determinism. "As if it were possible for a man of tender disposition not to interest himself keenly in all that concerns the lot of his fellow creatures." But men are not, as a rule, of tender disposition. Nor assuredly does the philosophy of the Revolution make them such. Empty men of the notion of God, which you denounce, with Mr. Morley, as hateful and ridiculous; abolish the old volitional

morality, as "the pedantic requirements of unreal ethics," and substitute for it "usage and the requirements of social self-preservation;" teach man that his true dignity lies in this—that he is "one weak spring" in the vast machine of nature, and, in point of fact, you hand over the human mammal, helpless and impotent, to the blind impulses of egoism, to the terrible heritage of savage instincts, accumulated in his nervous system, and now barely held in check by religion and philosophy. The work of civilisation is undone, and "*homo homini lupus*" is again the true account of the human race. "Sensibility," and "sympathy," and "tender disposition!" I confess this cant sickens me. The image of Joseph Surface rises before my mind, and I incline to say with old Sir Peter Teazle, "Oh! damn your sentiment." One knows very well what the issue of it really is; and how these rose-water revolutionists who set out with affirming that all is good in man's nature, end by finding the human race "suspect." Mr. Morley, as we have seen, professes to go by the facts. He glorifies "the great positive principle" that "we can only know phenomena, and can know them only experientially." Let him keep to the phenomena of human life, and assuredly the optimistic haze in which he views it will soon fade away. As assuredly, experience will certify to him the fact that our motives can be within our power. "Sir, we know that our will is free, and there's an end of it," said Dr. Johnson. Of course this dictum

requires to be limited and guarded, and thrown into scientific shape, before a metaphysician can accept it.\* But it is a rough-and-ready expression of a truth overwhelmingly demonstrated by the every-day experience of life, to which alone Mr. Morley, upon his own principles, has a right to refer. As to the argument from inanimate nature, where we all admit that necessity rules, to that which happens in what—*pace* Mr. Morley—is another province altogether, the human spirit, it is altogether irrational. It is like saying that sight is impossible because we have no eyes in the stomach. For the rest, the practical consequences to human society of the ethics, or unethics, taught by the new religion, appear to me to be abundantly clear. With what is called metaphysical liberty, with freedom of volition, merit and demerit disappear too. Human causality, human spontaneity, human responsibility, all die before the “uncreating word” of the Revolution. Its doctrine of absolute irresponsibility makes an end of ethics; its criminal legislation can be nothing but *vancæ sine moribus leges*. For the sting of punishment is not the actual fact—“stone walls do not a prison make”—but the moral disapprobation of which the fact is evidence. But how visit with moral disapprobation those who were incapable of doing anything but what they did? Poor victims of temperament, of heredity, of en-

\* I may refer those of my readers who desire to see a really philosophical discussion of this question to Lotze's *Microcosmus*, Book. ii. c. 5, and Book vii. c. 3.

vironment, they are to be pitied, not blamed; while, indeed, we seclude them for the protection of our persons and pockets; for we are the numerical majority, we can appeal to the *ultima ratio* of force, if to nothing higher. It is no fancy picture which I am now drawing. Fifty years ago Balzac wrote: "Crime has been made poetical; tears are drivelled over assassins." True as his words were then, they are even truer now. The idea of law as the embodied conscience of a nation of persons, the belief in justice, in the old sense, as something quite transcending mere expediency—*fiat justitia percat mundus*—the conception of the civil magistrate as a minister of the retribution ordained by that justice as "the other half of crime"—these things have well-nigh died out from the popular mind, where, in place of the old spiritual principles of ethics, the Revolution has substituted natural history.

Such is the necessary, the inevitable effect, upon the public order of that determinism which is a primary dogma of the revolutionary religion. The bond of civil society is obedience to law, fenced round with penalties. But legislation rests upon the doctrine of human responsibility. To that doctrine necessarianism is fatal. And if law, with penal sanctions, be the bond of civil society, the family is certainly its foundation. Where wedlock and legal paternity are unknown, and complete promiscuity prevails in the relations of the sexes—as among the aborigines of Australia and Fiji—civilisation

does not exist. The State depends upon the family, and the family depends upon marriage. Now, marriage, as it is still found in Europe, is mainly the creation of Christianity. Wordsworth gave utterance to no poetical fancy, but to the exact truth, when he sang of "pure religion breathing household laws." What will become of marriage, and of that virtue of purity of which it is the guardian, when the new religion imposes its ethics on the world, and the Gospel of Jesus Christ is superseded by the Gospel of the Revolution?

Let us ever remember that the first law of the Gospel of Jesus Christ is self-denial: conformity to the mind of the Master, who pleased not Himself: the taking up of His cross: the immolation thereon of the flesh, with its affections and lusts. As I have written elsewhere:

"There can be no question at all that Christianity presented itself to the decadent and moribund civilisation of the Roman Empire as an ascetic doctrine: a doctrine of abstinence, not only from the things which it branded as positively sinful, but from things in themselves licit. The world—which St. John exhorts his disciples not to love, because the love of it is incompatible with the love of the Father, which he describes as lying in the wicked one, which over and over again in the New Testament the disciples of Christ are bidden to forsake and overcome, and which (such is the vitality of phrases) stands even in our own day for the complete antithesis of the Church—is the present visible frame of things, doomed, as these early preachers believed, soon to pass away with the lust thereof; the flesh—in which St. Paul declared no good thing to dwell, which it was his daily endeavour to keep under and bring into subjection—is the whole of man's lower or animal nature. Whatever is doubtful, this is clear. And to those who do not

admit it we may say, without discourtesy, that, whether through ignorance or prejudice, they are so hopelessly in the dark on this matter as to render any argument with them regarding it mere waste of time. The principle, then, which transformed the individual by the renewing of his mind, was the principle of self-sacrifice. And this was the principle which transformed society.\*

Now, the teaching of Christianity about the virtue of purity rests upon the asceticism which is so essential a part of that religion. To live out one's impulses with no restraints, save those imposed by prudential moderation, was the highest counsel of that ancient naturalism which deified and worshipped the passion of desire. The precept of St. Peter is "*abstinere a carnalibus desideriis*": "to abstain from fleshly lusts"; and the reason he gives for such abstinence is, that they "war against the soul." "*Bonum est homini mulierem non tangere,*" writes St Paul. It is a counsel of perfection, given only to those who are able to receive it. To the multitude, whose lives are led upon the lower levels of humanity, marriage is conceded *propter fornicationem*, or, as the Anglican Nuptial Service puts it, correctly interpreting the unbroken Christian tradition of fifteen centuries; "that those who have not the gift of continency might keep themselves undefiled members of Christ's body." It is conceded, and it is transformed. From a mere civil contract it becomes "a great sacrament," holy and indissoluble: the curb of man's lawless

\* *Chapters in European History*, vol. i. p 84.

appetite and the bulwark of woman's fragile honour. There can be no question at all that upon this ascetic treatment of the most potent and deeply rooted of man's instincts, Christian civilisation is based. It has been well observed by a learned writer :

"When [Christianity] began its great work, not only was the unity of marriage broken by repudiation of the bond and perpetual violation of its sanctity, but in the background of all civilised life lurked a host of abominations, all tending to diminish the fertility of the human race, and to destroy life in its beginning and in its progress. . . . [The Church] succeeded not only in rolling back the tide of pollution, but in establishing the basis of all social life, the unity and indissolubility of marriage. . . . The power of a sacrament had silently been insinuated into the decayed, the almost pulverised foundations of social life, and built them up with the solidity of a rock, which would bear the whole superstructure of the city of God." \*

Let us turn now to the new gospel, and see what is its teaching upon this matter of such ineffable importance to society. Mr. Morley, in a passage of his *Voltaire*, very clearly indicates the attitude of the Revolution towards what he calls "the mediæval superstition about purity." † The adjective "mediæval" is, I suppose, rather vituperative than descriptive, the "superstition" in question being an essential part of Christianity, and no more peculiar to the Middle Ages than to any other period in the history of that religion:—

"The peculiarity of the licence of France in the middle of the eighteenth century is, that it was looked upon with complacency by

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\* *Formation of Christendom*, by T. W. Allies, vol. i. p. 306.

† *Voltaire*, p. 152.

the great intellectual leaders of opinion. It took its place in the progressive formula. What austerity was to other forward movements, licence was to this. It is not difficult to perceive how so extraordinary a circumstance came to pass. Chastity was the supreme virtue in the eyes of the Church, the mystic key to Christian holiness. Continence was one of the most sacred of the pretensions by which the organised preachers of superstition claimed the reverence of men and women. It was identified, therefore, in a particular manner with that Infamous against which the main assault of the time was directed. So men contended, more or less expressly, first, that continence was no commanding chief among virtues, then that it was a very superficial and easily practised virtue, finally that it was no virtue at all, but if sometimes a convenience, generally an impediment to free human happiness." \*

Quite in accordance with these views of the apostles and evangelists of the Revolution, Mr. Morley declares "the Catholic ideal of womanhood no more adequate to the facts of life than Catholic views about science, or property, or labour, or

\* *Voltaire*, p. 149. "The progressive formula," in its application to the relations of the sexes, must, I suppose, be considered to have been fully realised by the law of the 20th of September, 1792, which made of marriage a contract terminable at the pleasure of either party, and, in fact, reduced it to mere concubinage. By way of complement to this legislation the Convention decreed, on the 2nd of November in the same year, that natural children should be on the same footing as legitimate in the matter of succession. The words of Cambacérès, in recommending this change, are so significant that it may be worth while to cite them. "Il ne peut y avoir deux sortes de paternité, et nul intérêt ne peut prévaloir sur les *droits du sang*. Ce serait faire injure à des législateurs sans préjugé que d'oser croire qu'ils fermeront l'oreille à la voix incorruptible de la nature, pour consacrer à la fois et la tyrannie de l'habitude et les erreurs des jurisconsultes."

political order or authority.”\* He lifts up his testimony against “the mutilating hand of religious asceticism,”† and in another place, using the same significant phrase, he declares that “every branch of the Church, from the oldest to the youngest and crudest, has in its degree afflicted and retarded mankind” with “mutilation.”‡ He cites approvingly Diderot’s opinion, that “what they call evangelical perfection is only the mischievous art of stifling Nature.”§ Apparently Diderot is for Mr. Morley a special authority upon this subject. He assures us that this unclean writer, and no less unclean liver, “was keenly alive to the beauty of order [in the relations of the sexes] and domestic piety.”|| There can be no room for the impression that Mr. Morley is poking fun at us. He is nothing if not serious. The judicious reader is therefore driven to the conclusion that the Revolutionary conception of order in the relations of the sexes must be identical with the Christian conception of disorder. “This may be new-fashioned modesty,” exclaims poor Mr. Hardeastle; “but I never saw

\* *Diderot*, vol. i. p. 76. I trust I may, without offence, intimate my doubt whether Mr. Morley is very accurately informed regarding “Catholic views about science, or property, or labour, or political order, or authority.”

† *Rousseau*, vol. i. p. 16.

‡ *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 278.

§ *Diderot*, vol. i. p. 13.

|| *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 22. At page 34 Diderot is described as “in intention, a truly scientific moralist.”

anything look so like old-fashioned impudence." Reverse the precepts of "pure religion breathing household laws," which have made the family what it is in Europe, and apparently you will get the code of sexual morality and domestic piety prescribed by the new gospel. We should, however, wrong Mr. Morley if we supposed him to approve, or to recommend, unbounded licence in the gratification of the sexual appetite. On the contrary, he expressly characterises the view of "the great intellectual leaders," above set forth as "disastrous sophisms,"\* and solemnly eulogizes, "some continence and order in the relations of men and women as a good thing."† "Some!" It is vague. Still, whatever it may amount to, we may be thankful for it. To speak frankly, however—and the occasion calls for plain speaking—I fear it does not amount to much. In a suggestive passage dealing with the early excesses of "the great preacher of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*"—Robespierre—Mr. Morley counsels, not "the keeping under, the bringing into subjection,"‡ but "the better ordering and governance" of "the young appetite,"

\* *Voltaire*, p. 150. But he proceeds, *more suo*, to lay the blame on those who "made morality an appendage of a set of theological mysteries!"

† *Rousseau*, vol. i. p. 217. See also *Diderot*, vol. ii. pp. 20-23.

‡ The "castigo corpus meum et in servitutem redigo," of the Vulgate—emphatic as it is—very inadequately represents the force of the original: "ὑποπιάξω μου τὸ σῶμα, καὶ δουλαγωγῶ."

and insists that thereby "a diviner brightness would be given to the earth." \* Again, in describing Rousseau's mock espousals with his vile concubine, while declining to pronounce authoritatively whether this was or was not, "a marriage according to the truth of Nature," he admonishes us that "Rousseau was as free to choose his own rites as more sacramental performers." †

Paternity appears to be of as little account as marriage in the new gospel, which is perhaps natural. Evidently it can be little more than matter of opinion in such a state of society as that which "the progressive formula" must produce. It will be of interest in this connection to hear Mr. Morley upon the great author of the Revolutionary dogma in the character of father. After allowing that "no word is to be said in extenuation of Rousseau's crime" in sending his new-born children, one after another, to the Foundling Hospital, he proceeds:—

"At any rate, let Rousseau be a little free from excessive reproach from all clergymen, sentimentalists, and others, who do their worst to uphold the common and rather bestial opinion in favour of reckless propagation, and who, if they do not advocate the despatch of children to public institutions, still encourage a selfish incontinence which ultimately falls in burdens on others than the offenders, and which turns the family into a scene of squalor

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\* *Miscellanies*, vol. i. p. 7.

† *Rousseau*, vol. i. p. 130.

and brutishness, producing a kind of parental influence that is far more disastrous and demoralising than the absence of it in public institutions can possibly be. If the propagation of children without regard to their maintenance be either a virtue or a necessity, and if afterwards the only alternatives are their maintenance in an asylum, on the one hand, and their maintenance in the degradation of a poverty-stricken home on the other, we should not hesitate to give people who act as Rousseau acted all that credit for self-denial and high moral courage which he so audaciously claimed for himself. It really seems to be no more criminal to produce children with the deliberate intention of abandoning them to public charity, as Rousseau did, than it is to produce them in deliberate reliance on the besotted maxim that he who sends mouths will send meat, or any other of the spurious saws which make Providence do duty for self-control, and add to the gratification of physical appetite the grotesque luxury of religious unction." \*

How irreconcilably at variance are the traditions of the English home with the Revolutionary ethics may be judged from the following passage:—

"There is probably no uglier growth of time than that mean and poor form of domesticity which has always been too apt to fascinate the English imagination ever since the last great effort of the Rebellion, and which rose to the climax of its popularity when George III. won all hearts by living like a farmer. Instead of the fierce light beating about a throne, it played lambently upon a sty.† And the nation who admired, imitated. When the Regent came, and with him that coarse profligacy which has alternated with cloudy insipidity in the annals of the line, the honest part of the world, out of antipathy to the son, was driven even further into

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\* *Rousseau*, vol. i. p. 127.

† It is worth while to compare the judgment of M. le Play. "En Angleterre les mœurs avaient été restaurées sous la salutaire influence des bons exemples donnés par George III.," writes that publicist. (*L'Organisation du Travail*, p. 188.)

domestic sentimentality of a greasy kind, than it had gone from affection for the sire." \*

"Byron," Mr. Morley continues, "helped to clear the air of this." That, apparently is his great merit, and brings him within "the progressive formula." "The domestic sentiment almost disappears in those works which made Byron most popular, or else it only appears, to be banished with reproach. This is quite in accordance with the revolutionary spirit."

So much must suffice to indicate the nature of the Revolutionary religion, its faith and morals, of which Mr. Morley is the zealous preacher. How burning his zeal is will have been evident from the passages of his works which I have cited. We may truly say of him, as he has truly said of Condorcet, that there is "something theological in his hatred of theology;" † that in every page of his writings "the distant ground-swell of repressed passion sounds in the ear;" that "urgent, heated, impetuous, with a heavy vehemence all his own," he is "the incarnation of the Revolutionary Spirit." ‡ He insists strongly that those who are convinced that the Christian "dogma is not true, and that

\* *Miscellanies*, vol. i. p. 242.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 175.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 181.

both dogma and church must be slowly replaced by higher forms of faith"—we have seen what those "higher forms of faith" are—"have as distinctly a function in the community as the ministers and upholders of the churches."\* And this function of course is to destroy the dogma and the churches. That is the great end. The means must vary according to time and place. But there is one means just now of universal application throughout Europe, which is recommended both by its obvious efficacy and by the authority of the revolutionary leaders. What this means is, let us learn from a personage who being dead yet speaketh—the late M. Paul Bert—"a new glory of the Revolution," as he was designated by a sorrowful and admiring countryman. The designation seems to me very just. I discern in him a worthy successor of Chaumette, not inferior either in impiety or in ferocity to his great prototype. Unpropitious fates withheld from him the power of rivalling the exploits of that Apostle of the guillotine. He was reduced to seek his solace, during the intervals of blasphemy, in the blood and cries of creatures lower than man in the scale of sentient existence. Possibly, he may have found some consolation for the inferiority of his victims in the exquisite refinements of prolonged cruelty, whereby he was

\* *Compromise*, p. 221.

wont to torture out their poor lives. He rests from his labours; and can any one, whose moral sense is not hopelessly blunted, doubt that his works do follow him? Nay, if we may accept the revelation of the Unseen, given us in what, I suppose, must be accounted the *Cantica Canticorum*\* among the sacred books of the Revolutionary religion, must we not conceive of him as welcomed with an emphatic “*Chauffez-vous*” by the master whom he had so long and faithfully served? He has gone to his reward; but his words remain, a light to the feet and a lantern to the paths of those who have obtained like precious faith with him. The great work immediately before them, he solemnly insisted upon a

\* The *Song of Songs*, which is Voltaire's:—

Mon cher lecteur, il est temps de te dire  
Qu'un jour Satan, seigneur du sombre empire,  
À ses vassaux donnait un grand régal,  
Il était fête au manoir infernal.

\*                    \*                    \*                    \*                    \*

Le roi cornu de la huaille noire  
Se déridait entouré de ses pairs.  
On s'enivrait du nectar des enfers,  
On fredonnait quelques chansons à boire,  
Lorsqu'à la porte il s'élève un grand cri,  
“ Ah ! bonjour donc, vous voilà, vous voici,  
C'est lui, messieurs, c'est le grand émissaire,  
C'est Grisbourdon, notre féal ami ;  
Entrez, entrez, et chauffez-vous ici.”

(*La Pucelle d'Orléans*, chant v.,

memorable occasion, is to banish religion from primary education.\*

\* “Les religions n'ont pas qualité pour parler de morale ; car elles reposent sur des bases fausses, sur des hypothèses injustifiables, sur des conceptions erronées de la nature de l'homme, de son rôle dans la société et dans le monde physique. . . . L'enseignement religieux est l'école de l'imbécillité, du fanatisme, de l'antipatriotisme et de l'immoralité. Nous avons bien fait de le chasser de l'école. . . . *Plus les sociétés s'acheminent vers la morale, plus elles s'éloignent de la religion.*” (Speech at the Cirque d'Hiver, 28th August, 1881.)

I will give an extract from another speech of M. Bert, which may with advantage be compared with some of the passages cited from Mr. Morley in this chapter :

“Ici, les abstracteurs de quintessences s'exclament de bonne ou de mauvaise foi. Ils nous disent : vous n'avez pas le droit de donner l'enseignement moral tant que vous n'aurez pas défini la base de la morale, tant que vous n'aurez pas catégorisé d'une façon nette ce qui est le bien, ce qui est le mal ; tant que vous n'aurez pas trouvé le mobile et la sanction, vous ne pourrez pas édifier votre enseignement morale. Et alors ils nous font cette condition étrange qui rappelle les contes de fées ; il faut perforer à travers le marais de la métaphysique jusqu'à ce qu'on ait trouvé le roc solide—s'il y en a un.

“A ceux qui sont de mauvaise foi, en parlant ainsi, il n'y a qu'à tourner le dos. Quant aux autres, il faut leur répondre et je leur réponds : vous avez pendant des siècles, reculé la marche de l'esprit humain. Je vous connais. . . . Nous laissons là votre métaphysique. Continuez à tourner votre roue d'écureuil ; quant à nous, nous avons fait une physique et une chimie qui se portent assez bien et qui font bonne figure dans le monde des sciences. Ce qu'on a fait pour les sciences physiques on le fera pour les sciences morales, et les métaphysiciens continueront pendant l'éternité cet étrange jeu qui ressemble à un jeu de bilboquet dont la boule n'aurait pas de trou.” (Speech at a banquet of five hundred schoolmasters and schoolmistresses at Vélours, 18th September, 1881.)

What has been done in France to carry out this counsel we all know. We know also what it is desired to do in England. Let us hear what Mr. Morley has to say upon this momentous subject, in words written originally in 1874, and reprinted, unaltered, in 1886:—

“A small and temporary improvement may really be the worst enemy of a great and permanent improvement, unless the first is made on the lines and in the direction of the second. And so it may, if it be successfully palmed off upon a society as actually being the second. In such a case as this—and our legislation presents instances of the kind—the small reform, if it be not made with reference to some large progressive principle, and with a view to further extension of its scope, makes it all the more difficult to return to the right line and direction when improvement is again demanded. To take an example which is now very familiar to us all. The Education Act of 1870 was of the nature of a small reform. No one pretends that it is anything approaching to a final solution of a complex problem. But the Government insisted, whether rightly or wrongly, that their Act was as large a measure as public opinion was at that moment ready to support. At the same time it was clearly agreed among the Government and the whole of the party at their backs, that at some time or other, near or remote, if public instruction was to be made genuinely effective, the private, voluntary, or denominational system would have to be replaced by a national system. To prepare for this ultimate replacement was one of the points to be most steadily borne in mind, however slowly and tentatively the process might be conducted. Instead of that, the authors of the Act deliberately introduced provisions for extending and strengthening the very system which will have eventually to be superseded. They thus, by their small reform, made the future great reform the more difficult of achievement.” \*

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\* *Compromise*, p. 230.

These words seem to me especially worthy of being deeply pondered. Much might be said upon them. All I shall say at present is, that I have reason to think Mr. Morley ill-informed as to that "clear agreement" of which he speaks. I have myself been assured by the two statesmen chiefly responsible for the Education Act of 1870, that it was not designed as a step towards the supersession of voluntary and denominational schools; that neither of them had the least intention to bring about the "future great reform" which Mr. Morley so earnestly desires, and desires naturally enough, because he is well aware that it would supply the most effective means of undermining the Christianity of England, and of making straight the paths of the new gospel.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE REVOLUTION AND SCIENCE.

M. VACHEROT, in the extremely interesting work from which I have more than once quoted in the course of this volume, tells us that the new ideal of the public order is a society where science will be all-sufficient: "une société où la science suffise à tout, à la théologie, à la morale, à l'éducation, aussi bien qu'à l'industrie." \* There is in the present day a great, I might say an almost unanimous, *consensus* of testimony to the same effect from Revolutionary publicists. On every side we hear that the Revolution must be, that it is, scientific. The word is almost invariably employed in that mutilated sense to which it is now so generally narrowed. Science, in the mouth of ninety-nine people out of a hundred—the proportion is probably larger—is used as a synonym for physics. The very use is a tacit, in most cases no doubt an unconscious, recognition of what Mr. Morley calls "the great positive principle that we can know only phenomena, and can know them only experien-

\* *La Démocratie*, p. 80. Of course so accomplished a metaphysician as M. Vacherot does not use "science" as a synonym for physics.

tially ;” a principle which he accounts—as we have seen—“the cardinal condition of strength for times when theology lies in decay.”\* This great positive principle is certainly very highly esteemed in the Revolutionary Church as a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptance. What chiefly distinguishes the latest from the earlier phases of the new gospel is, indeed, its proclamation of itself as scientific. The original Jacobins refused to defer, even for one brief hour, the pleasure of butchering Lavoisier, upon the ground that the Republic had no need of chemists. The Jacobins of to-day are wiser in their generation, and seek in the laboratory “a solid formula” for their politics. It is upon “natural truths,” they urge, that the foundation of the public order must rest. Metaphysics and transcendentalism, and, still more, “all religion and all religiosity,” they execrate as mere shadows serving but to divert men’s attention from phenomenal realities, which are the sole realities, and to hinder progress in the material arts of life, which alone is progress. For them physical sciences are the only sciences. And the generalisation of those sciences, founded upon the teachings of the late Mr. Charles Darwin, and called after him, is pre-eminently dear to them.

Why this is so, we shall see presently. Here let me, in vindication of a great name, point out that,

\* p. 79.

as much Platonism is vulgarly current, for which we shall search, in vain, the philosopher of Academe, as the Lutheranism of the present day consists largely of opinions of which the founder of Protestantism was guiltless, so a great deal passes for Darwinism which is not to be found in the writings of Mr. Darwin. What the lifelong labours of that patient and conscientious inquirer really established, I shall have occasion to consider by-and-by. I am for the moment concerned with the signification which the word Darwinism bears in common parlance throughout Europe. And this will be best seen if we go to Germany. There it is that most of the world's cerebration is performed, There the doctrine of Mr. Darwin was eagerly embraced long before it had obtained credit among ourselves. And there it has been developed, with enthusiastic devotion and singular hardihood, by a school of *savants*, who have sought in it the key to well-nigh all the world's enigmas. Foremost among these is Professor Haeckel, whose writings have unquestionably done more than Mr. Darwin's own for the diffusion of what is generally known as Darwinism, not only in the Professor's native country, but in France, and it may perhaps be said in England too. The account which he himself gives of his aim is, that he has "endeavoured to bind together in a philosophy Darwin's facts; to view them in the light of general conceptions." But, in truth, speculation occupies a much greater place than fact

in his system. In the first place, he has adopted Darwin's theories, without the reserves, rectifications, and modifications by which that candid investigator afterwards limited them. Thus, to give merely one example, in the law of natural selection, to the action of which the English naturalist in his latter years confessed himself to have "probably attached too much," and which he, therefore, thought himself bound to restate, in order "to confine his remarks to adaptive changes of structure"—I am quoting from a well-known passage in his *Descent of Man*—his Teutonic disciple finds a complete explanation of all the facts of organic life, and of all its possibilities, including "indefinite variation." Again, to the hypotheses thus adopted from Darwin, Professor Haeckel has added others of his own. Of these, the most notable is the theory of abiogenesis, which amounts to this: that the organic comes out of the inorganic as its adequate cause, by a process similar to that whereby the molecules of crystalline bodies assume regular form. The general result at which he arrives is a purely physical explanation of life. He will allow of no activities in the organism but the chemical and mechanic. The persistence of matter and energy, correlation of forces, dissipation of forces, sufficiently explain for him the wondrous All. "The cell," he wrote to the German Association in 1877, "consists of matter called protoplasm, composed chiefly of carbon, with an admixture of

hydrogen, nitrogen, and sulphur. These component parts, properly united, produce the soul and body of the animated world, and, suitably nursed, become man. With this single argument the mystery of the universe is explained, the Deity annulled, and a new era of infinite knowledge ushered in."

Professor Haeckel, whose great attainments in zoology and morphology are unquestionable, here formulates the creed of a school of physicists well known in Germany. It is, apparently, of faith with these very positive Teutonic *savants*, that life, at first generated spontaneously, has ascended from the simplest form of protoplasm to the human automaton, through the twenty-two distinct stages of evolution which the Professor has excogitated. In England, there are not wanting gifted disciples of Mr. Darwin who, more or less implicitly, adopt this exposition of "nature's great progression from the formless to the formed, from the inorganic to the organic, from blind forces to conscious will and intellect." But it is in France that the Haeckelian version of Darwinism has had freest course, and has been most abundantly glorified; for it has supplied those "materialistic explanations in the science of man"—to use Mr. Morley's phrase—wherein the new gospel hopes to find the most effective weapon for the destruction of the old. It was observed a short time ago by a Revolutionary publicist, in words the terse-

ness of which translation would mar, “La révolution démolit Dieu, démolit tout le vieux monde, et une chose seule reste—l’évolution scientifique.” “Others may occupy themselves, if they will,” said M. Paul Bert, “in seeking a nostrum to destroy the phylloxera; be it mine to find one that shall destroy the Christian religion.” And that nostrum, we are confidently assured, is found in Darwinism.

The appeal then is to Darwinism. To Darwinism let us go. Whatever is doubtful, this is clear: that every dogma, however widely popular, to which the facts are opposed, is doomed to certain extinction. Now, what are the facts of Darwinism? Let us view them apart from the theories engrafted upon them by Professor Haeckel. I should be sorry to seem wanting in respect to so eminent a *savant*. Still I find it impossible to withhold a modicum of sympathy from Mr. Coke, when, in his interesting work, *Creeeds of the Day*, he complains, “The theories of Professor Haeckel are as trying to my credulity as the Pentateuch itself.” It is, indeed, difficult to see why the speculations of Professors should be more binding upon our belief than the revelations of Prophets. We will turn, then, from the Darwinism of Herr Haeckel to the Darwinism of Mr. Darwin. What may the researches of that indefatigable observer be taken to have established? The supreme problem to which he addressed him-

self was the origin of the human race as a distinct species. I shall present his solution of that problem in his own words, taken from the summary with which he ends his book on *The Descent of Man*.

"The main conclusion arrived at in this work," he writes, "and now held by many naturalists who are well competent to form a sound judgment, is that man is descended from some less highly organized form. The grounds upon which this conclusion rests will never be shaken, for the close similarity between man and the lower animals in embryonic development, as well as in innumerable points of structure and constitution, both of high and of the most trifling importance—the rudiments which he retains, and the abnormal reversions to which he is occasionally liable—are *facts* which cannot be disputed. They have long been known, but until recently they told us nothing with respect to the origin of man. Now, when viewed by the light of our knowledge of the whole organic world, their meaning is unmistakable . . . . By considering the embryological structure of man, the homologies which he presents with the lower animals, the rudiments which he retains, and the reversions to which he is liable, we can partly recall in imagination the former condition of our early progenitors, and can approximately place them in their proper position in the zoological series. We thus learn that man is descended from a hairy quadruped, furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in its habits, and an inhabitant of the Old World. This creature, if its whole structure had been examined by a naturalist, would have been classed amongst the Quadrumana, as surely as would the common and still more ancient progenitor of the Old and New World monkeys. The Quadrumana and all the higher mammals are probably derived from an ancient marsupial animal, and this through a long line of diversified forms, either from some reptile-like or some amphibian-like creature, and this again from some fish-like animal. In the dim obscurity of the past we can see that the early progenitor of all the Vertebrata must have been

an aquatic animal, provided with branchiæ, with the two sexes united in the same individual, and with the most important organs of the body (such as the brain and heart) imperfectly developed. This animal seems to have been more like the larvæ of our existing marine Ascidians than any other known form."

Such is Mr. Darwin's main conclusion; and the principal instruments by which he supposes this vast transformation to have been wrought are the law of natural selection in the struggle for existence, and the law of sexual selection. The struggle for existence! That is the primary fact upon which Darwinism is built. The world, to the eye of science, is a scene of incessant struggle of individual against individual, of species against species. The more healthy, the more vigorous, the more fortunate survive and multiply. The weakest succumb, disappear, and perish. It is so in the vegetable world as in the animal. Even "the humblest flower that blows" owes its every character and quality to the strife of countless ages. It is, and ever has been so among men, from the rudest societies in which cannibals openly prey upon one another, up to the most civilised, where the process by which man devours man, though thickly veiled, is none the less real. "It's no fish ye're eating," says Luckie Mucklebackit to the Antiquary, "it's no fish ye're eating, but men's lives." Nor can it be otherwise, if we consider that, without the innumerable causes of limitation springing from this ardent rivalry for life, each species would tend to

multiply in geometric proportion and possess the globe. The doctrine of natural selection means that out of innumerable tentatives, made by living beings whose organs and instincts are variable up to a certain point, the great majority come to nothing, but the exceptionally happy hits, which fall in with the surrounding environment, succeed. Thanks to the struggle for existence, every favourable variety is bound to perpetuate itself, while harmful deviations are eliminated. The slightest variations, if they are of advantage to the individual in whom they have produced themselves, by favouring him, in comparison with his fellows, contribute to his conservation, and are transmitted to his posterity. And here comes in the law of sexual selection, which means "the success of certain individuals over others of the same sex, in relation to the propagation of the species." Structural changes are the slowly accumulated results of functional changes. A new species is the issue of successive variations and adaptations. All the vast physical differences that distinguish man from the far off fish-like ancestor, common to himself and other mammals, Mr. Darwin refers to the modifications thus wrought—modifications which he describes as "accidental," meaning, thereby, as he tells us (it is an odd use of the word), that they came to pass "from unrecognised or unassignable causes." The barriers between man and the lower animals, once deemed insurmountable, which are presented

by the intellectual faculties, language, the moral sense, religion, he considers to fall, upon close and unprejudiced observation. The differences which exist in these regions he will have to be of degree, not of kind; and in support of this view, he adduces a vast number of curious facts, which have been largely confirmed and supplemented by more recent writers. The attributes of man, he considers, are variable, and in the study of the lower animals he seeks the key to the understanding of the psychic faculties of humanity. What we call the moral sense in man, he finds, in germ, in "our poor relations." He considers it to be the outcome of the social instinct, which is acquired, or at the least developed, by natural selection, and the chief elements of which are love and sympathy. Its earliest manifestations are definite and invariable, we might say, indeed, mechanical. But when consciousness and volition—the latest evolved of mental characteristics—have attained a certain development, it assumes the perfection in which we sometimes find it in the elephant, the dog, the ape, and is manifested as the faculty of comparing past and future actions and their motives, the thoughts meanwhile excusing or else accusing one another. The criterion of the value of actions is, he thinks, the general good, by which he means the prosperity, the physical and moral health, of the community. And these things depend upon the laws of life, which, holding as they do, of form

and "being, condition and environment, have no finality.

Such are the main lines of Mr. Darwin's teaching. It has been objected to him by Wigand that he wraps his theories up in facts. The objection seems to me eminently unfair. No one can doubt the unsparing care with which he verifies his facts, or the absolute candour with which he presents them. He tells us, indeed—and we might reasonably have complained if he had not told us—what they seem to him to prove. But he warns us that his own views are sometimes "highly speculative," and that "some will doubtless prove to be erroneous." I know of no writer in whom breathes more amply the spirit of the ancient philosopher: "Don't believe Socrates, but your own reason, which Socrates helps you to use." What then, following this canon, would seem to be the net result of this great naturalist's labours? What may we take him to have established? Here I can speak only for myself. Looking at the evidence of various kinds, and weighing it, as one is accustomed to weigh testimony upon which a jury would be called to decide, in some grave issue touching the property, or reputation, or life of a man, I cannot but feel that an overwhelming case is made out for Mr. Darwin's general conclusions: that, in his own words, "the great principle of evolution stands up clear and firm:" that in the development of the individual from the simple

unsegmented cell in which the human organism originates, we have the abstract and brief chronicle of the race. This is one of those cases in which "conspiring probabilities run together into a perfect conviction." And we may, I suppose, take it, that the old view of the distinct origin of extant species has well-nigh disappeared from the world of thought; that every competent authority allows their derivation from a few original types, or from one. Professor Haeckel, indeed, notes it as "an interesting and instructive circumstance, that the greatest indignation at the discovery of man's physical development from the ape, is displayed by those who differ the least, in intellectual or cerebral characteristics, from our common tertiary ancestors." It is to be regretted that culture has not exercised upon the manners of the Teutonic *savant* the emollient influence which the Latin poet claims for it. Still, this ferocious utterance of his is not, perhaps, wholly groundless. However that may be, the great glory of Darwin unquestionably is, that he has provided us with a scientifically intelligible theory of descent. I am far from saying that his theory is complete, that it includes all the factors. On the contrary, I shall have occasion to show later on that there are two principal factors, as I must account of them, which he does not include at all—which, indeed, he was not called upon to consider: I mean the psychic basis of life, and Directive Intelligence. Moreover, it

would seem clear that many of his hypotheses require to be largely modified, or even to be recast. This has been pointed out, with much cogency of reasoning and wealth of illustration, by Hartmann, whose admirable little volume on *The True and the False in Darwinism* should be in the hands of every student of Mr. Darwin's works. With these reservations, I cannot doubt that the law of natural selection, as he has stated it, largely explains the process of descent, or that the struggle for existence, the variation of types under circumstances, heredity, sexual selection, the action of environment, the use and disuse of organs, correlation, are really principles whereby the survival of the fittest is worked out. As little can I doubt the evolution of moral sentiment and dogma through prehistoric conditions, although I must take leave to question whether Mr. Darwin ever properly apprehended the essential nature of ethics. These facts are among the assured conquests of the modern mind. We may safely assume that, in another quarter of a century, they will be as generally accepted as the law of the earth's motion first demonstrated by Galileo, or the law of gravitation formulated by Newton.

How then does the Revolutionary dogma look in the light of these facts, so luminously exhibited by Mr. Darwin as the "scientific" account of

the human mammal? First consider the doctrine of the natural, inalienable, and imprescriptible rights of the individual, which is the chief corner-stone of the whole Revolutionary edifice. How is it possible to predicate such rights of an animal whose attributes are constantly varying—whose original is not Jean-Jacques's perfect man in a state of nature, but, not to go farther back, a troglodyte with half a brain, with the appetites and habits of a wild beast, with no conception of justice, and with only half articulate cries for language? Of the absolute reason, which the Revolution professes to worship, usually under the strangest travesties, Darwinism knows nothing. Its only notion of reason, as of justice and of right, is relative. Right to be means Might to be. For the true state of nature is a state of war: *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Again, take the thrice-sacred formula, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. What place is there for these conceptions if "the scientific evolution" alone remains as the one truth which the Revolutionary gospel will allow us to recognise? Liberty? the sovereignty of the individual? It disappears with the fiction of a perfectly homogeneous humanity. The message of "scientific evolution" to the masses is to know their masters, for that will be best for them; to recognise the provision of nature, which has made the few, strong, wise, and able; the many, weak, foolish, and incompetent. Equality? So far from being the

“holy law of nature,” as Marat was wont to affirm, it is flat blasphemy against that law. Inequality is everywhere her rule, and is the primary condition of progress. Why, man is nothing but the product of vast inequalities, of successive variations of previous animal types, which have constituted him a species, a race, an individual. Inequalities of right rest upon inequalities of fact. Fraternity? Yes; the fraternity of Cain and Abel. Cain survived because he was fittest, and proved his fitness by surviving. And in his story you have the brief epitome of the history of mankind, from the unknown beginnings of organic life, in the impenetrable past, down to this very hour. The Social Contract? A pure fiction! Darwinism gives the lie direct to the individualism which is of the very essence of Jacobinism. To nature, the individual is valueless. The natural goodness of the *bête humaine*? It is aboriginally unethical; ferocious passions are its very groundwork; and all that countless ages of progress have effected has been, more or less imperfectly to tame them in favoured varieties of it. To the panacea of “education,” so confidently recommended on the ground that “the evil in the world is the fruit of bad education and bad institutions”—that, it will be remembered, is Mr. John Morley’s exposition of this article of the revolutionary creed—Darwinism replies by the dictum of Mr. Herbert Spencer, that “crime is really connected with an inferior mode of life, *itself usually conse-*

*quent upon an original inferiority of nature ;*" that "ignorance is no more to be held the cause of crime than various other concomitants" ; that "the belief in the moralising effects of culture is absurd." There is not one of the most cherished positions of the Revolution to which the Darwinism, wherein it seeks a scientific basis—after having demolished God and the rest of the "old world"—is not absolutely fatal ; while to the optimism underlying the whole political doctrine of Rousseau, it opposes the blankest pessimism. Such is the radical antagonism between Darwinism and the Revolutionary dogma. If, as we are confidently assured, "the scientific evolution" is the only fact left, then the natural, inalienable, and imprescriptible rights of man are dreams ; there is no possible foundation for such rights in merely physical nature. For where there is only matter—as Herr Haeckel and M. Paul Bert, and I suppose we must say Mr. Darwin too, conceive of matter—there are only physical and mathematical laws sovereign over all. And the individual automata which make up human society, like all else, are the slaves of mere force. There is one, and only one, true natural right—or rather fact—founded upon the law of physical life, and that is the survival of the fittest.

Nothing is more certain than the absolute antinomy between the postulates of the Revolution and

those truths of physical science which the late Mr. Darwin has done so much to establish. Equally certain does it seem to me that the Revolution is in error in supposing any antinomy to exist between those truths and the great transcendental conceptions whereon religion is based. I will proceed to give briefly my reasons for this certainty.

All religions, even down to the lowest form of fetichism, rest upon an ethical feeling. Human nature everywhere bears about the concept of moral obligation, however various its correlatives may be. Everywhere, deep down in the most sacred recesses of consciousness, is the imperious conviction that—

“because right is right, to follow right  
Were wisdom, in the scorn of consequence.”

Nor does the internal monitor, which insists upon this tremendous obligation, fail to exhibit its credentials. “Conscience,” says Butler—and the world will never outgrow that teaching—“conscience magisterially exerts itself, and if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always, of course, goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own.” And, to the like effect, writes Victor Hugo, in noble words, worthily enshrining an august fact. “Let us take nothing from the human mind. Suppression is a crime. Certain faculties of man are

directed towards the Unknown. The Unknown is an ocean? What is conscience? The compass of the Unknown." Yes, the office of conscience is prophetic. It is truly "the compass of the Unknown," ever pointing man to the Divine Personality: "tu homo, tantum nomen, si te scias!"

And what, if we weigh the matter well, is the very central idea of Christianity but this, of the root of moral obligation in the Divine nature and in man's filial relation to it? As I have elsewhere observed,\* the doctrine of the affinity of the better side of human nature with the Divine, was the fount from which the moral and religious teaching of Christ flowed. This was the first great note of his teaching. The second, no less clear and unmistakable, in His proclamation of Himself as a teacher come from God, in a very special and unique sense: as the Deliverer of men from the tyranny of that lower self whereby they were held back from the supreme Good: "the Way, the Truth, and the Life" in the memorable words reported by the author of the Fourth Gospel. It is the doctrine of Kant that "without a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for, the glorious ideas of ethics may indeed be objects of approbation and admiration, but cannot be the springs of action." Religion, and especially the Christian religion, has for its very office to proclaim

\* *Chapters in European History*, vol. i. p. 53.

Deity and Immortality as the crown of that moral law, whose existence and dictates and absolute character reason itself discloses. How then do these transcendental conceptions accord with the verities of physical science, summed up in the evolutionary formula ?

That is the question. The answer to it seems to me this : That while Mr. Darwin has succeeded, to some extent, in tracing and exhibiting the evolution of conditions, he has revealed to us nothing whatever concerning the evolution of essence. I accept gratefully all that he can teach me about the facts of natural history. But he cannot teach me that which he did not himself know, that of which he disclaimed all knowledge. A physicist, not a philosopher, he worked in the sphere of sense perception. In metaphysics, in mental science, as is evident upon the face of his writings, he was quite unversed. He tells us explicitly that his system "is not concerned with the origin of spiritual or vital forces." That moral sense, of which I have been writing, may have been evolved as Mr. Darwin supposes. The facts seem to me to point clearly to such a conclusion. I do not doubt that as the germ of ethics exists in the low varieties of our race, still extant, who seem less human, in feeling, than our dogs and horses, so it existed in tertiary and quaternary men, aptly characterised by the poet as "*mutum et turpe pecus*;" dormant, like sunlight in coal, but still really there. I can as

little doubt that the physical organism, material nature, human society, have been conditions and instruments of its evolution. But you do not explain a thing by merely tracing it back to rudimentary forms, or by exhibiting the course of its development. If there is any one fact of which I am sure it is this: that in the moral sense there is something transcending organic life and sensation. Relativity is the last word of Darwinism, as of all physical science. The Categorical Imperative is not relative. It has a value quite independent of my interests, of all interests. It is absolute. Physical science cannot tell me what it means. But it can tell me much of the meaning of physical science. "Everything in the phenomenal world," says Leibnitz, "takes place at the same time mechanically and metaphysically; but the source of the mechanical is the metaphysical." The facts given by physics are but the printed syllables. It is the office of metaphysics to construe them. Those "beautiful contrivances" which Mr. Darwin so well describes in his book on the *Fertilisation of Orchids*, surely indicate objective purpose, design. The doctrine of final causes alone offers a rational interpretation of them. I do not speak of final causes as Dr. Pangloss expounds them. I speak of what Professor Huxley happily calls "that wider teleology which is not touched by the doctrine of evolution, but is actually based upon its fundamental propo-

sition." Again, what I read in the same fascinating volume of the "marvellous adjustments" between the plants and their environment, speaks to me plainly of a cause inherent in them which is one of the attributes of life itself. Nor, when I rise from its perusal, is there room left in me for doubt of the intelligence of these wonderful plant-organisms, of their consciousness, however dim, of their surroundings, of their possession in their measure, of the self-same endowment which in man we call mind. Mr. Darwin's facts point as clearly to a psychic basis of life as to Directive Intelligence. And so they lend themselves to the deepest spiritual teaching, and receive from it their only legitimate explanation. They lead us on to think, with Wordsworth, of "life and soul to every mode of being inseparably linked;" to conceive of matter, not as the base thing of the sensualistic philosophy, but as substance in its dynamic condition, pregnant with the potency of personality; to regard its laws as modes of the divine agency, its properties as effects of the divine indwelling.

And surely thus the whole universe is transfigured before us, and we catch, as "in high dream and solemn vision," some glimpse of its real meaning. The supreme law which rules throughout it is a law of tendency upward, of striving after perfection. This is the true law of evolution. Not only in man, but in the non-human animal, in the plant, and everywhere throughout the vast

family of organic life, down to the furthest limits of consciousness, of existence—the two words denote one thing, “*cogito, ergo sum*”—this great law rules supreme. What a flood of light is hereby thrown upon that deep saying that “the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together,” waiting for the deliverance! “In pain;” pain everywhere; pain throughout the boundless battle-field, the illimitable sepulchre of creation: but everywhere the necessary instrument of advance, not fruitless, even as He, in whom the eternally ideal became the historically real, was made perfect through suffering; in this, as in all else, “the first-born of every creature.” The highest and noblest of our race, in all ages and of all creeds, bear witness that to them pain was no real evil, but a supremely beneficent discipline. With one voice they proclaim that there is only one evil in the world: deflection from its divinely appointed law. And herewith accords the testimony of the moral sense, even in the lowest and least noble: for it speaks no word of “happiness, our being’s end and aim;” it witnesses only of justice. Happiness! If that be the end and aim, the martyrs, the saints, the heroes, in every generation — who “suffered countless things, who battled for the true, the just”—were indeed fools and blind; and the voice of conscience is a lie. But to tell me that, is as much a contradiction of a fact as would be the denial of my sense perception. As much, or rather, far more. For the fact thus gain-

said is witnessed for by my highest faculty, and is far more certain to me than anything in the phenomenal sphere. And this transcendent faculty supplements the testimony of physical science, and lightens, as nothing else can, "the burden and the mystery of all this unintelligible world." Darwinism tells me of law reigning throughout this universe of pain and death. Conscience replies, "Yes; supremely just law. And that is enough for thee to know. Cease thy foolish pratings of happiness and unhappiness. Cease thy blind guessings at insoluble enigmas. 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?' although 'His way is in the sea, and His paths in the great waters, and His footsteps are not known.'"

I venture to commend these considerations to earnest men of all religions, and especially to those among them—no small number—who rage furiously together against the doctrine of Mr. Darwin without really comprehending it. I would beg of such to lay to heart the dictate of Hebrew wisdom, "First understand, then argue." And to this precept of the Talmud they might well add the reflection of the Hindu sacred writer, "A fact is not altered by a hundred texts." I would urge them to weigh the responsibility attaching to those who seek to link living spiritual faith to dead physical theories, as though He whom they adore

as *Deus Scientiarum* could be served by opposition to any science. I would even ask a certain school of Christian apologists to reconsider some of their favourite positions; for example, the conception of creation formulated, with unconscious irreverence, by a popular American divine, that "Almighty God once took some nothing, and in a week produced the universe as it stands, and one man." Greswell, I remember, in his *Pasti Catholici*, is at the pains to fix the precise date of this event; it occurred, he tells, in the autumn of B.C. 4004. Is it in vain to set before such minds the majestic belief to which Mr. Darwin guides us, of uniform law, working through all time and all space, for the development of order and beauty from the formless void, of life and intelligence from primordial nebosity; and even now working on to vaster issues? Again, why should good people cry, "he blasphemeth!" when the naturalist displays the derivation of our race from inferior types of animal life, and yet acquiesce uncomplainingly, or even joyously, in the process of human generation which—classic passages of Jeremy Taylor, of Sterne, of Schiller, point it out all too plainly—exhibits a still more ignominious starting-point for ourselves? Surely Mr. Darwin is well warranted when he contends, "It is not more irreligious to explain the origin of man, as a distinct species, through the laws of variation and natural selection, than to explain the birth of an individual through the laws

of ordinary reproduction. The birth of the species and of the individual," he adds, in wise and pious words, "are equally part of the grand sequence of events which the mind refuses to accept as the result of blind chance. The understanding revolts at such a conclusion." Yes. But it revolts, too, at the ineptitudes of defenders of the faith who know not how to employ the language of science and of reason : that is of truth. Admirable is the saying of St. Augustine, written, indeed, in a different connection, but universally applicable : "*Bonum est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive confitentem.*"

## CHAPTER V.

### THE REVOLUTION AND ART.

WE saw in a previous chapter that very excellent things are spoken of Naturalism by the distinguished man of letters whose exposition of the Revolutionary Gospel we followed at some length. Its special merits Mr. Morley accounts to be these: that it humbles the "futile vanity" of men in regarding themselves as "the end and object of creation;" and that it "supplies them with the most powerful of motives for the energetic use of the most powerful of their endowments." Acquiescence in it he commends as "wise and not inglorious;" and he predicts a great future for it in the sphere of æsthetics. "Naturalism in art," indeed, he appears to consider one of the "notes" of the Revolution.

Some time ago, finding myself in the city of Paris, I called these utterances to remembrance, and turned my feet unto the Ambigu Theatre, where, as the newspapers unanimously testified, the greatest triumph as yet achieved by Naturalism in art

was to be witnessed. The piece represented was M. Zola's *Nana*, adapted for the stage by M. Busnach. The aim of the playwright had been to put the story of the courtesan's life and death before the audience with complete "reality." For this purpose, the resources of the stage decorator had been taxed to the utmost, the result being nine *tableaux*, beyond which, it was proudly contended, the force of scenic illusion could no further go. The first exhibited a *cabinet de toilette*, where the heroine was revealed to us "au saut du lit, décoiffée, en peignoir de damas foncé sur une jupe de satin rose." The second introduced us to the *salon* of a great lady, much commended by Parisian journalists as a marvellous reproduction. Not less marvellous was the third *tableau*, which took us behind the scenes of the *Théâtre des Variétés*; while the fourth, which presented the ruins of Chaumont, with the paths winding through the vines, the rustic bridge over a stream of real water into which a real man fell—happily he was clad in mackintosh underneath—to say nothing of artificial sunlight and an artificial nightingale, excited the spectators to almost lyrical enthusiasm, and was with one voice glorified as of a quite adorable poetry. Next came a drawing-room furnished *à la japonaise*, a species of upholstery just then in the height of fashion; after that a racecourse with real horses, and then a boudoir hung with real blue satin. In the eighth *tableau* a noble town house was

burnt to the ground before our eyes. 'The ninth and last was a perfect copy of a room at the *Grand Hôtel*, in which Nana lay dying of confluent small-pox. Yes, there she lay, "un tas d'humeur et de sang, une pelletée de chair corrompue;" and the thrill of horror which ran through the house bore witness to the fidelity with which the "marchands de maquillage," aided by the doctors of the theatre, had imitated the ravages of the dire disease. Such was the realistic representation of the harlot's progress wherewith our eyes were feasted. The dialogue, judiciously adapted from the pages of M. Zola's fiction, was a fitting accompaniment to it. Of course nothing savouring of imagination was uttered by any of the *dramatis personæ*. "Reality" was the great law which the playwright proposed to follow, and it is not exactly imagination that seasons the talk of the *lupanar*. "On s'ennuyait à crever," observes M. Zola, in his account of a famous supper given by his heroine. M. Busnach, in this respect, as in others, had kept faithfully to his original. It seemed to me, indeed, that both the master and the disciple had here somewhat overshot their mark. I thought of Dr. Johnson's account of Thomas Sheridan: "Why, sir, Sherry is dull, naturally dull. But it must have taken him a great deal of pains to have become what we now see him. Such an excess of stupidity, sir, is not in nature." The utter inanity of the piece was

relieved only by a few cynical speeches—"mots raides" they are called in the jargon of the day—put for the most part, if my memory is not at fault, into the mouth of Nana's *bonne*. This is one of them which may serve as a specimen of the rest. "Elle n'est donc plus au théâtre, Nana?" some one asks her. And she replies, "Non, le théâtre, c'est bon quand on commence; après, ça fait perdre trop de temps."

M. Zola, who, I believe, regards Nana as his masterpiece, has expressed, in most emphatic language, his unbounded admiration of his friend's dramatic version. "Ce rôle de Nana," he writes, "est superbe, car il tient tout le clavier humain." I do not propose just now to discuss the value of this estimate. I wish rather to consider what is the significance of the Naturalism of which Nana, whether in the original form of a novel or in M. Busnach's theatrical adaptation, may be taken as a type. And, as M. Zola is confessedly its great luminary, it will be well in the first instance to consider the account of it which that master has provided in his volume *Le Roman Expérimental*. I shall be obliged to compress into few words what he has said in many, but he would, I feel sure, allow that my exposition does him no injustice. M. Zola holds, then, that the time in which we are living is essentially a New Age. Its spirit is "scientific." Now a civilisation is all of a piece (*tout se tient dans une civilisation*). The great

movement of the last century was a vast inquiry—often nothing more than a groping—after reality ; its effect being to state afresh the problems of human life and human society. Everywhere there has been a return to nature, to reality. In politics it has assumed the form of Democracy ; in metaphysics of Positivism ; in art of Naturalism. You may call it generally the Naturalistic Evolution.\* It means everywhere the banishment of imagination, of empirical doctrines, of poetic idealism ; the recognition of facts cognisable by the senses, which are the only facts ; and the adoption of the experimental method. Analysis and experience, the study of environment and mechanism—such is everywhere the course to be followed. The new democratic society is merely a collection of organised beings existing upon earth in certain conditions—of *bêtes humaines*, who have given up the futile vanity of regarding themselves as the end and aim of creation, who know that they are human beasts, and do not pretend to be anything else, who are well aware that the old religious conceptions which regarded them as something else are cunningly devised fables. The republic, as it happily exists in France, is the best type of human government—*le gouvernement humain par excellence*—resting, as it does, upon universal suffrage, determined by the majority of facts, and so corresponding with

\* So Mr. John Morley accounts of the Revolution as “ a great revival of Naturalism.” *Rousseau*, vol. ii. p. 200.

the observed and analysed wants of the *bêtes humaines*, who make up the nation. Now every definite and stable government must have a literature. And Naturalism supplies the fitting literature for this government, since it is the expression, in the intellectual domain, of the causes of which the Third Republic is the political and social outcome.

The great aim and object of Naturalism, according to M. Zola, is a return to nature. The novelist, the dramatist, he says, ought to be the photographers of phenomena. Their business is to study the world ; to observe, to analyse humanity as they find it.\* But this is best done in its most vulgar types. The human animal—"la bête humaine," a phrase which our author employs with

\* It may be worth while to subjoin the following passage from *L'Œuvre*, in which M. Zola expounds his view of "the progressive formula" through the mouth of Sandoz :

"Hein ? étudier l'homme tel qu'il est, non plus leur pantin métaphysique, mais l'homme physiologique, déterminé par le milieu, agissant sous le jeu de tous ses organes. . . . N'est-ce pas une farce que cette étude continue et exclusive de la fonction du cerveau, sous prétexte que le cerveau est l'organe noble ? . . . La pensée, la pensée, eh ! tonnerre de Dieu ! la pensée est le produit du corps entier. Faites donc penser un cerveau tout seul, voyez donc ce que devient la noblesse du cerveau quand le ventre est malade ? . . . Non ! c'est imbécile ; la philosophie n'y est plus, la science n'y est plus ; nous sommes des positivistes, des évolutionnistes, et nous garderions le mannequin littéraire des temps classiques, et nous continuerions à dévider les cheveux emmêlés de la raison pure ! Qui dit psychologue dit traître à la vérité. D'ailleurs, physiologie, psychologie, cela ne signifie rien : l'une a pénétré l'autre, toutes deux ne sont qu'une aujourd'hui, le mécanisme de l'homme aboutissant à la somme totale de ses fonctions. . . . Ah ! la formule

damnable iteration—is the same in all social varieties and conditions. Look at the revelations which “sensational” trials occasionally make of the highest classes, showing how little they, in truth, differ in their ethos from the lowest. Everywhere at the bottom there is filth (*l’ordure*). Those proceedings in the courts of justice which from time to time bring it to the surface—like an abscess—are merely an experimental novel unfolding itself, chapter after chapter, before the public. Now the business of the novelist or the dramatist is to do scientifically what is there done fortuitously. He should display the real mechanism of life. A simple monograph, a page of existence, the story of a single fact, such is what the novel and the play are more and more becoming. The artist in experimental fiction is, apart from questions of style and form, merely a specialist, a savant who employs the same instruments as other savants, observation and analysis. His domain is that of the physiologist. Only it is more vast. To be master of the mechanism of human phenomena, to exhibit the machinery (*les rouages*) of intellectual and sensual manifestations, as physiology shall explain them, under the influences of heredity and environment, then to show the living

est là ; notre révolution moderne n’a pas d’autre base ; c’est la mort fatale de l’antique société, c’est la naissance d’une société nouvelle, et c’est nécessairement la poussée d’un nouvel art, dans ce nouveau terrain. . . . Oui, on verra la littérature qui va germer pour le prochain siècle de science et de la démocratie !” Such is the fruitful doctrine which M. Zola opposes to what Mr. Morley calls “sterile transcendentalism.” *Diderot*, vol. i. p. 8.

man in the social order which he has himself produced, which he daily modifies, and in the bosom of which he undergoes a constant transformation—such is the theory of the experimental novel. In like manner the experimental drama must be a material evocation of life on the stage; and who can now doubt the possibility of effecting this by the art of the scene-painter and the upholsterer? No: “après les décors si puissants de relief, si surprenants de vérité” (possibly M. Zola was thinking of the nine *tableaux* in *Nana* which I have described) “on ne peut nier la possibilité d’évoquer à la scène la réalité des milieux.” So too the language must be “real”—the language of the street—*un morceau de rue*. The old notion of a style differing from that of common life, more sonorous, more nervous, more highly pitched, more finely cut, is an abomination to M. Zola, and it must be allowed that he scrupulously avoids it. With equal care he eschews idealism and poetry, which he calls lyricism, and of which, he tells us, literature is “rotting.” Invention must be used as sparingly as possible and must be confined to the plot, which, however, is to be strictly kept within the limits of every-day life. The rest he will have to be mere copying—a transcript of facts. Formerly the greatest compliment you could pay a novelist or playwright was to say, “He has a great deal of imagination.” If such a speech were addressed

to M. Zola he would regard himself as a very ill-used gentleman.

Such, in M. Zola's own words, is the theory of the novelistic and dramatic art, as of all other art, presented to us by Naturalism. Of course there is nothing new in his contention that art must be the minister, the interpreter of nature; that its function is to create the image and symbol of that which is. What is peculiar to the Revolutionary æstheticism is its conception of Nature. Formerly men looked upon phenomena as the visible expression of an invisible reality. Thus to our Aryan ancestors the universe was no dead thing. Its substance was held to be intelligence. It was, in Goethe's phrase, "der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid;" Deity's living robe. Its beauty, its bounty, its terror were revelations. The hymns wherein the rishis "sought out the thousand-branched mystery, through the vision of their hearts," were attributed to "the promptings of the thoughtful gods." So in ancient Hellas, the sense of the beautiful was the sense of the divine. The poetic gift was conceived of as inspiration. When Homer said, *ᾄειδε θεά*—"Sing, O goddess!"—he meant what he said. Visible loveliness was referred to an invisible type. Phidias was no mere copyist of phenomena: he worked from within. "*Ipsius in mente insidebat specise pulchritudinis eximia quædam*," Cicero well

says. Again, Christianity, accentuating the conflict between the inferior instincts and the higher aspirations, between the spiritual and the material, and proclaiming the absolute supremacy of the soul, compelled even things of the contrary order to put on the semblance of the supersensuous. I need not dwell upon what is so familiar. Speaking generally we may say, that from the very dawn of the intellectual development of our race until the middle of the last century, men had looked upon external nature as a veil, a parable, a sacrament. The conviction that behind the world of form, of colour, of extension there is a reality of which phenomena are the shadows was formerly the life of art. Its function was conceived to be the union of spiritual substance and material symbol. To eliminate the accidental, the transitory, the superfluous, to penetrate through innumerable vain details, that rank parasitic growth, "heavy as frost and deep almost as life," to find the type and to body it forth—such was the office of the artist. This view has been succinctly stated by Balzac in his profoundly philosophic study, *Le Chef-d'œuvre Inconnu*. "The mission of art," he makes Maître Frenhofer say, "is not to copy nature, but to express it. We have to seize the spirit, the soul, the physiognomy of things. Effects! They are but the accidents of life, not life itself." But art was held to be life, to be idealised creation. And this in its latest form of the novel as much as in its earliest of painting. Springing into notice in the last century, romantic

fiction has gradually taken a large place in the literature of our age as one, and perhaps the most distinctive, of its legitimate forms. It is, in fact, mainly a development of the drama. The modern novel might with strict accuracy be called an unacted play, and the modern play an acted novel. Both have been regarded as essentially works of imagination, and so as subject to the same great laws and immutable principles which rule throughout the whole domain of art.

So much as to the difference between the old and the new æstheticism. The one was poetical, and in dealing with the commonest realities of life was "quick to recognise the moral properties and scope of things," using sensible forms to body forth their inner significance. The other claims to be scientific, and proposes as its object the study of the human animal—*la bête humaine*—subject to the action of its environment, the compulsion of heredity, the fatality of instinct. The one is dominated by the ideal, and in a true sense is, and cannot help being, religious. The other is strictly materialistic and frankly professes atheism. M. Zola is not surprised that "classicalists" and "romanticists" "drag him in the mud." "I quite see the reason," he writes. "It is because we deny their *bon Dieu*, we empty their heaven, we take no account of the ideal, we do not refer everything to that abstraction." Even the cult of beauty he repudiates as heartily as all other worship. It is "suspect" to him, as holding of Theism. "That

religion," he tells us, "does not exist apart from the others. The pretended Beautiful, the Absolute Perfection, fixed according to a certain standard, is only the outward expression of the Deity that men dream of and adore;" which, to be sure, is true enough. Not less decisively does he cast aside ethical considerations. You have nothing to do with them, he tells his disciples. Sympathy with good or hatred of evil are as much out of place in your work as would be a chemist's anger against nitrogen as inimical to life, or his admiration of oxygen for a contrary reason. Your aim should be to produce a composition—he might more properly have written decomposition—which logically classifies and correctly values the facts. "Literature," he assures us, "must become pathological or it will cease to exist." "Pathological?" does the reader exclaim? Even so. Literature in general, and in particular the novel and the drama. M. Zola has devoted a long, and, I must say, a very ingenious, essay to prove that the artist in fiction, like all artists, must follow the latest methods adopted by the student of experimental medicine. Invention must disappear from the novel and the drama. The science of the vivisector is to take its place. In this way, he tells us, we shall arrive at practical sociology: our craft will become an auxiliary to the political and economical sciences. "I know of no labour," he adds, "more noble or of larger application. To be master of good and evil, to regulate society, to solve in the long run

all the social problems, above all to furnish justice with solid foundations by determining experimentally questions of criminal law—is not that the most useful, the most moral, of human tasks?” Thus does he magnify his office. He disclaims, however, the honour of having introduced this new spirit into the novel and the drama. For his great forefather he claims Diderot, whom he accounts the most considerable figure of the eighteenth century, and very much in advance of it. One work of the *philosophes*, he thinks—a work to a great extent unconsciously executed—was to break up the old classical form of French literature, Voltaire, great destroyer as he was, being its last representative. Upon its ruins two new schools arose, the school of Diderot and the school of Rousseau, the latter essentially idealist, the former frankly positivist. Rousseau appears to him the literary ancestor of Madame de Staël, Victor Hugo, and George Sand. On the other hand, Stendhal and Balzac, Gustave Flaubert and himself, he regards as the literary successors of Diderot.

This is in substance M. Zola's apology for himself and his school. And it must be admitted that there is a great deal of truth in it. I am indeed by no means prepared to accept it *en bloc*. There is in it much which is not true. Perhaps it may be as well to disentangle this from his verities, in order that they may be the more clearly appre-

hended. First, then, as to M. Zola's literary parentage. I do not deny that he does in some sort represent the movement initiated by Diderot,\* and so may claim to be of his house and lineage. It has been said that the philosophy of Materialism always issues in mere filth. M. Zola furnishes a good illustration of the saying. Diderot, of course, was filthy enough, but he was something more. Sometimes the scintillations of his vast genius almost blind us to his obscenity. The Caliban of the eighteenth century, while his backward voice utters foul speeches in sad abundance, his forward voice discourses on occasion admirably well. Take for example his famous dictum which strikes at the root of M. Zola's doctrine of art: "Il faut que l'artiste ait dans son imagination quelque chose d'ultérieur à la nature." What M. Zola inherits from Diderot is the dogma that there is nothing sacred in man or in the universe, and the nauseous bestiality which is the outcome of that persuasion. His claim to number Stendhal and Gustave Flaubert among the prophets of experimental fiction appears to me to rest upon an even slenderer foundation. M. Zola professes to be nothing but a physiologist. Now, Stendhal was anything but a physiologist. M. Taine has well pointed out that sentiments, traits of character, vicissitudes of the soul, in a word, psychology, constituted the domain

\* Mr. Morley observes in praise of Diderot's vile novel *La Religieuse*, that the author "found nothing in human pathology too repulsive for examination." *Diderot*, vol. ii. p. 34.

in which he worked. Again, how little Flaubert can be brought within the experimental formula is forcibly shown by a recent writer. "He has been represented as a realist, a naturalist," we read in M. du Camp's *Souvenirs*. "There are those who have sought to see in him a literary surgeon, dissecting the passions and making a kind of *post mortem* of the human heart. He was the first to shrug his shoulders at this sort of thing. He was in truth a poet (*un lyrique*).” Yes, a poet; not indeed of a high order, for of the deepest founts of inspiration he never drank; but a great master of literary form, which he was wont to account the whole secret of his art. And what shall we say of M. Zola's attempt to shelter himself and his method under the name of Balzac? He tells us, "Balzac was the great master of the real." True; the greatest certainly in the literature of France. But there is all the difference in the world between M. Zola's unimaginative realism and Balzac's imaginative reality. Balzac is no mere copyist from the streets. To him, as to every artist worthy of the name, the living model is a means, not an end; and he was, primarily and before all else, an artist, ever working in the spirit of his own dictum that art is idealised creation. An artist is one who reproduces the world in his own image and likeness. And in the *Comédie Humaine* we have a colossal fresco in which the society of the first half of the century is painted for us with pitiless accuracy and

terrible pathos, as by the brush of Michael Angelo : a Titanesque work, described with equal grandeur and truth by Victor Hugo in his superb funeral oration on its author as “livre vivant, lumineux, profond, où l'on voit aller et venir, et marcher, et se mouvoir, avec je ne sais quoi d'effaré et de terrible, mêlé au réel, toute notre civilisation contemporaine; livre qui est l'observation et qui est l'imagination; et qui par moments, à travers toutes les réalités brusquement et largement déchirées, laisse tout à coup entrevoir le plus sombre et le plus tragique idéal.” Like the great Florentine, Balzac was indeed an anatomist, and owed his vast technical skill to dissection; and, like him, he parades his science too much. But where his scalpel has destroyed, his brush recreates; and with what accuracy of detail, what force of conception, what depth of colour, what prophetic divination! His figures present that almost perfect union of type with character which is the highest note of the poet. They are instinct with life; they become to us, as they were to him, more real than the men and women of the phenomenal world; and no wonder, for genius holds of the noumenal. I know, and I by no means seek to extenuate, the blots which disfigure the work of this incomparable master. The ideal with him too often falls into the mud. King as he is among French artists in romantic fiction, his royal robes cover a cancer at the heart. M. Zola is wholly eaten up by that cancerous taint. Above the mud he never rises; it is his native element.

So much has he in common with the author of the *Comédie Humaine*. “L’imagination de Balzac m’irrite,” he complains. No wonder. But it is precisely that rich and puissant imagination which specially marks off Balzac from the “experimental” school. M. Zola seems, indeed, to have caught a glimpse of this verity. “Peut-être,” he writes, “si Balzac pourrait nous lire, nous renierait-t-il” :—

“ Thus he, for then a ray of reason stole  
Half through the solid darkness of his soul.”

M. Zola’s literary pedigree must then, I think, be pronounced for the most part spurious. But the parallel which he has drawn between his school in literature and the school in medicine of which Claude Bernard was the great light, appears to be fair enough. The attempt to determine ethical and jurisprudential problems by means of physiological fiction seems entitled to precisely the same amount of respect as the attempt to discover the secrets of physical life by torturing animals in a physiological laboratory. One of the claims most commonly made for vivisection is this: that by the observation of symptoms artificially produced in sound animal organisms, we may arrive at a knowledge of the causes of natural symptoms in unsound human organisms; for example, that by studying the phenomena of death by heat in a rabbit baked alive, we may understand the mechanism of febrile disturbances in a man. This claim

obviously rests upon the confusion of two entirely different sciences, physiology, the science of healthy life, and pathology, the science of unhealthy states—a confusion which, in the words of the late Professor Bufalini, “has caused both science in general, and medicine in particular, the greatest evils, for it has blotted out the indirect treatment of disease and has extinguished the best method of diagnosis, substituting for it one which is perfectly arbitrary and conjectural.” It is difficult to conceive of anything more senseless and unscientific than an attempt to interpret morbid states and morbid phenomena by physiological theories, to develop the laws of nature by mutilating the structure of conscient organic beings, every one of them an integral system of most complicated nervous network; to illustrate the modifications which spring up in a disease, by processes which are foreign to natural influences. I say nothing of the confusion which also arises from the perfect dissimilarity between the functions and diseases of man and of the lower animals.\*

\* Professor Virchow—who is not an anti-vivisectionist—as quoted in the *Thier-und-Menschen Freund*, Nos. 5-6, Dresden, 1887, has well put this point: “The inner life, in a word the whole structure of animals, is in so many ways different from that of human beings, that it has always been regarded as necessary to science and to medical practice, that the latter should themselves be made subjects of research. . . . The value of vivisection is at best very doubtful. Sound conclusions in human physiology and pathology can only be arrived at by the study of the human body. . . .

But, indeed, the history of medicine is largely a history of human folly. Its so-called science in every age has consisted, to a lamentable extent, of mere aberrations from common sense. We live in an era of vivisection. And the voice of reason is as ineffectual against that ghastly shibboleth, as it was against the vomiting of the emetic era, the evacuation of the purging era, the depletion of the bleeding era, the poisoning of the mercurial era and of the iodide of potassium era. Certain it is that the whole race of vivisectors, from the first until now, have not discovered one single agent for the cure of any malady, nor established any therapeutic fact or theory helpful in the smallest degree for the treatment of disease, nor contributed at all to the advance of scientific surgery.\* Certain it is

We have always maintained that to be consistent vivisectors should make experiments on themselves. Sacrifices should be voluntary, not compulsory." This seems very reasonable. I should be glad to see legislative sanction given to the proposal that vivisectors should make experiments on themselves and on one another.

\* I use these words advisedly. I observe that, as a rule, the apologists for vivisection confound the demonstration of a fact in surgery or medicine with its discovery, as in the matter of Harvey and the circulation of the blood. Again, I do not say that no facts connected with physiology or pathology have been discovered by vivisection. I am well aware that facts remotely bearing on these sciences have been so discovered. The editor of the *Medical Annual* for 1889 writes (p. 2): Vivisectional "investigations have a negative value, and teach us the difficulty of establishing therapeutics on a direct physiological basis. But just as the search for the philosopher's stone led to the enunciation of the principles on which the science of chemistry is constructed, so we are likely from

that some of the most ferocious vivisections upon record—those, for example, of Dr. Bennett and Dr. Rutherford on the biliary secretion of the dog—have issued in mere fallacy and absurdity. Certain it is, as has been pointed out with great plainness of speech by Professor Koch, that the vast series of experiments in splenic fever performed by M. Pasteur have yielded results which are worse than valueless, so insufficient and so evanescent is the immunity against natural infection conferred by his preventive inoculation, and so grave are the dangers which it develops for man and other non-inoculated animals. Nor is there the slightest reason for believing that the new vaccine of rabies, prepared in the laboratory of the same *savant*, by similar processes, is one whit more efficacious. The instances of its manifest failure are as conspicuous as are the instances of its alleged success. Nor is there any satisfactory evidence that in the cases where success is claimed for it, the patients were really suffering from rabies at all. Let it not be said that it is arrogant for a layman, like myself, to express so confident an opinion upon a matter lying

the mass of data, which has recently been collected, to obtain some broad principles as to the nature of drug action." Vivisectors will not go beyond this among those who know, whatever they may say to the general public in commendation of their pursuit. Of course my own objection to it does not rest merely upon the hollowness and untenableness of the claims made for it. I regard it as absolutely unethical, and should condemn it unhesitatingly, however great the advantage resulting from it might be.

within the domain of medicine and surgery. Here the question is of no esoteric mystery. It is purely of fact. And any mind trained to weigh and appreciate evidence according to the admirable rules followed in our courts of law is in a far better position to judge of it than a mind destitute of that discipline, warped by professional prejudices and fettered by medical etiquette. A practitioner who refuses the vivisection shibboleth is in great danger of being put out of the synagogue. And although, as I know well, there are many of his brethren who share the convictions of Mr. Lawson Tait, there are few who have shown the courage displayed by that eminent surgeon when, a few years ago, he read before the Birmingham Philosophical Society his masterly paper—it may be perused in the third volume of the Society's *Transactions*—wherein going through the specific claims made for vivisectional experiments as a means for the advancement of medical science, he demonstrated their hollowness and untenableness. The similar claims made by M. Zola for his experimental method in literature are just as empty; the results obtainable by his researches in the latrine and brothel are of precisely the same value as those which the vivisector derives from the torture trough. "The problem," M. Zola tells us, "is to know what a certain passion, acting in a certain environment, and in certain circumstances, will produce as regards the individual and society. And the way to solve it is

to take the facts in nature, then to study their mechanism by bringing to bear upon them the modifications of circumstances and environments. Just as M. Claude Bernard transferred the experimental method from chemistry to medicine, so I transfer it from medicine to the drama and the novel." Quite so. And, we may add, as the vivisector confounds two distinct sciences, physiology and pathology, so does M. Zola confound two sciences as distinct, physiology and ethics. And as the vivisector, in the study of phenomena arbitrarily produced in certain organisms, seeks the explanation of natural phenomena in very different organisms, due to quite other causes, so does M. Zola take his types from one variety of the human species, place them in certain arbitrary conditions, mutilate them at his pleasure, and then pretend to draw from them conclusions as to the action of the passions in the lives of men. True it is that the experimental medicine of M. Paul Bert and the experimental morality of M. Zola are analogous. And true it is that they are both as false in theory, and as worthless, and worse, in results, as they are vile and debasing in practice. "*Trahit sua quemque voluptas.*" Remonstrances are wasted upon the artist in filth or upon the artist in torture. Nor is it by any means the first time in the world's history that obscenity and cruelty—the natural, the inevitable results of Materialism—have sought to conceal

their foul and hideous lineaments under the mask of science.

And now let us come to what is the main point of M. Zola's vindication of himself, and the point with which I am most directly concerned. He humbly pleads that he is but the poor minister of a great movement of the human intellect. The literary evolution of which his school is an instrument is merely part of a vast naturalistic transformation, that for a century has been remaking European society. In an age grown "scientific," the novel, the drama, must become scientific too, and must keep to matter of fact and the needs and instincts of the *bête humaine*. "Nous avons tué l'idéal," says Massimilla Doni sadly, in Balzac's *Gambara*. Yes, exults M. Zola, we have killed the ideal; it is the great achievement of the age. For the future, in art, as in philosophy and politics, we must be altogether experimental and altogether materialist. Hence the literature which he provides supplies a want. He claims, as we have seen, that it is the only appropriate form of fiction for the Third Republic, and argues that the Third Republic will do well to recognise that truth, and to find in *Nana* the poetry of universal suffrage. The time has come, he says, to bring the Republic and literature face to face; to see what the one should expect from the other; to examine whether we, analysts, anatomists, collectors of human docu-

ments, *savants* who admit no authority but that of "fact," should find in the republicans of the present hour friends or enemies. For himself he does not doubt that the existence of the Third Republic is involved in the question. And, availing himself of the famous phrase of M. Thiers, he declares prophetically, "*La République sera naturaliste ou elle ne sera pas.*" Whatever may be the value of M. Zola's vaticination, his contention that the fiction of his school is the popular artistic expression of the Revolution seems to me unquestionably true. The spirit which exhibits Nana in all the foulness of her life, and the horror of her death, for the admiration of contemporary Paris, is the same which a century ago exalted Mdle. Candeille "of the Opera," on the altar of Notre Dame, as the living image of Reason, and sacrificed hecatombs of human victims to that deity in the Place de la Révolution. If we would apprehend the practical value of any idea we must consider it, not as expounded by the masters, but as it lives and works in the minds of the common people. No system of philosophy which makes its way into credit is without potent influence upon the masses, absolutely unacquainted though they must necessarily be with its formal expression. Insensibly it descends among them, and modifies their instincts, their sentiments, their beliefs. We know that all matter is in constant flux, that, physically considered, we have nothing of our own. I have often thought that this may have its counterpart in

the intellectual order. However that may be, the especial value of the writings of M. Zola and his school seems to me this: that they are the most popular outcome of the Revolutionary doctrine in the sphere of æsthetics. Of course this doctrine may be presented with great literary skill and adorned with graces not its own. Mr. John Morley—to mention no others—has so presented it, in a passage which I have quoted from him in a previous chapter.\* M. Zola has done us this service; he has reduced it to its ultimate, its most vulgar resolution. He has supplied the most pregnant illustration known to me of the dictum that “the visible, when it rests not upon the invisible, becomes the bestial.”

The bestial, or something lower. I use the word with some reluctance. I do not think the beasts would like it. If we weigh the matter well, wherein lies the chief difference between civilised man and creatures beneath him in the scale of being? Is it not in the power of apprehending the necessary and universal? Not indeed that I can altogether deny to the lower animals something analogous to the rational and religious sentiments. Thus, in a dog we find the instinct of duty, the instinct of reverence and love for one of a higher order, a blind instinct of dependence, self-renunciation, consciousness of relationship to the worshipped object, his master—who, as Lord Bacon says, is to him instead of a god or *melior natura*. This by the way. My

present point is that the condition of advance in the scale of being is not merely, or chiefly, the subjugation of the external world, but emancipation from the tyranny of the senses: that the great criterion of elevation in the order of existence is whether the higher or lower self is dominant: the self of the appetites and passions, or the self of the reason and moral nature. The true law of progress is to

“Move upward, working out the beast,  
And let the ape and tiger die.”

The Revolutionary doctrine does just the reverse of this. It eliminates from man all but the ape and tiger. It leaves of him nothing but the *bête humaine*, more subtle than any beast of the field, but cursed above all beasts of the field. It is beyond question—look at France if you want overwhelming demonstration of it—that the issue of what M. Zola calls the Naturalistic Evolution is the banishing from human life of all that gives it glory and honour: the victory of fact over principle, of mechanism over imagination, of appetites, dignified as rights, over duties, of sensation over intellect, of the belly over the heart, of fatalism over moral freedom, of brute force over justice, in a word, of matter over mind. Tell me not of its industrial triumphs in which Philistia finds a crown of rejoicing; think rather of the cost at which they are purchased. Emerson has said that there is some-

thing cruel in the aspect of any great mechanical work. Cruel indeed is the effect of machinery upon the working man. Consider how it destroys the elegance and picturesqueness of his labour; how it makes of him a mere "hand," a subordinate adjunct to a structure of wood and iron; how it condemns him to a life-long servitude of weariness and disgust, with no scope for personal initiation, no field for the exercise of one faculty of the soul. This much-vaunted industrialism is largely materialism, in its most ignominious form. It is that industry without art, which Mr. Ruskin has well called brutality.

And now, since I have rejected the Revolutionary theory of art, as presented by M. Zola, it may, perhaps, be fairly expected that I should go on to state what appears to me the true mission of the artist in such an age as this. Surely his mission is not to merge art in physical science, which is its perpetual living contradiction; but in the midst of the ugly and sordid phenomena of daily life to present that image of a fairer and better world, the desire of which springs eternal in the human breast. Certain it is that the spirit of man cannot be long content with that which has not been touched and hallowed by the ideal. And surely as existence becomes more and more materialised, and glory and loveliness die away from it, and the sphere of mechanical necessity enlarges,

and the kingdom of dulness rules among men, the mission of the artist will become of ever higher importance, of ever deeper sanctity, as the minister of the supersensuous, the transcendental, the eternal. Well has Schopenhauer written on this theme, in what is, perhaps, the most valuable part of his philosophy. The function of art, he holds, is to deliver man from the chain of vulgar illusions which binds us to the phenomenal world, by presenting those things that have true being; the permanent essential forms, immutable and ever true, the disinterested contemplation of which is as the shadow of a great rock in a weary land; the pure timeless subjects of knowledge independent of all relations; and thus to reveal to us the thing-in-itself, or, as I would venture to say after Plato, Him who alone hath life and immortality in Himself. Such would seem to be the true mission of the artist, as at all times, so especially in this new age. And it holds of the novel and the play no less than of the other departments of art. No less, but rather more. When Balzac or Thackeray, George Eliot or George Sand is the storyteller, we are all listeners, the wise and learned, as well as the ignorant and foolish. But the writer of romantic fiction is especially the minister of the ideal to the multitude, who, as they gaze on the masterpieces of the painter and the sculptor, having eyes see not; who have no ears to hear the message of the poet, the philosopher, the musician. Mr. Carlyle scornfully abandons to him

“children, minors, and semifatuous persons.” Well, but, Mr. Carlyle himself being judge, children, minors, and semifatuous persons constitute the vast majority of “our own flesh and blood.” “Twenty-five millions, chiefly fools!” Perhaps. Yet we may be quite sure that in the most foolish, the heart does not exist that has never throbbed with a deep emotion, nor the intellect that has never harboured a true thought, nor the imagination that has never nursed a dream of beauty. In the dullest, the least cultivated, as in the most richly endowed and highly disciplined of our race, we may discern what the historian of Materialism confesses to be, “the same necessity, the same transcendental root of our nature which leads us to fashion a world of the ideal, whither we may escape from the limitations of the senses, to find there the home of our spirit.”

“The man of letters has a cure of souls,” a great French writer has well said. This is particularly true of those who work in that department of romantic fiction, the influence of which in this age is so great and is ever increasing. It is their vocation to refine, to elevate, to moralise. And here comes in the essential difference between their function and that of the physicist. To physical science nothing is filthy or impure. The student in its domain takes all the facts and catalogues them in the order of their importance, reducing them to formulas. He deals with matter. Ethics

is a sphere into which he does not enter. Far other is it with the writer of fiction. In the first place he is not concerned with all the facts. His work is essentially poetical, and the primary duty of the poet is choice, which is governed by those eternal laws, those necessary conventions, ruling throughout the domain of art. The great ethical principles of reserve, shame, reverence, which have their endless applications in civilised life, prescribe limits to imagination as to action. There are moods of thought which do not yield in heinousness to the worst deeds—moods of madness, suicidal and polluting. To leave them in the dark is to help towards suppressing them. And this is a sacred duty. “We are bound to reticence,” says George Eliot, “most of all by that reverence for the highest efforts of our common nature, which commands us to bury its lowest fatalities, its invincible remnants of the brute, its most agonising struggles with temptation, in unbroken silence.” The main theme of the novelist, the dramatist, is ever the passion of love—the most common, the most imperious of human sentiments. But love is not to him what it is to the physiologist—a mere animal impulse which man has in common with moths and mollusca. His task is to extract from human life, even in its commonest aspects, its most vulgar realities, what it contains of secret beauty; to lift it to the level of art, not to degrade art to its level. And so he is concerned with this most

potent and universal instinct, as transformed, in greater or less degree, by the imaginative faculty; whether, dealing with it in its illicit manifestations, he exhibits it as the blight and bane of life, or depicts it in its pure and worthy expression — “the bulwark of patience, the tutor of honour, the perfectness of praise.” His ethos comes out in the treatment of his subject rather than in his personages, his plot, or his *dénouement*. It is easy to conceive of a work of fiction in which all the characters should be evil, but which should be severely ethical in its tone. An hour passed in Dante's *Inferno* does but intensify our longing to enter his *Paradiso*.

Unquestionably, this general canon may be laid down, that in a work of art the depicting of deformity and evil is admissible, only as it brings into stronger relief beauty and virtue; that the sensuous impression should not overpower the spiritual. Certainly the drama or the novel of modern life must be true to life; it may not put darkness for light, nor light for darkness: it must represent the darkness and the light as they are. A work of imagination should not obtrude the moral sentiment. To employ it for the establishment of a thesis is fatally to pervert it from its true function. Flaubert was well warranted when he wrote, “Une œuvre d'art qui cherche à prouver quelque chose est nulle par cela seul.” Let the literary artist body forth things as they are in this confused drama of existence,

subject only to the reservations which the essential laws of art impose. Those "bad good books," as they have well been called, which depict things as they are not, stand condemned by the first principle of literary ethics, for they are wanting in the primary condition of morality, which is truth. Balzac has profoundly observed, "Great works of imagination subsist by their passionate side. But passion is excess, is evil. The writer has nobly accomplished his task when, not putting aside this essential element of all literary work, he accompanies it with a great lesson. The really immoral book," he justly adds, "is that which saps the bases of property, religion, justice," in other words, which ignores or denies the spiritual nature of men, whereon these essential foundations of civilisation rest. And he elsewhere sums the matter up in the proposition that to moralise his epoch is the end which every literary artist should propose to himself. How far this great master contributed to moralise his epoch, how far he is open to the impeachment that his virtue is after all but an obscene virtue, are questions which must not detain us now. What I would insist on is the great principle which he so well states, that the true value of any work of art is its ethical value, and that the measure of its ethical value is its correspondence with the truth of things. But the true is the ideal; the phenomenal is not the real, but its perpetual antithesis. A generation

taught by Kant should not need to be reminded how pregnant is that old aphorism of Hellenic wisdom that the senses are very indifferent witnesses of truth ; that what meets them is merely an expression, adapted to our imperfect apprehensive powers, of eternal verities, which eye hath not seen nor ear heard, for they are beyond the reach of our limited perceptive organs. Those verities are the true domain of the artist in fiction as of all artists. He is essentially a psychologist ; and it is precisely in the degree that the physiognomy, gestures, words, actions of his characters interpret truly the innumerable sentiments which make up the life of the soul, that he is veracious ; for the soul is the great human reality ; man's moral being is the dominant fact about him. Balzac's piercing eyes discerned this truth clearly enough ; and he has formulated it with admirable succinctness in the introduction to the *Comédie Humaine*—"Un roman a pour loi de tendre vers le beau idéal." Yes ; this is the great law of romantic fiction. The ultimate test in judging of it ever is, whether there is any high thought, any true ideal, which serves as the centre of the fable and informs the composition. If, and in so far as, there is, it may be pronounced artistic, ethical, true. In the filthy æstheticism of which M. Zola's writings are the most popular manifestation there is not a vestige of the *beau idéal*. There is nothing but blank and crude materialism, the trivial, the foul, the base of

animal life. A movement of prurient curiosity, a spasm of lust, a thrill of physical horror—these are the highest emotions which such art excites. That it can possess the slightest charm for any one who has not sunk to Nana's spiritual level is inconceivable; and herein is the appalling significance of its popularity. Whether acquiescence in such Naturalism is "wise and not inglorious" is a question the answer to which must depend upon our conception of wisdom and glory. That it is the true expression of the Revolution in the domain of popular æsthetics, there can be no question whatever.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE REVOLUTION AND DEMOCRACY.

It is commonly said that we are living in an age of Democracy. And this is true. It is also true that we are living in an age of commonplaces. The popular mind is fed chiefly on phrases provided by the newspapers, which constitute for the great majority their only literature. Hence words take largely the place of ideas :

“ Denn eben wo Begriffe fehlen,  
Da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein.”

And one result is that words lose precise connotations and, too often, serve merely to darken counsel. Democracy is a word which has experienced this fate. In common parlance it is used in the loosest manner. Those who attach to it some definite sense, usually employ it to denote the polity, in contemporary Europe, which is informed by the Revolutionary dogma. Very few, probably, are aware how widely removed is that polity from everything that the world has hitherto meant by Democracy. Mr. Mill has observed in his inval-

able work on *Representative Government*, that “the current idea of Democracy is derived from the falsely called democracies which now prevail.” Certainly, no citizen of ancient Athens, no burgher of medieval Florence, would recognise as Democracy such a polity as that which at present exists, let us say, in France. Some one—I forget who, nor does it matter—was once commending, in high terms, the philosophical merit of M. Cousin. “The Plato of our age,” he said, “a nineteenth century Plato.” “Yes,” it was replied, “an electro-Plato.” The repartee was a little hard on M. Cousin, perhaps. But it may help us to an illustration. The Révolutionary Democracy of these latter days has as much in common with the noble town autonomies of Hellas or Italy, as the ware vulgarly named after the enterprising city of Birmingham has in common with the commodities which it counterfeits.

The word Democracy in prechristian Europe, and in the Europe of the Middle Ages, denoted the rule of that comparatively small class which constituted the *δῆμος*, or *populus*. In those democracies, citizenship was regarded not as a natural right, but as a legal privilege, to be gained with difficulty and to be guarded with jealousy. The result of fierce struggles, and of the triumph of the most highly endowed races, they rested everywhere upon a basis of fact. And they were everywhere, even in their most popular form, essentially aristocratic. To be a burgher of ancient Athens, or of medieval

Florence, was to have a patent of nobility. The Revolutionary Democracy of the present day, so far from resting upon prescription and privilege, like the older democracies, starts from the proposition that man, *quà* man, possesses all the highest attributes of citizenship. It is based upon an *à priori* theory of the supposed rights, innate, inalienable, and imprescriptible, of humanity in a hypothetical state of nature. It everywhere depends, whether consciously or unconsciously, upon the doctrine of man and society which Rousseau formulated, and which Robespierre sought to realise: an abstract, an unrelated, an universal man: identical in all ages, in all latitudes, in all races, in all states of civilisation. It everywhere aspires, with varying degrees of vehemence, to sweep away historic institutions, with the innumerable diversities attaching to them, in order to make room for a reconstruction of the public order on the basis of arithmetic, and of what it calls pure reason. It everywhere worships what it accounts to be "abstract rights," and believes them to govern the world. In France we see it in the fullest and most logical development it has, as yet, attained. But, even in this country, as I shall have to point out more at length in the next chapter, it has made proselytes, and has embodied itself in many a cherished phrase, many an effective shibboleth. Thus, the Benthamite aspiration,

“Everybody to count for one: nobody for more than one,” or the more succinct formula, “One man, one vote,” is merely a translation into the vulgar tongue of Rousseau’s sophism of the equivalence of all members of the community, and of their natural right to participate equally in the expression of the general will. The proposition with which the air still resounds, that “the true political creed is faith in the people,” is but a variation on the theme that “human nature is good,” justly reckoned by Mr. John Morley “the central moral doctrine of the Revolution.” The equally familiar thesis that the adult males of any country—that is a majority of them told by head—however low in the scale of humanity, however devoid of the most elementary instincts and aptitudes of freemen, as, for example, in Egypt, are its sole legitimate rulers, is only the practical application of the *Contrat Social*. Nor is the success of this teaching difficult to understand. “Ce qui fait une puissance extraordinaire aux idées de Rousseau,” wrote M. Tain to me some time ago (I cite his luminous words by his kind permission) “c’est surtout la simplicité de la conception. Un enfant, un ouvrier croit la comprendre. En effet le raisonnement publique qu’elle enfante est aussi aisé qu’une règle de trois. Comment prouver à cet homme qu’il ne comprend pas, que la notion de l’état est une des plus difficiles à former, que le raisonnement politique est hors de sa portée? Ce

serait l'offenser. Il ne peut pas admettre, même comme possible, une chose si énorme: et son amour-propre suffit pour aveugler son bon sens."

Such unquestionably is the Democracy of the Revolutionary type as it now exists, in various stages of development: the incarnation of the dogma which we have been considering, from various points of view, in the preceding chapters. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt as to its practical issue. The real question of our day is not political, but social: what there is to devour, and who shall devour it? And this question will certainly be helped towards a solution by the doctrines of absolute political equality and of the supreme right of the numerical majority, who are, and always must be, relatively poor. You tell Lazarus, in his rags, that he is equal in rights to Dives. "Equal in rights?" says the beggar; "where, then, are my purple and fine linen? What have I done that I should lack even the crumbs which fall from the rich man's table, as he fares sumptuously every day? It is unjust. There ought to be no poor. The wealth of the rich is a robbery of the poor. The vote must change all that. For, after all, *we* are the majority; *we* are the sovereign people." And the demagogue, whose very function it is to trade upon the envious and malignant passions of mankind, is at hand to pro-

mise him, in exchange for his vote, the infinite amelioration of the conditions of human life, by legislation. This is quite in accord with the ethos of the Revolution, which is imbued with Rousseau's principle, that civil society is a mere artificial contrivance, and that the lawgiver is omnipotent. Constant instability is its distinctive characteristic. It lives on innovation, on ever-renewed pandering to the greed of human nature. If any fact is certain beyond all possibility of doubt it is this: that to invest the indigent classes—the numerical majority—with absolute control over the possessors of property, is to condemn a country to rapid demoralisation. Free association, in the largest sense of the word, is an essential part of liberty. To infringe it is a sacrilege against humanity. The Revolution, holding out the State as a sort of earthly Providence, issues necessarily in that Communism which shuts up human society within the barbarous moulds of an artificial mechanism, which destroys individuality, and depersonalises man. True was the instinct which led Rousseau to curse civilisation, for it is incompatible with his doctrines. He is the great anarch who is leading his votaries back to a state of nature, not such as he dreamed of, but such as we really find at the dawn of history, and the true account of which is—barbarism.

That this is the goal to which the Revolutionary dogma necessarily conducts the peoples who try to realise it, and to live by it, seems to me certain.

This is the hell—a very real one—which assuredly awaiteth the nation that maketh and loveth a lie. And a lie the dogma of the Revolution manifestly is. Here—and not in the shallowness of the pedants, the vulgarity of the buffoons, the ferocity of the butchers, who have played their ignoble parts in it—here, is its unpardonable sin. Every one of the propositions which constitute its ideal of man and society is demonstrably, is obviously false. That “great central moral doctrine” of the natural goodness of man—especially “the man of the people,” as less spoilt by civilisation—can anything be imagined more utterly opposed to the plainest facts of life? The natural man, uncorrupted by civilisation, good? Why, the more natural, that is the more animal he is, the worse is he. The very law of ethical progress is to

“Move upward, working out the beast,  
And let the ape and tiger die.”

You may get rid of the name of original sin. But the thing which the name represents is a primordial, permanent ingredient of human nature, explain it how you will. The old Hebrew legend is, at all events, the allegory of a moral fact.\* “Radical Böse,” Kant called it, truly enough. It is aborigi-

\* “The candid incline to surmise of late,  
That the Christian faith may be false, I find.  
I still to suppose it true, for my part:  
See reasons and reasons; this, to begin:  
'Tis the faith that launched point blank her dart  
At the head of a lie: taught Original Sin,  
The Corruption of Man's Heart.”—

BROWNING: *Gold Hair; a Legend of Pornic.*

nal, not adventitious; an infection of nature, not the product of bad laws or of bad education. It is more in one and less in another. There are those human monsters in whom it overshadows the whole ethical character. There are those fair souls in whose "all but utter whiteness" it is hardly traceable. But, in whatever proportion, it is always there, a taint, a perversion, transmitted by heredity; a wild beast within us, Plato said, which must be chained. The philosophy of Rousseau lets the wild beast loose. No. The doctrine of the unalloyed natural goodness of man is as false as the Calvinistic doctrine of his total depravity. The sense of moral imperfection is just as much a fact of our nature as the sense of ignorance. It is the best who are most sensitively conscious of an evil element innate in them, just as it is the wisest who feel most severely the inadequacy of reason. For the view of man as an essentially rational animal is no less untenable than the view of him as an essentially virtuous animal. Unquestionably, men are capable of ratiocination, in degrees varying indefinitely upwards from little more than zero. But who that is not theory-blind can ignore the fact, that human life, taken as a whole, is dominated by physical temperament, corporal instinct, prejudice, imagination, passion, interest, far more than by reason?

Let us go on to the next of the Revolutionary postulates concerning man: its egalitarian doctrine. "Equality," says Bailleul, "which is nothing but

strict justice, was the aim of the Revolution from the beginning." But equality is a question-begging word. And it is precisely the opposite of strict justice, as Plato observed two thousand years ago, to dispense equality alike to equals and unequals. Here, again, the new gospel ignores the facts of life. Men are no more absolutely equal than they are absolutely good or absolutely reasonable. Equal in their common nature they are. Equal before the law they ought to be. Equal, in the sense of equivalent in the body politic, they certainly are not, and never will be until doctrinaires succeed in radically transforming mankind. This appears to have been more or less clearly apprehended by one of "the giants of 1792," a certain Armand de la Meuse, who is recorded to have demanded the introduction of mental equality. This sage was certainly within his logic. He went to the root of the matter. The great, the perennial source of inequality among men, lies in difference of intellectual constitution and of psychic power.

So much as to the attributes ascribed by the new gospel to "the man and the citizen," as its cant phrase is. Next, as to its theory of the public order. Does civil polity rest upon the Social Contract? It is enough to ask the question. There is no instance upon record in any age, in any country, of a number of men saying to one another, "Go to; let us enter into the Social Contract and found a state." Political society is no contract. It is a

necessary historical product, uniting might with right, and establishing human freedom by their union. Man comes into the world under the law of solidarity. Society is to him what the soil is to the plant. The individual is not the starting-point, but the goal of human progress. The most important relations of life, public and private, do not arise out of convention; we are born into them. “*Nascitur non fit*,” is the true account of the social order, in fact: while, philosophically considered, we may regard it with Kant, as the union of a multitude of men under the laws of Right—“*die Vereinigung einer Menge von Menschen unter Rechtsgesetzen*.” But what is Right? We may reply, that the only adequate conception of Right is that which founds it upon necessity. It issues from the nature of things, from that *θεῖος νοῦς*, which is the supreme reason. But for the inner assent which the human intellect is bound, by its very laws, to give when Right is thus apprehended, Rousseau substitutes the imaginary adhesions of the multitude to a fictitious convention. He deduces Right from what is accidental and changeable, instead of from what is necessary and immutable; and in doing this he performs a mortal operation upon it. Natural Right—*Naturrecht*—is the absolute law which is, or should be, the pattern of all existing law. To deny it, is to deny that Right, in any philosophical sense,

exists at all. Let me not be misunderstood. I am well aware that in discussing any question of natural right we cannot dispense with data, whether we approach it synthetically or analytically. A principle is like a seed. It grows in the soil into which it is cast, and seeks its nourishment from without. We cannot uproot it, so to speak, in dealing with the concrete, and deduce by mere abstract ratiocination the proper course of its development, or indicate the conditions of its application. That is precisely what the Revolution has endeavoured to do. This by the way. At the present moment I am merely concerned to point out, that what the Revolutionary dogma predicates of the individual reason, is true only of the abstract reason. And the individual reason is apt, in practice, to mean the individual passions.\* Hence the appropriateness of Chaumette's choice of Mdlle. Candeille "of the Opera," to personify, on the altar of Notre Dame, the Deity of the new gospel. Lastly of Rousseau's conception of sovereignty we may safely affirm, that it has no more place than his conception of right in any philosophy worthy of the name. For unlimited dominion belongs

\* The "Declaration of Rights," Professor von Sybel justly observes, in his *History of the Revolutionary Period*, "raised to the throne not the reason which is common to all men, but the aggregate of universal passions": "nicht die Allen gemeinsame Vernunft, sondern die Masse der individuellen Leidenschaften." B. II. c. 3.

only to perfection. It is an attribute of the Absolute. To the Infinite and Eternal, and to conscience, as His aboriginal Vicar and perpetual representative in the heart of man, alone is due unrestricted obedience. All the great religions of the world proclaim—it is their *raison d'être*—that there is a bound to human sovereignty, a sphere in which it does not enter. And, even in its proper sphere, it is essentially limited and fiduciary. The claim that all is Cæsar's, whether the Cæsar be Emperor or King, a ruling caste or “the sovereign people,” gives the lie to the most sacred rights of human personality. “What the people wills is just,” the Jacobins insisted a hundred years ago; and insist now. That is the conclusion of the whole matter in the new gospel, which issues in the apotheosis of the worst of tyrants, a mob that strikes and will not hear; surely the basest idol ever made to itself by “the purblind race of miserable men.”

Whether whole nations, like the individuals of whom they are composed, may go mad, was a question which troubled the profound mind of Butler. Had he lived in our day, he would not have experienced much difficulty in solving it. Or, rather, he would have found its solution presented by a century of Revolution. Can any nation be accounted perfectly sane which believes that it is possible to determine what is right and wrong, just

and unjust, by counting heads? Or which shuts its eyes to the patent fact that inequality is the universal law of nature; as in the physical world, which is an immense hierarchy of phenomena, so in the intellectual order, the moral order, the social order? Or which tries to break with its past and to make a new departure in history? Or which insists that the electoral franchise is a natural right of man? An idea the "moral mischief," of which when it has once taken "root in the general mind," has been so forcibly pointed out by Mr. Mill, and which is, at the least, as absurd intellectually, as it is morally mischievous. The Revolutionary dogma, with its inane pretensions to simplicity, its delight in *à priori* principles, is surely one of the most delirious delusions recorded in the annals of human error.) It does not in the least recognise that the history of our race is, to the eye purged by science, the record of the efforts of real superiorities to assert themselves and to vindicate their divine prerogative. It has not even the most rudimentary conception of the great law of evolution. That all is a perpetual becoming; that the relative, not the absolute, rules in politics, as throughout the whole of the phenomenal order; that national life cannot be petrified in abstract formulas—all this is hidden from the eyes of its doctrinaires, who unhesitatingly apply the geometrical method to the public order, and deal with the State as though it were a triangle.

I spoke just now of the Revolutionary dogma as a lie. But let us remember that not by its mendacity does any lie live. It has been well observed by Sydney Smith, an acute if not a very profound student of human nature, "Errors to be dangerous must have a great deal of truth mingled with them; it is only from this alliance that they can obtain an extensive circulation; from pure extravagance and genuine unmingled falsehood the world never has and never can sustain any mischief." Unquestionably in the Revolutionary dogma are hidden verities which have greatly contributed to its success, and, at the same time, have added vastly to its power for evil. Thus, the absolute, unconditioned equality, in the name of which it disintegrates society and personality alike, is false. But the falsehood veils the truth, that members of the body politic, in Aristotle's words, "if not equal man to man, are yet equal proportionately, when their several and respective claims have been referred to a common standard." The doctrine of the sovereignty of the individual, which means, practically, the sovereignty of the masses, as taught by the Revolution, is opposed to right reason. The doctrine of self-government by a people, not numerically, but dynamically, is the sum of political wisdom. That each man has, of natural right, an equal share in the government of the country where he happens to be born, is a palpable absurdity. That all men not labouring under some sufficient legal disqualifi-

cation should, when a certain stage of civilisation has been reached, exercise some influence commensurate with their importance in the social organism, no scientific thinker will deny. That all men have the rights of men is self-evident. As self-evident is it, that all men have not the same rights. That "the reason of the multitude can make a law" is a proposition wholly irreconcilable with any philosophic conception of law. That the assent, express or implied, of the individual—who is a person, not a thing—is essential to a just regimen, is a primary position of true political science. To which we may add, as a corollary, that such assent is not necessarily, nor, as a rule, best, given by voting. That right should rule the world is an august, a sacred verity. That right is derived from the mere empirical consensus of multitudinous individuals is a stupid and insane blasphemy against the essential law of reason,—the supreme and indefeasible lawgiver.

But that great, universal, irrepressible all-penetrating fact called modern Democracy is one thing. The Revolutionary dogma is another. There is no necessary connection between them. And, indeed, the work of the Revolution for Democracy has been chiefly to pervert and falsify it: to exhibit it to the world clad in sophism and mendacity: and—

Goethe's penetrating eyes saw this clearly \* — to retard indefinitely its tranquil development. It is a profound observation of Joubert: "Il n'y a de bon dans les innovations, que ce qui est développement, accroissement, achèvement. Imitiez le temps," he adds: "il détruit tout avec lenteur; il mine, il use, il déracine, il détache et n'arrache pas." The procedure of the Revolution was precisely contrary to this. It essayed to treat European society as Medea is fabled to have treated the aged Pelias: hacking and hewing to pieces the body politic, under the pretence that a rejuvenated world would issue from its foul cauldron. No greater mistake can be made than to suppose—as it is very commonly supposed — that the new phrase called Democracy, into which European civilisation has entered, is the product of the Revolution, although the Revolution undoubtedly prepared the place for it, by sweeping away throughout Europe the absolutist monarchies of the Renaissance type, and a social hierarchy resting on an antiquated basis, and dissonant from the truth of things.

Contemporary Democracy is no abstract speculation, no mere mechanism. It is a stage of organic growth; a state of society issuing from the history of the world and the nature of things; a political fact, the result of long centuries of development; the latest term in a movement which has been in

\* "Franzthum drängt in diesen verworrenen Tagen wie ehemals Lutherthum es gethan, ruhige Bildung zurück."

progress since the beginning of European civilisation. The whole history of that civilisation is, to the philosophic eye, the history of the oft-thwarted but ever-advancing vindication of human freedom, of the value of man as man, of the supremacy of right over force, of the equality of all men before the law, whose only true root is in Right. We may call it—as I have called it in a previous chapter—"the evolution of the individual in the social organism, or federation of organisms, of which he is the cell: when each exists for all, and all for each, and the life of each is multiplied by the common life of all." It is the ever deepening apprehension of the great truth that man is *non res sed persona*, of the capital fact of human personality. In so far as we are persons, we have rights. The greater our personality, the greater our right. Personality, I say, is the measure of man's right, just as the idea of right is the principle and germ of progress.

Now modern Democracy expresses the realisation of this great fact of human personality. It implies the equality of men as persons, and of their title, arising from that equality, to a like share of political power. This equality is not of course absolute, but relative. The proposition "All men are equal" is true, in the same sense as that in which the Stoic paradox "All crimes are equal" is true. It is true that men as persons are equal; it is as true that they are unequal. The rights of the individual

are but aspects of that great aboriginal right whereof I just now spoke: his right to realise the creative thought of his being. They may be deduced—to speak in language that is necessarily crude, and therefore open to misconception—from his rights; that is to say, from a consideration of his various faculties, subject to the provision that no man has a right to annihilate the rights of others for his own sake. There is a natural hierarchy, upon which the order of human life is necessarily founded.

This, then, is what modern Democracy means; the inclusion within the *δῆμος*, or *populus*, of those large classes whom the ancient democracies excluded; the full recognition of their *status* as persons; and their direct influence upon public affairs. The advent of the masses, of the numerical majority, to immediate political authority is the social fact of the day. It is also the social danger. Power is with them. What will they do with it? That is the question of questions.

“Vis consili expers mole ruit sua:  
Vim temperatam di quoque provehunt  
In majus——”

Democracy is not light or leading; it is not human wisdom or divine inspiration. The attributes of a multitude will be the attributes of its constituent units: the same vices, the same virtues, the same capacities, the same incapacities. There are those who maintain that as soon as “citizens” assemble in public meeting, or around ballot-boxes, they, or rather the majority of them, are endowed with a

mystic illumination, and are inaccessible to passion, temptation, error. With these fanatics—honest or dishonest—I do not argue. I leave to them their liberty of absurdity, only begging that in return they will respect my liberty of common-sense. What, then, is the ordinary “man and citizen” as he really exists, even in the most civilised countries? What is he, at the best, but a child in understanding, while too frequently, in Aristotle’s well-weighed words, he is “not appreciably superior to the lower animals.” Put before him the simplest train of argument, invite him to exactness, ask him to define, beg him to consider differences, and you will strike him dumb, unless, perchance, by way of answer, he damns your eyes. He views things disconnectedly, unable to make use of that “large discourse, looking before and after,” which would interpret their connection. The very notion of causation is strange to him. Condemned by a law which shall never be broken—for it issues from the nature of things—to a life of manual toil, “his phenomenal existence, his extensionless present, his momentary satisfaction—this alone has any reality for him, and his energies are concentrated on its maintenance.” Such are, and such, more or less, must of necessity ever be, the numerical majority in every country. They are power; not reason, not right. “The masses,” Amiel has well observed, “are the *matter* of Democracy, but the *form*—that is to say the laws which express reason, justice, general utility—is the product of wisdom which is

by no means an universal possession. That which emanates (*ce qui dégage*) from a multitude is an instinct, or a passion. The instinct may be good; but the passion may be bad. And instinct never gives a clear idea, nor passion a just resolve."

We may say, speaking generally, that there are in the modern world two types of Democracy. There is the type moulded by an abstract idea, and that a false one, which adopts the *Credo* of the Revolution: which, in the name of a spurious equality assassinates liberty and depersonalises man: which gives the lie to the facts of science and the facts of history: which is essentially chaotic as lacking the elements of stability and tradition essential to society: which opposeth and exalteth itself above all that is called God or that is worshipped, to the moral law which is His voice, to the laws of social life which are His ordinance—the formula "*Ni Dieu ni maître*" correctly expresses it—which has no sense of any law superior to popular wilfulness, and which is condemned already simply by the very fact that it is anarchic; that it is *consili expers*, at variance with the reason of things, which no man, or nation of men, can disobey under dire penalties. Of such a Democracy our greatest poet has indicated the inevitable fate.

"Then everything includes itself in power:

Power into will, will into appetite:

And appetite, an universal wolf,  
 So doubly seconded with will and power,  
 Must make, perforce, an universal prey,  
 And, last, eat up himself."

That is one type of Democracy, faithfully represented by contemporary France. But there is another type. There is a temperate, rational, regulated Democracy, the product of that natural process of "persistence in mobility," which is the law of the social organism as of the physical; a Democracy recognising the differences naturally springing from individuality, allowing full room for the free play of indefinitely varying personalities, and so, constructive and progressive, the nurse of patriotism and the tutor of freedom; a Democracy in harmony with the facts of history and of science, and with the necessary laws of human life issuing from the nature of things, and therefore, in the truest sense, divine; a Democracy where the masses are not fawned upon by the discounters and jugglers of universal suffrage, who so well understand the old maxim "Flatter and reign," but schooled and governed by the strong and wise; a Democracy at once the outcome and the subject of law.\*

Such is the imperial fabric of Democracy which has been reared in Germany upon the sure basis of national traditions and historical continuity and

\* See, in this connection, an admirable passage on the difference between the German and the French view of life—*Gegensatz der deutschen zur französischen Weltanschauung*—in Lady Blennerhassett's *Frau von Staël*, vol. iii. p. 59.

intellectual culture, and moral discipline and domestic piety; philosophers and poets like Kant and Hegel and Goethe and Schiller, true kings of men like the patriot princes of the noble house of Hohenzollern, puissant and prescient statesmen like Stein and Bismark, being the chief master-builders. I know of no more interesting and instructive pages in history than those in which are recorded the labours of the Baron von Stein, in the hour of his country's deep degradation, to bring her public life into harmony with the conditions and exigencies of the new age. He is a great exemplar of the true patriot, loving his land :

“——with love far-brought  
From out the storied Past, and used  
Within the Present, but transfused  
Thro' future time by power of thought.”

His admirable reforms, municipal, territorial, agricultural, administrative, military, commercial, were the orderly and legitimate development of historical institutions, and breathed the genuine spirit of rational liberty and regular progress. To him, more than to any one else, is it due, that even half a century ago was found, in Prussia, what Hegel accurately called “Democracy working in harmony with a real monarchy.”

And what Stein began has been carried on by his successors,\* with whatever imperfections and

\* The following extract from an admirable pamphlet on universal suffrage, published a few years ago by M. de Lacombe, may

aberrations, on the whole right worthily, down to our own days. Even now the Imperial Chancellor, alone, as would seem, among European statesmen, is applying himself to that great question of the future — the social question. He discerns that in the claims of socialism, mad and anarchical as their expression generally is, there is latent an element of justice, which constitutes their real danger. The great problems for the scientific politician to ponder in the present day are these: What is the normal type of civilised life? Does it include, or presuppose, such strife between Labour and Capital, as that which has resulted in the portentous “progress and poverty” visible around us on all hands? Is the true foundation of the industrial system competition or co-operation? Whether we like it or not, to reason, that is to the nature of things, is the ultimate appeal. And can anything be less reasonable than what Mr. Ruskin has happily called fitly find place here. “Lorsqu’en 1849, dans le tumulte d’une révolution, la Prusse entra en possession de la liberté politique dont ses libertés communales et provinciales lui avaient été un si salubre apprentissage, elle voulut *non pas subordonner la société au suffrage universel, mais adapter le suffrage universel à la société*. Le corps électoral, dont tout Prussien, âgé de vingt-quatre ans, fut déclaré membre, se divise en trois classes, formées elles-mêmes d’après le montant des contributions : dans la première classe sont inscrits les plus imposés dont les cotes réunies représentent le tiers de l’ensemble des impôts supportés par la circonscription ; dans la seconde, la suite des plus imposés jusqu’à concurrence du deuxième tiers de l’impôt ; dans la troisième, le reste des contribuables. Chacune de ces trois classes nomme un nombre égal d’électeurs du second degré, lesquels à leur tour élisent le député.”

“the shame of mingled luxury and misery which is spread over the land” of England? A land where “wealth accumulates and men decay.” Yes, and men accumulate too; and in what conditions! At one extremity of the social scale, the unemployed rich, sunk in boundless luxury and unbridled self-indulgence; and at the other, the unemployed poor, with no choice between imprisonment in the workhouse and starvation outside of it. Easy enough it is to deride the crude proposals made by Socialism. The work of the thinker is to discern and express the huge unpalatable truth which is in it. Well has one of the foremost of living German jurists observed, “Only when the socialist ideas have been taken out of the interminable popular and philanthropic utterances which make up socialistic literature, and have been translated into scientific conceptions of Right, will practical statesmen be in a position to discern how far the existing order of rights must be transformed in the interests of the suffering working classes.”\* Yes, and in the interests of the social organism generally. The reconstruction of our industrial system, which means to a large extent the reconstruction of the social organism, on the basis of justice—such is the problem which lies before the world. In the disciplined, law-abiding, and architectonic Democracy of Germany, with its re-

\* *Das Recht auf den vollen Arbeitsertrag in geschichtlicher Darstellung*, von Dr. Anton Menger, Vorrede, p. 3.

spect for human personality, its love of historical traditions, its loyalty to the illustrious house in which the national unity is personified and centred, its faith in spiritual, moral, and intellectual forces, we may reasonably hope to see that problem receive its solution. “*Vim temperatam di quoque provehant in majus.*”

We may well insist with M. Vacherot that Democracy must be scientific. And what is science but the logical apprehension of facts, as underlain by principles? Democracy must accept all the facts of all the sciences, and the political lessons which they teach. It will have thoroughly to lay to heart the fact that the State is not a conventional arrangement, arrived at by sovereign individuals, but an organic growth, the component parts of which vary indefinitely in value; that there are social forces far higher than the numerical. It will have deeply to apprehend that inequality among men, having for its perennial source the differences in their intellectual constitutions and psychic energies, lies at the very root of civilisation; that subordination, obedience, self-sacrifice, are primary public virtues; that liberty is *not* absolute but proportional. It will have to repent in sackcloth and ashes, wherever it has adopted that “fanaticism of *égalitairisme*,” which is a leveling down, and a retrogression towards barbarism,

and to discern that the strong, the wise, the just, are the rightful leaders of the multitudes who are neither strong, nor wise, nor just, in the slow, oft-thwarted, but still continuous march upward of the human race. The social organism tends to complexity, not to simplicity. An ever-increasing differentiation, an ever-growing distinction of functions, is the law of advancing civilisation. To that polity of the future, which may be dimly foreshadowed as the outcome of the world's political progress, the arbitrary classifications now current are inapplicable. Consider the various social elements scientifically, and aristocracy and democracy are misleading words. Certain, however, it is that not a dead uniform level, but unity in the difference which is the necessary outcome of the growth of individuality, is the condition of that "commonwealth of men" indicated by science as the ideal. Hierarchical, society must of necessity be. Revolutionary Democracy differs from ancient and medieval merely in this, that it is not an aristocracy, or government of the best, but a kakistocracy, or government of the worst—a polity in which wisdom, culture, virtue, even wealth, are suppressed by folly, ferocity, vice, and poverty. Once more : Democracy will have to abandon its fond illusion of remaking the world in a day, or in a century, and to recognise as the law of the social organism, no less than of the individual, that binding together of old and new, the one handed down by heredity, the other added on by differentiation,

which is of the very essence of evolution. So far the teachings of science are what may be called, in quite another than the partisan sense, Conservative. But they present other aspects, which are Radical, beyond the dreams of most politicians who affect that name. To mention only two of them. In the first place, while science announces the right of true superiorities—racial or individual—it is fatal to false. No Jacobin, in his most dithyrambic mood, could more emphatically proclaim the death of artificial privilege, or demand more imperiously a free career for talent, in the struggle for existence, the battle of life. Again, the great question of the day is, as I have said, the social question; and the first and last word of that question is capital. Its solution assuredly will not be found in those Socialistic schemes—the necessary outcome of Rousseau's doctrines—which, Mr. Spencer has well said, amount to this: "To take from the worthy the things they have laboured for, in order to give to the unworthy the things they have not earned." But, as assuredly, science points to quite other conceptions of the responsibilities, of the nature of wealth, than those which its possessors are accustomed to entertain. Thus the great truth of the solidarity of the social organism, governed by the law of inequality, clearly indicates that the public contributions should be levied on assets. The fiscal system of contemporary Europe is, to a very large extent, a system whereby industry is

plundered for the benefit of capital: a system which tends to make the rich richer, and the poor poorer. No more iniquitous tax is conceivable than a tax on labour, intellectual or physical.

“The social organism.” The words may well make us pause. Human society is as truly corporate as the human frame. It may be worth while to consider a little what Democracy has to learn from physiological science regarding this analogy, so strongly insisted on by every light of political wisdom, from the days of “the master of those who know” to our own age. We cannot do better than listen, in this connection, to the suggestive observations of Hartmann :

“Whoever should approach the organism of the higher vertebrata with the preconceived opinion that in it, as in the plant, everything is accomplished by democratic co-operation of cell-individuals with equal rights would, when he considered the intensive concentration of the sway of the higher over the lower elements and of the cerebral hemispheres over the whole, be convinced that he was possessed by prejudice. Whoever, on the other hand, from the standpoint of a one-sided psychology should bring with him the opposite opinion that a single central organ guides and governs all, that nothing happens without its order, and everything happens only as it has been prescribed even to the smallest detail, would again have to be taught by the facts that, in spite of a rigid centralisation for the common interests of the collective organism, and in spite of a certain sovereignty of the supreme authority, this latter is yet relieved of all pettifogging details, because the principle of the *self-government* of subordinate spheres is thoroughly carried out in a remarkable manner. The whole organism is only developed and preserved by the continual self-activity of all the

single individual cells, as the state only by the self-activity of all the citizens ; but the social activity of these individuals is not, as in the simple form of a small democratic republic, uniformly distributed, but graduated in many ways.

“ The individuals arrange themselves in groups or families of the most diverse form, each of which represents a higher stage of individuality, and endeavours to fulfil a higher individual aim ; the groups likewise coalesce in circles, and these into provinces, and the provinces obtain a government of their own through special functionaries. As such a province we may understand the sum of those parts of the organism which are traversed and innervated by one and the same nerve. The magistracy of the provincial government of such a province would be the first centre in the spinal cord (or in the brain), with which the particular nerve comes in contact, *i.e.*, into which it enters or from which it springs. These provincial governments now have further governing bodies, which, however, are only distinguished partially by *local* demarcation from the sub-offices pertaining to them, in another part by *qualitative* separation of their departments like the various ministries within the same central government. Lastly, over these different provinces is enthroned the chief of the executive, who, however, has at the same time reserved to himself a province of his own, for independent work. The various ministers here, however, form no council, but each rules independently over his own sphere ; and although between related provinces direct communication takes place to facilitate common functions, yet the establishment of complete unanimity is not left to their collective agreement, but is assured by the direction which they collectively receive from the highest power in the state.

“ This supreme governor occupies, then, pretty much the position of a gifted monarch, who performs the part of his own prime minister without thereby limiting the spontaneous action of any minister in his own department, or of the president of a republic who disdains being, like a constitutional prince, merely the dot upon the i, and not only reigns, but also actually governs. Thus the organism, as model of an artistic union of guiding-head, independent provincial government, local self-government, and individual self-activity, keeps the right mean between democratic anarchy and centralised autocracy. What this organisation of Nature has

least affinity with, is the constitutional system with its parliamentary machinery and the ideal brutality of its government by majorities. However, it would perhaps be hazardous to reproach Nature that it also has not followed this doctrinaire model, which, until quite recently, passed pretty generally as the ideal of political organisation. It were rather worth considering whether, conversely, our modern political wisdom might not derive a stimulus to fresh revision of its doctrines from the study of the arrangement of the natural organism.”\*

Yes. This is truly worth considering. The study of the arrangement of the natural organism may teach valuable lessons as to the arrangement of the political organism. But there is one thing which it cannot teach : one thing needful before all others : and that is the doctrine of Right, which is the only true foundation of the public order. Where shall we seek that doctrine ? I answer, in the moral law. The very same ethical law which reigns over the individual reigns over the aggregation of individuals in civil society. And its dictates are truths of supreme authority which no gainsaying of the largest and loudest multitude can, in the least, invalidate. It is the fundamental fact, not only of individual life, but of the social order. It is the supreme rule alike of private and public existence : the sun of righteousness illuminating the world of rational being ; and there is nothing hid from the heat thereof. For the great thinkers of the ancient

\* *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, vol. iii. p. 274. I avail myself of Mr. Coupland's translation.

world all duties—*officia*—were included in ethics : jurisprudence was a part of moral philosophy. The masters of the medieval school judged likewise. It is from the time of the Renaissance that we may trace the de-ethicising of public life. Our modern utilitarianism is the logical outcome of its anti-nomianism. Kant has again pointed the world to a more excellent way. For him the State is essentially an ethical society, rooted and grounded in the moral law, of which he finely says that should it cease, all worth of human life on earth would cease too. The very foundation of the public order, as he judges, is the rational acknowledgment that there are eternal immutable principles and rules of right and wrong. This is the everlasting adamant upon which alone the social edifice can be surely established. Rear it upon any other basis, and you do but build upon sand. However fair the structure may seem, fall it must, and great will be the fall of it. To talk of the rights of the isolated individual, abstracted from the moral law, is an absurdity. Such an individual does not exist ; and if he did exist, he could have no rights, for right is the correlative of duty. What I claim as my right, due to me, I first feel as my duty, due from me : an obligation laid upon me by One who is higher than I. Hence every vindication of a right means the riveting of a duty. Every increase of liberty, which is an increase of right, requires an increase of ethical discipline. But where in an age, rent by religious divisions

and stunned by conflicting philosophies, where shall men seek the oracle of that moral law? The wise of all ages are at one in their response. "Lo, the shrine is in thy own heart." "The true Shekinah is man." "The kingdom of God is within you." Under the law of that kingdom we are born: "Thou oughtest and thou canst." Destroy all creeds and all philosophies, and still in the Categorical Imperative of duty there is left the supreme rule, as of religion and of ethics, so of the political order. Make of conscience, with the false prophets of the new gospel, but the crystallised experience of the past, or but a bundle of solar rays stored up in the brain, and, with religion and ethics, liberty, which is the expression of personality, perishes too. For the autonomous *person* has disappeared. In his place you have merely the most highly developed of mammals, which you may class as biped, bimanous, and so forth, and of which that is the whole account: a primat among the other animals, and as incapable as the rest of rational freedom.

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE REVOLUTION AND ENGLAND.

“CONTENIR et régler la démocratie sans l'avilir, l'organiser en monarchie tempérée, ou en république conservatrice, tel est le problème de notre siècle.” \* So wrote Montalembert in 1856. He confidently hoped that in England, if anywhere, this problem would be solved. The past career of our country offered warrants for his confidence. The history of the English people for a thousand years—as I have drawn out at some length in the first chapter of this work—has been the history of the political enfranchisement of classes, as they have become competent to share in the control of public affairs. The present century has witnessed that enfranchisement on the largest scale. Certainly the net result has been to bring our institutions into harmony with the democratic movement which is the capital social fact of the age.

\* *De l'Avenir Politique de l'Angleterre*, 4me édition, p. 38.

That all the changes, whereby this result has been attained, have been sagaciously planned or judiciously executed, will probably be asserted by no one possessed of even an elementary knowledge—such knowledge is not so commonly diffused as could be desired—of the primordial principles of political philosophy. In the extremely peculiar system of party government which prevails among us—the accident of an accident, curiously glorified by newspaper publicists and after-dinner orators, as the perfection of political wisdom—sagacity and judgment are chiefly directed to the acquisition and retention of office. M. Louis Blanc has put it not amiss. “*Petites conceptions, petites manœuvres, petites habiletés, petites intrigues, voilà de quoi se compose l’art de conquérir une majorité dans une assemblée qui dure longtemps. On y arrive à ne plus tenir compte que de ce qu’on a devant soi, autour de soi, et le pays est oublié.*” And to the same effect a very different authority, the late Professor Green, writes : “The question of what really needs to be enacted by the State in order to secure the conditions under which a good life is possible, is lost sight of in the quest for majorities, and as the will of the people in every other sense than the measure of what the people will tolerate, is really unascertainable in the great nations of Europe, the way is prepared for the sophistries of modern political management, for manipulating electoral bodies, for influencing

elected bodies, and for procuring *plébiscites*.”\* As a matter of fact it has been precisely “in this quest for majorities” that the great alterations in the distribution of political power in England during the present century have been made; leaps in the dark, the late Lord Derby called them; taken with reckless indifference to any other consideration

\* *Works*, vol. ii. p. 388. I am tempted to add here certain pungent remarks of Mr. Carlyle, which, buried in one of the volumes of his *Frederick*, are not so generally known as they deserve to be.

“Votes, under pain of Death official, are necessary. You may buy them by money down (which is felony and theft simple against the poor Nation); or by preferments and appointments of the unmeritorious man—which is felony double-distilled (far deadlier, though more refined), and theft most compound: theft, not of the poor Nation’s money, but of its soul and body so far, and of all its moneys and temporal and spiritual interests whatsoever; theft, you may say, of collops cut from its side, and poison put into its heart, poor Nation! Or again, you may buy, not of the Third Estate in such ways, but of the Fourth, or of the Fourth and Third together, in other still more felonious and deadly, though refined ways, by doing claptraps, namely, letting off Parliamentary blue-lights, to awaken the Sleeping Swineries, and charm them into diapason for you,—what a music! Or, without claptrap or previous felony of your own, you may feloniously, in the pinch of things, make truce with the evident Demagogos, and Son of Nox and of Perdition, who has got “within those walls” of yours, and is grown important to you by the Awakened Swineries, risen into alt, that follow him. Him you may, in your dire hunger of votes, consent to comply with; his Anarchies you will pass for him into “Laws,” as you are pleased to term them;—instead of pointing to the whipping-post, and to his wicked long ears, which are so fit to be nailed there, and of sternly recommending silence, which were the salutary thing.—Buying may be done in a great variety of ways. The question, How you buy? is not, on the moral side, an important one.”—*History of Frederick the Great*, Book xii. c. 12.

save that of “dishing” (to use the same statesman’s phrase) political opponents.

And now a share of political power—nominally an equal share—is in the hands of every householder. In theory every one counts for one, and nobody for more than one. In the most delicate and difficult affairs of State the ultimate appeal is to “the yea and no of general ignorance.” It is a momentous change, and has been watched with anxiety by the clearest heads. The Duke of Wellington, that incarnation of common-sense, judged that even so much of it as he lived to see, amounted to “a revolution in due course of law.” Mr. Mill, one of the most thoughtful of our publicists, was profoundly impressed by its grave perils, and thought a system of plurality of votes absolutely necessary if we would attain its benefits “without more than equivalent evils.” \*

\* *Representative Government*, p. 179. As this work is more praised than read, it may be not amiss to subjoin the following extract from it:—

“The natural tendency of representative government, as of modern civilisation, is toward collective mediocrity; and this tendency is increased by all reductions and extensions of the franchise, their effect being to place the principal power in the hands of classes more and more below the highest level of instruction in the community. But, though the superior intellects and characters will necessarily be outnumbered, it makes a great difference whether or not they are heard. In the false democracy which, instead of giving representation to all, gives it only to the local majorities, the voice of the instructed minority

The true defence of the almost universal, and entirely ungraduated, suffrage which prevails among us, has, I take it, been tersely stated by the late Mr. Bagehot; "the nominal constituency is not the real." Indirectly, those elements of national life which are of far more importance than mere numbers, exercise their due influence in the public order. Indeed, in a work published a few years ago,\* I went so far as to express the opinion, that in a country penetrated, as ours is, by the spirit of inequality and competition, there is no danger that fortune and family will not wield their proper power; that the real danger is the other way; that when we consider the balance of mind, the political instincts, the public sense, produced among us by ages of self-government, we may account our wide

may have no organs at all in the representative body. . . . . The great difficulty of democratic government has hitherto seemed to be how to provide, in a democratic society, what circumstances have provided hitherto in all the societies which have maintained themselves ahead of others—a social support, a *point d'appui* for individual resistance to the tendencies of the ruling power; a protection, a rallying-point for opinions and interests which the ascendant public opinion views with disfavour. For want of such a *point d'appui* the older societies, and all but a few modern ones, either fell into dissolution or became stationary (which means slow deterioration), through the exclusive predominance of a part only of the conditions of social and mental well-being. . . . . The only quarter in which to look for a supplement, or completing corrective to the instincts of a democratic majority, is the instructed minority; but in the ordinary mode of constituting democracy, this minority has no organ."—Pp. 145-150.

\* *Chapters in European History*, vol. ii. p. 245.

Parliamentary suffrage as not only safe, but a safeguard, the best pledge of social order.

To that opinion I still adhere. But yet I cannot deny that if I had written in the light of still more recent events, I should have been less confident in expressing it. One of the newest and ugliest features of our political life is the growth of a school professing principles far removed from any which have hitherto been accepted in England. It calls itself Liberal, but it is possessed by another spirit than that which has ever animated the great historic party known by the name. In my judgment, we owe to the Liberal party, directly or indirectly, every wise reform, every beneficial law, whereby our ancient institutions have been preserved and strengthened, during the last two centuries. To the action, the suffering, of that party we owe it, that British freedom has "slowly broadened down" from the Bill of Rights to the last Act for the removal of religious disabilities. But the Liberal party has until now accounted Rousseau the most dangerous foe to liberty. It has regarded his speculations with disgust, and their practical application by the Jacobins with abhorrence. The new school of Liberalism draws its inspiration from Rousseau, nay, openly professes his sophisms, and does not shrink from apologising for the most monstrous crimes of his disciples. It breathes the spirit of the Revolutionary dogma.

Heine tells us, in one of his letters, that an Englishman loves liberty like his lawful wife. But the *doctrinaires*, of whom I speak, seek to persuade him to give her a bill of divorcement, and to take in her place a Goddess of Reason *à la française*.

Unquestionable is it that the new gospel has made a certain number of converts among us, and that not exclusively from the filth of the world, the offscouring of all men, whose enthusiasm for it is intelligible enough. There are among its proselytes those whose characters are unstained, whose standing in society and in public life is assured, of whom we can by no means say, as of the rank and file of the Jacobin host, “*guarda o passa.*” Perhaps we should not err in regarding Mr. Gladstone as the most notable of these.\* It is interesting to observe how this eminent person, once “the rising hope of stern and unbending Tories,” has gradually gravitated to the party of Revolution. There can indeed be no question of his natural dispositions for the new faith. He is fond of claiming for himself consistency in his public career. And, however erratic that career may seem, superficially considered, this claim will bear examination.

“We are changed by slow degrees,  
All but the basis of the soul.”

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\* Of course I do not mean that Mr. Gladstone, like Mr. John Morley, adopts the whole revolutionary *Credo*. We must account of him as “a proselyte of the gate”: as a Girondist, rather than a Jacobin.

That abides. Mr. Gladstone has not essentially altered since 1839. Half a century has but ripened in him those qualities which Lord Macaulay then discerned with admirable clearness of vision, and delineated with no less admirable power of language. As I turn over the pages of that famous essay, and read of "the fatal facility with which Mr. Gladstone multiplies expressions stately and sonorous, but of indeterminate meaning," of "his delight in propositions of vast and indefinite extent," which, when tested by "a very few of the particulars included in them, we find false and extravagant," of his tendency "to escape from the legitimate consequences of his false principles, under cover of equally false history"—I feel that I might be listening to a candid account of his recent speeches. When I am told that "whatever Mr. Gladstone sees is refracted or distorted by a false medium of passions and prejudices," that the doctrines which he advocates are "such, as, if followed out in practice to their legitimate consequences, would inevitably produce the dissolution of society," that the principle laid down by him as to the function of government, will assuredly lead the statesman who acts upon it, "to debase and enfeeble the community which he governs from a nation into a sect," there arises before me the depressing vision of the octogenarian statesman, devoting his last days to setting "the masses" against "the classes," "em-

ploying all his remaining strength in inflaming the worst passions of mankind." \*

The sovereignty of the masses—not the sovereignty of the people, which is quite another thing, for the masses are not the people, nor the most important constituent thereof—is the principle upon which the new school of English Liberalism is founded: the domination, not of the ethical idea, but of brute force. That nothing is sacred against the will of the numerical majority, miscalled the people, that it is the unique source of all power, of all right, that the only real crime is to gainsay its wishes—such is their cardinal tenet. Hence their passionate contention that the wish of the majority ought always to prevail; in ignorance, or contempt of the elementary truths that the only *ought* is an ethical ought: that the mere desire of a multitude of men, however large, is no more capable of giving birth to any *right*, than is the desire of the most foolish of the units of whom it is composed: that the moral value of a majority depends upon the moral value of the elements which constitute it. Hence their apologies for the most cowardly outbreaks of mob violence, for the most flagitious violations of the elementary principles of social

\* *The British Empire and other Essays*, by Dr. Geffcken, p. 290. (Eng. Tr.)

order: \* apologies usually conceived in the spirit of Robespierre's dictum: "Quand le peuple souverain, reprenant les pouvoirs qu'il a délégués, exerce son droit inaliénable, nous n'avons qu'à nous incliner." Hence the declaration made expressly by one of their humbler legislators, and, to say the least, insinuated by the most notable of their leaders, that no one need obey a law which he does not happen to like: a declaration which lays the brutal axe of Revolution to the very root of liberty: "to be free," said a great English judge, "is to live under a government by law." Hence the progress of the doctrine that economic suffering in any class constitutes a rightful claim to State relief: as though it were the function of government, in the words of the comic poet, τοῦ δήμου καταχεῖν ἀρυταίνη πλουθυγίαν, to pour down upon the public, health and wealth with—a soup ladle! Hence the constant tampering with the sanctity of contract—"the very foundation of modern society" †—as quack outbids quack in the House of Commons. Hence the ever-increasing degradation of that Assembly, "a body far too large for united counsel, and distracted in itself by factions, consecrated under the name of party." Hence the judgment of some of the most sagacious and sympathetic

\* "Le vol et l'assassinat sont inclus dans les dogmes de la Révolution," M. Taine truly remarks. *Origines de la France Contemporaine*, vol. iii. p. 197.

† T. H. Green, *Works*, vol. iii. p. 382.

of our foreign critics that—to quote the words of them—"the healthiness of our Parliamentary life" is "undermined,"\* that "our hereditary aptitude in public affairs seems to be departing." These things, not to continue further the dreary catalogue, may well make us fear for the future of England. And yet

"It is not to be thought of that the flood  
Of British freedom, which, to the open sea  
Of the world's praise, from dark antiquity  
Hath flowed, 'with pomp of waters unwithstood,'  
That this most famous stream, in bogs and sands,  
Should perish."

---

\* *The British Empire* and other Essays, by Dr. Geffcken, p. 287.  
(Eng. Tr.)



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